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ABSTRACT 
The emergence and growth of nontraditional lenders in short- and intermediate-term 
agricultural credit markets during the 1990s prompted a number of smdies on the economic 
incentives and competitive strategies for input supply or manufacturing firms to create 
captive finance companies. Comparably, little work, however, has been done on the 
choice of nontraditional lenders from the borrower's perspective. This dissertation 
examines the farmer-borrower's decision-making process in choosing between traditional 
and nontraditional lenders when financing short- and intermediate-term loan contracts. 
The objective of this research is to provide a better understanding of the factors that 
influence farm-level demand for traditional and nontraditional credit. In addition, the 
research identifies factors that lenders could use as a marketing strategy to enhance the 
borrower's acceptance of a particular loan contract. 
The theoretical model describes a joint decision process through which the lenders 
determine the optimal terms of loan contracts, and the borrower selects the most appealing 
loan contract. The model suggests that certain cost and informational advantages may 
allow nontraditional lenders to offer more attractive loan terms or reach riskier borrowers 
compared to traditional lenders. Further, the model demonstrates that the borrower's loan 
contract acceptance decision is significantly affected by the contract attributes, such as loan 
size, interest rate, and collateral requirement, as well as the borrower's socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
An empirical model of the contract participation, or acceptance, decision was 
estimated from data obtained in the 1993 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. The model was 
estimated using a two-stage probit procedure. The first stage involved estimating die loan 
viii 
term variables offered in the lender's loan contract. The second stage involves estimating 
the borrower's participation equation. 
The empirical results support the hypotheses that loan term differentials, financial 
measures and borrower characteristics do have significant impacts on the 
farmer-borrower's choice of traditional and nontraditional lenders. However, interest rate, 
loan size and collateral incentives appear to be the most important factors influencing the 
borrower's decision. In other words, the financial loan terms appear to outweigh other 
socioeconomic factors in explaining the farmer-borrower's selection or use of 
nontraditional credit. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
Production agriculture in the United States is a capital-intensive industry. The 
current $917 billion in productive assets is financed by $769 billion in equity and $148 
billion in debt. Virtually all equity in the sector is retained from earnings because equity 
markets are, in general, not available to most farmers. Therefore, access to debt capital is 
of critical importance to U.S. farmers' operating and investment decisions. 
Over the past 25 years, U.S. agricultural credit markets and institutions have 
experienced periods of rapid expansion followed by severe contraction and stagnation 
along with changes in market composition. For the most part, these changes had their 
origins, outside the agricultural sector—^in the agricultural policy of importing nations and 
in U.S. macroeconomic policies. Nonetheless, the boom, bust, and stagnation cycles of 
the agricultural credit industry draw into question the ability of the agricultural credit 
industry to adequately provide credit and terms appropriate for farmers. 
Now, midway through the 1990s, U.S. agriculture seems once again poised on a 
knife edge between a period of increasing and volatile prices and one of narrow profit 
margins and a lowered safety net provided by farm commodity programs. Against this 
backdrop, access to capital and capital costs and terms assume critical importance. Since 
the mid-1980s, growth in outstanding farm debt has been negligible. Despite this fact, 
however, market shares held by credit suppliers have fluctuated widely. And, despite the 
apparent maturity of U.S. agricultural credit markets, new forms of credit suppliers 
continue to emerge and enter the industry. Therefore, the question of credit supply to 
production agriculture must also include the characteristics and objectives of the credit 
supplier. 
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This thesis examines farmers' choice of lenders or credit suppliers. Specifically, 
the thesis analyzes factors that influence farmers' choice of a traditional credit suppliers— 
a commercial bank or the cooperative Farm Credit System, or a nontraditional credit 
supplier such as a dealer, manufacturer, or an input supplier. 
Most of the work to date on nontraditional lenders has focused on the economic 
motivation for input supply or manufacmring firms to establish captive finance companies 
and these companies' lending activities and competitive strategies. Some key research 
questions in this area mclude the following. 
1. Why do nontraditional lenders offer credit to farmer-borrowers? What are the reasons 
or purposes that induce nontraditional lenders to extend credit to targeted farmers? 
2. How are nontraditional lenders able to acquire and provide loanable funds without the 
financial instruments available to traditional lenders? How does a supply firm perform 
the special fimctions of intermediation within the agriculmral credit market? 
3. Do nontraditional lenders' competitive advantages accrue from a business strategy or 
from the relatively unregulated environment? Or, should policymakers implement 
more strict regulation on unregulated nontraditional lenders? 
Comparably, little work has been done from the borrower's perspective. In other 
words, the economic incentives for a farmer-borrower to select one lender over another 
have not been well examined and analyzed. Therefore, a nimiber of research questions 
associated with farmer-borrowers' selection of short- and intermediate-term lenders might 
include the following. 
1. What motivates farmer-borrowers to select a nontraditional lender's loan contract over 
that of a traditional lender? Which factors provide the needed incentives for 
farmer-borrowers to participate in a nontraditional lender's credit program? 
2. Which choice criteria determine the likelihood of a farmer-borrower's participation in a 
nontraditional lender's credit program? 
3. What do the competitive strategies of nontraditional lenders as manifested in their loan 
contracts imply for the competitive strategies of traditional lenders? 
Examination of these questions can provide a better understanding of the responses 
of a farmer-borrower to different factors affecting his/her choice of a credit supplier and 
the relative influences of changes in these factors on the selection of each credit supplier. 
More importantly, this type of examination shows borrower performance, choice criteria, 
and farm-level demand for traditional and nontraditional credit from the viewpoint of 
borrower-customers and the demand side of the loan market. In other words, this study 
departs from previous works in that it interprets outstanding agricultural debt from the 
farmer-borrower's perspective, or demand side, rather from the lender's perspective, or 
supply side of credit. Thus, the most important feamres of this smdy are its 
microeconomic analysis of credit from the demand side of the credit market and its 
implications for lending activities in the agricultural credit market, neither of which are 
well developed in current literamre. 
Objectives 
This study is driven by two primary objectives. 
1. To investigate why the farmer-borrower is willing to borrow short- and 
intermediate-term credit from nontraditional lenders instead of traditional lenders. 
Specifically, what are the competitive attributes and strategies that potentially affect the 
success of nontraditional lenders from the farmer-borrower's perspective? 
Furthermore, do the borrower-specific attributes or type influence his/her 
decision-making process concerning use of nontraditional credit? 
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2. To analyze the potential implications of the emergence and success of nontraditional 
lenders on the credit activities and business strategies of traditional lenders and on 
competition within the agriculmral credit market. 
Organization of Study 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the 
U.S. agricultural credit market, which provides a fundamental understanding of the effect 
of changes in agricultural credit markets on the lending activities of borrowers and lenders. 
Chapter 3 briefly summarizes the economic activities of nontraditional lenders in the 
agriculmral credit market. The literamre relevant to this smdy is reviewed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 develops the theoretical firamework employed in analyzing of lenders and 
borrowers in the loan contract decision-making process. Chapter 6 describes the 
estimation procedure and microdata used in this smdy. Empirical results and 
corresponding implications are presented in Chapter 7. Finally, the conclusions of this 
smdy and some suggestions for further research are discussed in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT MARKET 
U.S. agriculture is a capital-intensive industry. Farm businesses are heavily reliant 
on credit markets to finance their operations because equity markets are not generally 
available. Therefore, "the agricultural credit market and institutions have played a vital 
role in capitalization and modernization of farm businesses, fmancing the production and 
marketing of agricultural commodities, providing risk bearing services, building rural 
capital, and making other financial services available to agricultural borrowers and others 
in rural communities. The major credit suppliers to agriculture include the commercial 
banks. Farm Credit System, Consolidated Farm Service Agency, life insurance companies, 
merchants and dealers. Commodity Credit Corporation, and individuals" (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, 1991, 1). During the 1980s, the agriculmral credit market and most 
agriculmral lenders experienced a number of strucmral changes due to the farm financial 
crisis. These changes not only significantly affected credit suppliers' lending activities, 
strategies, and competition in supplying agricultural credit, they also affected 
farmer-borrowers' reliance on traditional and nontraditional credit sources. In other 
words, changes in the financial environment and trends in the U.S. agricultural credit 
market affected both the economic activities of agriculmral credit suppliers and those of 
credit users. 
This chapter presents an overview of the U.S. agricultural credit market. The first 
pan of this chapter examines trends and competition in the U.S. agriculmral credit market 
in whole. A more detailed description of the real estate (loan mamrity of ten to thirty 
years) and non-real estate (loan mamrity of less than ten years) credit markets are 
examined in the second and third parts of this chapter. 
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Trends and Competition in the U.S. Agricultural Credit Market 
The agricultural credit market 
Over the past 25 years, total outstanding agricultural debt in the United States has 
experienced a nearly complete cycle of expansion and contraction. Figure 2.1 clearly 
indicates that the aggregate farm debt reached a peak of $204 billion during the period 
between 1982 and 1984 and then dropped 30 percent during the next six consecutive years, 
to $141 billion in 1991 (see Appendix A Table A.l for detailed data). This contraction 
was the result of a numbers of factors. As the tight monetary policy pushed the real 
interest rate up in the early 1980s, rapid increases in capital and operating costs increased 
the financial burden of farmers. At the same time, U.S. farm products were losing their 
competitiveness in international markets. Export demand declined, causing an excess 
supply and inventory of farm products in the domestic market. Many farmers experienced 
sharp reductions in cash flow as production costs and interest expenses soared. At the 
same time, land values and farmers' equity plummeted, leaving many lenders in a 
precarious financial position. 
Outstanding farm debt and extension of new credit decreased as farmer-borrowers' 
repayment ability decreased and lenders applied more stringent loan evaluation standards. 
The major agriculmral lenders became more cautious in supplying agricultural credit. 
Lenders were severely influenced by the growing delinquencies of farm borrowers, 
increasing volumes of default loans or net chargeoffs, and commercial banks failures. By 
the end of the 1980s, more than 300 agriculmral banks had failed, which seriously affected 
sources of funding to the agricultural industry. 
By 1985, delinquent non-real estate farm loans at commercial banks had increased 
to $2.6 billion, from $0.9 billion in 1982. Delinquencies accounted for 7.3 percent of total 
outstanding debt (Table 2.1). One of the most striking consequences of the farm 
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Figure 2.1. Total farm debt outstanding, 1976-94. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
8 
Table 2.1. Delinquent loans and percent of outstanding loans, 1982-93 
Billion Dollars Percent of Outstanding Loans 
Year CB'' FCS LIC CFSA CB' FCS LIC CFSA 
1982 0.9 0.7 0.8 9.5 2.5 1.1 6.4 37.9 
1983 1.5 1.3 1.3 11.0 3.8 1.8 8.3 43.9 
1984 2.1 2.1 1.2 12.1 5.2 3.3 9.6 45.9 
1985 2.6" 5.3 1.7 11.9 7.3" 8.7 15.1 41.5 
1986 2.2 7.1" 1.8" 12.0 7.0 14.4" 17.0" 42.9 
1987 1.4 5.2 1.3 11.8 4.8 9.9 14.3 45.8 
1988 1.0 3.3 0.8 12.5" 3.3 6.5 8.9 49.8" 
1989 0.7 2.6 0.4 11.1 2.3 5.0 4.7 47.8 
1990 0.6 2.5 0.4 8.1 1.9 6.1 4.2 41.3 
1991 0.7 2.2 0.4 7.3 1.9 5.4 3.8 41.7 
1992 0.6 1.9 0.3 6.6 1.8 4.6 3.3 42.5 
1993 0.5 1.5 0.2 5.8 1.4 3.6 2.2 41.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, LIC: Life Insurance 
Companies, and CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency. 
^Fann non-real estate loans only. 
^eak level, 1982-93. 
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crisis is that total delinquent farm loans of the Consolidated Farm Service Agency (CFSA) 
rose to their highest levels, at $12.1 billion and $12.5 billion in 1984 and 1988, 
respectively, or about 46 percent and 50 percent of outstanding debt. The Farm Credit 
System (FCS) and life insurance companies suffered peak delinquent loan rates of 14 
percent and 17 percent, respectively, in 1986. Delinquent farm loans rapidly eroded the 
financial strength of farm lenders. 
Loan losses in the non-real estate farm debt of commercial banks expanded to $1.3 
billion in 1985, or about 3.3 percent of outstanding loans (Table 2.2). As loan losses 
grew, the failures of agricultural banks also mounted due to their less diversified lending 
portfolios compared with those of large commercial banks. Prior to 1983, less than 10 
agricultural banks failed each year. However, 68 failed in 1985, 65 failed in 1986, and 69 
failed in 1987. 
At the same time, large banks took over small rural and regional banks as bank 
holding companies due to the rural banks' solid deposit base and higher cost strucmre. 
Thus, the small local commercial or agricultural banks with less diversified portfolios were 
often replaced by branches of large regional or national lending institutions. This 
evolution likely resulted because large banks with more diversified loan portfolios, more 
efficient overhead costs, and lower costs of capital could dominate the agricultural financial 
market. However, the lower operational costs via mergers and take-overs could be 
negated by higher regulatory costs originating from the financial innovations, which 
increased deposit insurance premiums, limited the amount of insurance offered to an 
insured, or imposed other rigorous regulations for avoiding losses and risk, such as a 
requirement for higher levels of capital for banks. 
Total loan losses of the FCS rose to 2.3 percent of outstanding debt, equal to $1.3 
billion dollars. The volume of life insurance company foreclosures soared to 7.9 
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Table 2.2. Loans losses and percent of outstanding loans, 1983-93 
Million Dollars 
Year CB^ FCS UC CFSA CB'' FCS Lie CFSA 
1983 8 247 77 0.00 1.9 0.3 
1984 900 428 289 128 2.3 0.50 2.5 0.5 
1985 1,300= 1,105 530 257 3.3 1.60 4.8 0.9 
1986 1,195 1,321= 827= 434 3.4= 2.30= 7.9= 1.5 
1987 503 488 692 1,199 1.6 0.90 7.5 4.3 
1988 128 413 364 2,113 0.4 0.80 4.0 8.4 
1989 91 - 5 204 3,297= 0.3 0.00 2.3 12.4 
1990 51 21 85 3,199 0.2 0.04 0.9 13.5= 
1991 105 47 95 2,289 0.3 0.09 1.0 10.4 
1992 82 19 148 1,887 0.2 0.04 
00 
9.1 
1993 54 0 96 1,768 0.2 0.00 1.1 9.4 
Percent of Outstanding Loans 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, LIC: Life Insurance 
Companies, and CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency. 
^Farm non-real estate loans only. 
^Foreclosures. 
•"Peak level, 1982-93. 
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percent of outstanding loans, or $0.8 billion, at their peak in 1984. To increase efficiency 
in serving agricultural credit markets and reduce overhead and operating costs, the FCS 
imdertook a series of mergers and consolidations under the Farm Credit Act of 1987. 
However, the FCS faced higher monitoring and regulation costs in the form of more 
stringent regulations aimed at reducing risk and stabilizing capital reserves. These 
regulations, for instance, required the FCS to hold a higher capital level (7 percent of 
risk-adjusted assets and off-balance-sheet activities), increase insurance to protect 
bondholders against default, prepare an insurance reserve to protect government against 
further problems, and repay government assistance. Therefore, although reorganization 
resulted in a direct cost-saving and costs of fiinds similar to those available to the federal 
government, the FCS still struggled to offer competitive funds due to the higher costs of 
operation. 
In contrast, the CFSA had insignificant losses before 1987, but had peak volumes 
and percentages of loan losses in 1989 and 1990, at about S3.3 billion, or 13.5 percent. 
This delayed response is due, in part, to policy pressures from the government and from 
the CFSA's own administration. For example, a policy was established to restrict 
foreclosures and to defer the realization of loan losses due to budgetary concerns. In the 
late 1980s, the CFSA implemented a new strategy to deal with the large volumes of 
problem loans in its portfolio. "The new strategy is designed to either move loans back to 
a more current stams or get them off the agency's books through restrucmring or other 
adjustments" (Sullivan, 1991, 23). As a result, the CFSA experienced additional losses in 
the early of 1990s and cut direct loans for new lending activities. In addition, budget 
pressure and the proposal of a 20 percent equity participation in the CFSA guarantee 
program by the CFSA administration shifted the CFSA's lending activities from direct 
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lending toward the guarantees of loans other lenders offered. These changes reduced the 
agency's role as a lender of last resort. 
After overcoming this adversity, surviving lenders and borrowers cautiously 
resumed their normal activities in a modestly growing agricultural credit market. Each 
agricultural lender carefully engaged in a different level of restrucmring and began to focus 
on specific segments of the agricultural credit market. The trends in two specific segments 
of the agricultural credit market—real estate and non-real estate credit—^are reviewed next. 
The agricultural real estate credit market 
In this and the following section, changes in outstanding debt and market share of 
major agricultural lenders are examined in the real estate and non-real estate agricultural 
credit markets. Trends in the agricultural real estate credit market are examined in this 
section. 
Figure 2.1 shows that agricultural real estate debt, or long-term debt, plummeted 
from $106 billion in 1984 to $74 billion in 1990, which is equivalent to a 30 percent 
reduction during those six years. This structural change and reorganization extended to the 
beginning of the 1990s when outstanding agricultural debt slowly began to increase, ending 
a six-year period of annual reduction. Trends in the agricultural real estate credit market 
for major lenders are presented in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
The major suppliers of real estate, or long-term, financing are the FCS and 
"individuals and others". Individuals and others (I&O) includes individuals (mostly 
farmers selling on contract), merchants, and dealers. Outstanding debt held by the FCS 
and I&O decreased by more than 40 percent of outstanding loans over the period of 1984 
through 1989. During this period, market shares for the FCS and I&O decreased 
approximately 10 percent and 6 percent, respectively (see Appendix A Tables A.2 and 
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Figure 2.2. Real estate farm debt, by type of lender, 1976-94. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, LIC: Life Insurance Companies, 
I&O: Individuals and Others, and CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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Figure 2.3. Market shares of real estate farm credit market, by type of lender, 1976-94. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, LIC: Life Insurance Companies, 
I&O: Individuals and Others, and CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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A.3). By contrast, commercial banks markedly enhanced their holdings of real estate loans 
throughout this recession period and even overtook I&O lenders to become the second 
largest real estate credit provider in 1990. These facts indicate that the FCS and I&O 
group lost market share but retained their relative importance in this credit market. 
However, commercial banks began to play a more vital role in the agricultural real estate 
loan market than before. This trend probably can be attributed to the higher monitoring 
and regulation costs of financial restrucmring by the FCS following the 1987 Act and to 
the wave of interstate banking and consolidation faced by commercial banks. The FCS's 
higher operating costs, used to repay loan losses, reduce operation risk, and secure credit 
activities, may affect the composition of a loan contract offer. Integration and deregulation 
in the banking industry, which resulted in superregional commercial banks with more 
efficient costs and lower costs of funds than those achieved by small local banks, may help 
the commercial banking sector strengthen its position in the real estate credit market. 
Life insurance companies, historically major long-term lenders, had steady 
outstanding loan volume and stable market share (11 percent) from the 1980s to the 1990s. 
Farm real estate loans held by the CFSA remained steady in the latter part of the 1980s and 
then dropped in the early 1990s. This change may reflect the CFSA's inability to resolve 
bad loans because of prohibiting legislation in the mid-1980s and the shift in emphasis 
from direct loans to guaranteed loans. 
Overall, after the agricultural financial credit crisis, traditional lenders— 
commercial banks and the FCS—^appeared to have a stronger position in the real estate 
segment of the credit market, especially the commercial banks. The I&O group, including 
individuals and nontraditional lenders, tended to slow down credit extension in this 
segment of the credit market. These results seem to indicate that traditional lenders are 
more likely to serve the real estate segment of the credit market. 
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The agricultural non-real estate credit market 
The agricultural non-real estate credit market provides capital for operating costs 
and assets such as machinery and breeding stock. The non-real estate credit market 
declined by 30 percent of outstanding loan, from $102 billion to $67 billion, between 1982 
and 1989 (see Appendix A Table A.4). The volume of non-real estate loans held by 
commercial banks plununeted by about 25 percent in the late 1980s, but their market share 
has steadily increased since 1988 (see Appendix A Table A.5). In the early 1990s, 
commercial banks quickly recaptured loan volume and market share, remming to the peak 
levels of the niid-1980s (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). The I&O group experienced a decrease in 
loan volume and share in the late 1980s, but quickly recovered from the trough. By the 
early 1990s, the I&O group gained market share at the expense of the FCS and became the 
second largest credit supplier in the non-real estate market, with a 20 percent market share. 
Namely, the I&O group is becoming more important as a supplier of short- and 
intermediate-term agricultural credit. 
The FCS markedly reduced its farm non-real estate debt volume and market share 
during 1984 through 1987, but has increased both since 1988. However, the FCS loan 
volume and market share are lower than they were when the decade began. As with the 
simation in the real estate credit market, the CFSA gained loan volume and market share 
from 1985 through 1990 and then lost ground in both areas during the early 1990s. These 
changes again reflects the agency's attempt to resolve poorly performing debt and its shift 
from direct to guaranteed loans. 
The above historical evidence can be summarized as follows: 
1. As large commercial banks with diversified loan portfolios and solid credit 
sources played a more significant role in supplying different financial services, the 
commercial banks group continued to dominate the non-real estate farm credit market with 
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NON-REAL ESTATE DEBT 
1975 
Figure 2.4. Non-real estate farm debt, by type of lender, 1976-94. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, I&O; Individuals and Others, and 
CCC; Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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Figrure 2.5. Market shares of non-real estate farm credit market, by type of lender, 1976-94. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, I&O: Individuals and Others, and 
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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a market share of 50 percent. Further, the commercial bank group significantly increased 
market share in the real estate credit market. 
2. Even though the FCS remains the largest lender in the real estate credit market, 
it faces a number of challenges, such as a less diversified loan portfolio compared with 
commercial banks, the need to repay government assistance from the 1987 restructuring, a 
regulatory requirement to hold higher capital reserves, and higher costs of insurance 
premiums. These factors appear to have hampered the recovery of the FCS's market share 
in both the real estate and non-real estate credit markets. 
3. The CFSA, with half of the delinquent loans in U.S. agriculture, reduced direct 
loans in the agricultural credit market and emphasized on guarantees of loans made by 
other lenders. This change indicates the diminishing role of government involvement as a 
provider of capital to agriculture. 
4. The I&O group seemed to strengthen its market share in the short- and 
intermediate-term farm credit market, whereas it maintained its position in the long-term 
agricultural credit market. Note that the I&O group is heterogeneous and its composition 
is very different between the two sectors. The I&O group is becoming increasingly 
prominent as a supplier of non-real estate credit for agriculmre. The farm crisis of the 
1980s forced some players to alter their strategies in agricultural lending, but it also 
attracted other kinds of lenders to the game. Finance companies, subsidiaries of merchants 
and dealers such as input suppliers, cooperatives, machinery suppliers, and processors are 
increasing their activities to provide short- and intermediate-term agricultural credit. Their 
existing facilities, dealer networks, and expertise may facilitate their ability to extend 
credit. Some major agribusinesses, such as John Deere, Pioneer Hi-bred International, 
Growmark, Farmland Industries, Dekalb Genetics, and Cargill, are currently increasing 
credit activities, and other agribusinesses are likely to participate in the short- and 
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intermediate-term agricultural credit market very soon. Thus, the increasing prominence 
of nontraditional lenders in the non-real estate agriculmral credit market is important and 
can not be neglected in the 1990s. A more detailed analysis with respect to the motivation 
and characteristics of nontraditional lenders is carefully examined in next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
NONTRADITIONAL LENDERS IN THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT MARKET 
This chapter defines and describes the characteristics and economic objectives of 
nontraditional lenders serving U.S. agriculmre. One of the trends identified in the 
previous chapter was the dramatic change in market shares occurring in an ostensibly 
mamre agricultural credit market. Consequently, one focal point for this chapter is to 
clearly delineate some of the potential advantages possessed by nontraditional lenders that 
may strengthen their competitive position relative to that of traditional lenders. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The definition and importance of 
nontraditional lenders in the agricultural non-real estate credit market are more precisely 
and carefully restated in the first two sections, respectively. The motivations for 
nontraditional lenders to extend credit to farmers are discussed in the third section. 
Finally, intermediary functions of nontraditional lenders are described in the fourth 
section. In particular, we focus on how nontraditional lenders successfully engage in the 
extension of short- and intermediate-term agricultural credit, and even compete with 
traditional lenders with a number of financial instruments availabe to use, diversified loan 
portfolios, government assistance, or professional funding agencies. 
Definition of Nontraditional Lenders 
Nontraditional lenders are usually defined as firms that provide credit to their 
customers to facilitate or promote purchases of the firm's own goods and services. In 
agriculmre, nontraditional lenders include input suppliers, local and regional cooperatives, 
machinery manufacmrers, dealers, and other agricultural mput processors of feed, seed, 
chemicals, fertilizer, petroleum, machinery, and equipment. Nontraditional lenders supply 
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credit tlirough extensive and different programs targeted toward specific segments of 
farmers in a flexible and largely unregulated environment. Some nontraditional lenders, 
such as Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Farmland Industries, and Growmark, provide 
product and credit for input purchases for the entire growing season or production cycle. 
Others, such as Case-Iatemational Harvester and Deere & Company, offer 
intermediate-term credit for farm equipment and machinery purchases. Credit provided by 
these firms is extended through formal lending agreements or contracts with specific 
purpose, amount, mamrity, and loan terms. Such contracts significantly differ from the 
normal 10- to 30-day trade or convenience credit. In other words, nontraditional lenders 
are not only dealers who provide goods and services, but also lenders who perform some 
of the same functions of financial intermediation as do traditional lenders. 
The Importance of Nontraditional Lenders in the Agricultural Credit Market 
In the previous chapter, the growth of market share of the I&O group in non-real 
estate credit market was discussed. In this section, the composition of the I&O group and 
the prominence of merchants and dealers is examined more completely. 
Loan volimie and market shares held by nontraditional lenders are not well 
documented. The USDA annually reports the aggregate level of debt provided by the I&O 
group. This group includes individuals, as well as merchants and dealers. The U.S. 
Census of Agriculmre did report actual "merchants and dealers" credit in 1969 and 1978. 
Based on this information, nontraditional lenders held 13.5 percent and 13.8 percent of the 
non-real estate market share in providing non-real estate loans to farm operators in 1969 
and 1978, respectively. This level is equivalent to 80.8 percent and 75.4 percent of market 
share in the I&O category of the non-real estate market. In contrast, the census data 
indicated that merchants and dealers supplied only 0.2 percent and 0.3 percent of real 
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estate credit to farm operators in 1969 and 1978, respectively. This level is equal to 0.7 
percent and 0.1 percent of share in the I&O category for the real estate credit market. The 
preceding results show that the major component of the USDA's I&O category for non-real 
estate debt is likely made up of nontraditional lenders. 
A recent paper by Monke, Sherrick, and Sonka (1992) also shows that 
nontraditional lenders have aggressively attempted to build market share by offering more 
comprehensive and flexible programs. Interviews conducted with nontraditional lenders in 
1991 revealed their expectation that by 1996 loan volumes will be two to three times their 
1990 levels. In addition, several papers (Thompson, 1987; Monke, Sherrick, and Sonka. 
1992; Monke, 1993; Sherrick and Lubben, 1993; Sherrick, Sonka, and Monke, 1994; 
Sullivan, 1991; U.S. Department of Agriculmre, 1993) discuss the emergence and growth 
of nontraditional lenders in short- and intermediate-term agriculmral credit market in the 
1990s. 
Motivations for Extending Credit by Nontraditional Lenders 
Nontraditional lenders extend credit to targeted segments of farmer-borrowers for a 
variety of reasons. However, the four main motivations are to 
1. stimulate sales or solidify market share, 
2. generate profits from credit sales, 
3. make use of information advantages, and 
4. provide convenience for agriculmral borrowers; in other words, to reduce 
the transaction, searching and contracting costs to agriculmral borrowers. 
These four motivations help to explain not only the emergence of nontraditional 
lenders, but also their unique goals, advantages, and benefits for serving specific niche 
markets. A detailed examination of each motivation follows. 
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Stimulating input product sales and Hnancial product (credit) sales 
The original motivation for nontraditional lenders to enter the credit market was to 
enhance sales of company products. Monke (1993) pointed out that credit is a marketing 
tool or promotional device that can stimulate sales and profits of product lines for some 
nontraditional lenders who do not view lending programs as stand-alone profit centers. 
These nontraditional lenders believe the total profits of both manufacmring margin from 
sales of products and credit margin from sales of credit exceed the profits of manufacturing 
margin alone. In fact, by increasing the volume of business generated by offering low-cost 
credit, the manufacturing margin (sales profit) can be used to subsidize the break-even, or 
negative, credit margin as long as total profits (sales profit and credit profit) are higher 
(Sherrick and Lubben, 1993). That is one of the reasons why nontraditional lenders 
without well-diversified portfolios and lower capital costs are able to offer a more 
attractive interest rate than can traditional lenders with more diversified portfolios and 
lower capital costs. 
Other nontraditional lenders operate their credit programs as stand-alone profit 
centers or separate business entities, often as wholly-owned subsidiaries of parent 
companies. Some finance companies (subsidiaries of merchants and dealers) seek to 
increase sales of member companies' products or to solidify their relationship with farmers 
through credit extension. These kinds of nontraditional lenders not only help the parent 
company to benefit from additional sales, but also yield their own profits internally through 
flexible financial strategies. Reinforcing customer relationships is another impetus of 
extending credit. By offering credit, along with financial management and production 
consulting services, customer loyalty and market share may be easier to solidify. Hence, 
by incorporating the credit activity in the total business portfolio, a nontraditional lender 
25 
can improve the performance of the whole business due to the effects of cross subsidization 
and improved or strengthened customer relationships (Sherrick, Sonka, and Monke, 1994). 
Making use of informational advantages 
Nontraditional lenders may have informational advantages compared with 
traditional lenders. When extending "point-of-sale" credit, nontraditional lenders already 
have free and superior access to background information about borrowers based on past 
noncredit contacts, which may not be freely released to traditional lenders. Therefore, 
nontraditional lenders with more accurate and inside information could more effectively 
evaluate the riskworthiness of a credit applicant or facilitate the credit-risk assessment 
process. Namely, the product supply relationship and related information enable the 
nontraditional lender to more precisely determine the best credit contract, interest rate, and 
collateral charged and to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Furthermore, this ongoing supplier relationship conveys information about a borrower's 
current operation and management stams, which helps reduce the lender's monitoring 
costs. In contrast, traditional lenders without this type of relationship may need to monitor 
borrowers more often, thereby increasing the monitoring cost, and to protect themselves 
from default risk and risk of moral hazard. In addition, sharing the information among 
different departments or among member corporations could reduce the informational 
collection cost and result in a cost advantage for credit delivery by nonuraditional lenders. 
Providing convenience to agricultural borrowers 
Owing to the namre of nontraditional lenders, "point-of-sale" credit may be 
regarded as a complement to a firm's product line, providing convenient 
"one-stop-shopping" for product and financial inputs. Obviously, this one-stop-shopping 
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saves the transaction cost of credit applicants at the time of searching for lenders and 
making a formal loan application. In an example mentioned by Sherrick, Sonka, and 
Monke (1994), a potential borrower could obtain a John Deere Credit card in less than 12 
minutes from time of entry into the dealership until the account was created and debited. 
Acquisition of capital in such a convenient way may attract panicular segments of farmers 
to evaluate the credit decision and input requirement decision together. Customer 
convenience is another reason (and a competitive advantage) why merchants and dealers 
extend credit programs in the short- and intermediate-term loan market. 
The Intermediary Functions of Nontraditional Lenders 
This section discusses how nontraditional lenders, despite the lack of various 
financial instruments, well-diversified loan portfolios, and government assistance or agency 
status, can obtain loanable funds. Because nontraditional lenders are not required to report 
information as traditional lenders, the most detailed information concerning the 
intermediary characteristics of nontraditional lenders was obtained through interviews with 
agricultural input supply firms during the summer of 1991 in a study conducted by Monke, 
Sherrick, and Sonka. The major intermediary characteristics of nontraditional lenders are 
summarized next. 
Funding sources 
Agricultural credit markets are highly integrated into the national and international 
capital and money market. Therefore, interest rates charged in different segments of the 
national financial market will directly affect costs of funds to agricultural lenders and 
thereby affect the interest rate charged to borrowers. Obtaining loanable funds efficiently 
and in the desired volume tends to be a critical factor for nontraditional lenders as they 
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compete with traditional lenders having depository authority, government agency status, or 
quasi-agency status to finance low-cost and stable funds. 
The primary fimding sources of the nontraditional lender's loan portfolio are 
commercial paper sold either by themselves or the parent or member company, credits 
with commercial banks, and their own or their parent or member company's equity capital. 
Because most nontraditional lenders are subsidiaries of parent companies, they are not 
large and well-known enough to successfully borrow loanable fiinds by issuing their own 
commercial paper. Therefore, commercial paper sold by reputable parent or member 
companies is a vital source of short-term and low-cost funds. In general, nontraditional 
lenders often pay the commercial paper rate plus a fixed margin to acquire the funds. 
These rates are then offered to borrowers by charging a variable interest rate which ties to 
the prime interest rate to reduce interest rate risk. Credit lines provided by commercial 
banks also represent another source of loanable funds. Sherrick, Sonka, and Monke 
(1994), argued that in this financing segment the credit supplier is a traditional lender and 
that the nontraditional lenders serve primarily as originators. This relationship allows 
nontraditional lenders to borrow "in bulk" and relend to their customers. However, why 
would a traditional lender be willing to offer credit to competitors? This question can be 
explained by the theory of indirect lending, which states that the traditional lender's 
strategy is to reduce the costs of screening the borrower and the costs of lending by 
encouraging higher-risk borrowers to self-select nontraditional lenders. Thus, the interest 
premiums charged to nontraditional credit users are higher due to their higher risk than 
those charged to traditional credit users. Furthermore, the internal funds and equity capital 
of nontraditional lenders or parent companies still serve as a fundamental sources of 
loanable funds. 
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Risk and the security eyaluation process 
The cost of funds and overhead costs are included in the basic loan rate of the 
lender's loan portfolio. However, the riskiness of each loan applicant is also a key 
determinant of the borrower's loan rate. The default risk premium, an additional charge 
on the basic loan rate, is used to compensate lenders for bearing potential risk in case of 
default. Hence, risk evaluation plays a crucial role for lenders in determining the interest 
rate and the collateral or security requirement of each loan contract. 
Credit scoring is widely exploited by nontraditional lenders in the loan approval 
process, but the weights of various factors used in various models probably are different, 
depending on the namre and characteristic of the individual business. However, due to the 
advance information released through sales of input products, nontraditional lenders are 
likely to use this superior information to enhance the correctness of results of the credit 
scoring model and to charge the appropriate interest rate and collateral on a specific loan, 
which could improve loan profitability. In addition, nontraditional lenders can take 
advantage of their existing expertise and knowledge in the agricultural industry to 
efficiently manage specialized collateral and save more collateralization cost than can 
traditional lenders. In sum, like traditional lenders, nontraditional lenders employ credit 
scoring techniques to evaluate the riskworthiness of a particular applicant, but the superior 
access to information may benefit nontraditional lenders in offering competitive and 
profitable credit terms. 
Services 
As the agriculmral credit market becomes more competitive, nontraditional lenders 
tend to provide more complex lines of credit and more comprehensive services. According 
to a survey conducted by the American Banker, service-related factors strongly determine 
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the financing decisions of corporate financial decisionmakers (Duncan, 1991). Therefore, 
like credit lines, services gradually come to be regarded as supplementary and attractive 
product lines. Nontraditional lenders not only provide professional production consulting 
services and lending services, they also provide other financial services, such as brokerage, 
hedging, tax preparation, and financial management advice, which will enhance their 
understanding of and strengthen their relationships with a particular group of borrowers. 
The professional knowledge and expertise owned by nontraditional lenders can strengthen 
their financial services and production consulting services, which are other overriding 
competitive advantages. 
Regulation 
Traditional lenders are restricted or protected by regulations and laws of 
government agencies, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the 
Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, state and federal banking 
regulators, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Congress, who are required 
to ensure the soundness of the U.S. financial market, promote the provision of 
information, and protect depositors. Because nontraditional lenders do not place small 
depositors at risk as do traditional lenders, they are regulated only by property, lien, 
usury, and security laws. Because of their distinct funding sources, nontraditional lenders 
are not required to report the same detailed information traditional lenders must report. 
Traditional lenders often claim one-sided regulatory requirements place them at a 
competitive disadvantage compared with nontraditional lenders. Because "banking 
regulations protect depositors and not borrowers" (Monke, Sherrick, and Sonka, 1992, 7), 
however, the adjustment of current regulation seems unlikely. In fact, the bondholders and 
stockholders of nontraditional lenders and their parent companies bear both the operational 
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(business) and financial risks of the whole business entity. The absence of reporting 
requirements and government regulating may reduce some costs for nontraditional lenders 
and increases their advantages in keeping confidential information. 
In summary, nontraditional lenders' potential advantages due to unique operating 
features, credit activities, and business strategies, such as flexible organizational structure 
allowing internal cross-subsidization and exchanges of financial and information inputs, 
close relationships with targeted segments of farmer-borrowers, and unique market 
strategies, lead to their obvious success in offering short- and intermediate-term loan 
contracts. In the next chapter, these nontraditional lenders' advantageous feamres are 
applied to analyze the determination of a loan contract and the competition of a loan 
contract offering. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study examines the competitive relationship between traditional lenders and 
nontraditional lenders and its implication for farmer-borrowers in the U.S. agriculmral 
credit market. The microeconomic basis for farm-level demand and supply for traditional 
and nontraditional credit can be viewed in terms of an optimal loan contract between 
borrowers and lenders. The contract reflects a number of factors or issues evaluated by 
lenders in their offering decision and by farmer-borrowers in their participation, or 
acceptance, decision. These factors or issues substantially influence the equilibrium loan 
contract and the specific financial relationship between farmer-borrowers and lenders in 
their credit activities. Consequently, the research questions and objectives identified in this 
thesis initially will be addressed by examining the existing literamre on the 
decision-making process of borrowers and lenders as reflected in the loan contract. 
There are several areas of literature relevant to understanding the 
farmer-borrower's selection of a lender and a loan contract. One broad area examines the 
role of information, collateral, and interest rates in managing problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection. Specifically, reviewing the structure and determination of an 
optimal loan contract and the interrelationships among its component instruments, such as 
collateral, interest rates, the borrower's creditworthiness, transaction costs, and related 
information problems, provides a general insight into the interaction between borrowers 
and lenders. A second area of literature focuses on the incentives for firms to establish 
captive finance companies. The literature regarding indirect lending or vendor financing 
further helps to explain the emergence of nontraditional lenders, the strategic differences 
between the two types of commercial lenders, and their relationship with borrowers. A 
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third line of inquiry uses scoring and evaluation models to capture lenders' credit 
underwriting decisions. The literature regarding credit scoring models, widely exploited 
by lenders to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers and to price loans in terms of 
default, provides additional insights into the lender's empirical loan evaluation process. 
Finally, a fourth area of literature, contributed primarily by labor economics, helps to 
develop an understanding of how a farmer-borrower's choice of a loan contract can be 
modeled as a participation decision. These discrete choice models (or random utility 
models) facilitate analysis of the participation and self-selection that occur in the 
farmer-borrower's decision-making process on financing operating credit. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section reviews issues pertaining to 
how information affects a lender's efficient design of a loan contract in the presence of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. This approach explains the interrelationship among 
the component instruments of a loan contract on the basis of different information sets. 
The second section reviews issues about how specific economic and managerial 
characteristics of two different types of commercial lenders affect their lending activities 
and the resulting loan contracts. In the third section, several credit scoring models are 
reviewed to give a clearer picmre of the lender's loan approval and loan pricing processes 
in practice. Finally, discrete choice models are reviewed as a possible way to capmre how 
a farmer-borrower selects traditional or nontraditional lenders as short- or 
intermediate-term credit suppliers. 
Collateral, Interest Rates, and Asymmetric Information 
The theme centering on information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in 
financial transactions occupies an important position in the current literature in debt 
markets. Several initial studies, such as Akerlof (1970), Jaffee and Russell (1976), and 
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), have demonstrated that information problems in credit markets 
may raise the price of loan contracts for some classes of borrowers, change the 
combination of loan contract terms, or even cause markets to break down. To some 
extent, imperfect information characterizes the complexity of the financial relationship 
between borrowers and lenders. Under such a setting, when two commercial lenders 
compete for loans, their distinct credit policy attributes, instimtional factors, cost 
differences, and access to information can result in contracts with imique profitability and 
risk characteristics. These differences also result in distinct utility values for a 
farmer-borrower when selecting an optimal loan contract. In this section, the research 
literature pertaining to the determination of the loan contract under specific information 
regimes is reviewed. 
The collateral pledged by the borrower and the rate of interest charged by the 
lender are two of the most important factors of a loan contract. Traditionally, it is 
believed that a higher interest rate and collateral requirement are usually required by 
lenders to reduce default risk and to generate higher expected returns if there is no 
imperfect, or asymmetric, information. Asymmetric information, in this case, is defined 
as the situation in which lenders and borrowers possess different information sets. So, 
under the conventional setting, collateral has been widely used as a mechanism to secure or 
enforce a loan contract. Specifically, the value of collateral after liquidation determines 
the lender's security margin should default occur. Similarly, the interest rate charged 
reflects not only the lender's cost of fiinds, overhead cost, required rate of return, and own 
interest-rate risk, but also the borrower's unique financial and business risk. However, 
because the literamre regarding asymmetric information is applied to the borrower-lender 
relationship in the credit market in the 1970s, the interactions between the interest rate, 
collateral, quality, and risk behavior of a borrower and the expected remm of a lender 
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differ dramatically from the original analysis without emphasis on the asymmetric 
information issue. Specifically, in the presence of asymmetric information, a higher 
interest rate and collateral requirement may no longer produce a higher expected remm 
and a lower default risk for lenders. Rather, it might attract higher-risk borrowers and 
reduce lenders' security and profit margins. In other words, asymmetric information, 
adverse selection, and moral hazard significantly influence the determination of a loan 
contract package and result in interrelationships among contract provisions that 
significantly deviate from conventional wisdom. 
The basic concepts associated with information problems were first introduced by 
Akerlof in 1970. These concepts and the possibility of market failure were then applied in 
credit markets by Jaffee and Russell (1976). Akerlof modeled the behavior of sellers and 
buyers in used car markets. He showed, theoretically, that when buyers only can observe 
the average quality of an asset and pay average-quality price, then only sellers of 
low-quality goods (lemons) are active by selling them at the average-quality price. Sellers 
of high-quality goods withdraw from the market because they are not fully rewarded. 
Akerlof showed that asymmetric information may distort the transaction behavior of 
market participants. Jaffee and Russell applied these concepts to lending activities. They 
showed that when borrowers and lenders have asymmetric information about the 
borrower's risk of default, assuming that default probability increases with loan size, good 
borrowers are more willing to accept a smaller loan size, which reduces the average default 
rate and lowers the interest rate premium charged, and bad borrowers are forced to accept 
a smaller loan size to hide their high default rate. However, Jaffee and Russell's model 
only considers the influences of loan size and interest rate premium, and ignores those of 
collateral, equity requirement, and non-price terms. Thus, this classic argument reveals 
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that, in addition to price terms, the information problem plays an important role in 
determining a loan contract package through its effect on borrower-lender behavior. 
Another strand of early literature (Barro, 1976) examined the effect of the 
probability of default on several influential factors of the credit contract, such as collateral, 
interest rate, and transaction costs. Barro's paper pointed out that owing to the costs of 
collection and liquidation of collateral and the transaction costs of collateral to the lender, 
there is an asymmetric collateral valuation between the borrower and the lender that causes 
"divergence between the borrower's expected interest rate, the explicit loan rate, and the 
lender's expected interest rate" (p. 455). This paper provides insights into the composition 
of a loan price which should incorporate both the explicit interest rate and the specification 
of collateral, as well as on the impacts of transaction costs on the collateral requirement 
and interest rate charged by a lender. 
These early smdies provide a foundation for two strands of thought—the 
sorting-by-private-information paradigm and the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm. Each 
strand is based on different assumptions of the borrower's risk due to the asymmetric 
information problem in the credit market. By reviewing the relevant literature of these two 
lines of inquiry, the interaction between borrowers and lenders via terms of the loan 
contract can be further understood. 
The sorting-by-private-inforniation paradigm 
A number of theoretical papers argue that, in the real world, the borrower has more 
accurate private information regarding his or her own creditworthiness. In this case, 
asymmetric information with respect to the borrower's quality results in low-risk 
borrowers being required to pledge more collateral but pay a lower interest rate than are 
high-risk borrowers. In other words, there is a negative relationship between the amount 
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of collateral pledged and the borrower's risk. Most of the theoretical papers associated 
with information asymmetry focus on the sorting-by-private-information paradigm. 
The fundamental relationship among collateral, interest rate, and asymmetric 
information was not elaborated in the theoretical literamre until the notable paper published 
by Stiglitz and Weiss in 1981. Prior to their work, the conventional argument implied that 
a higher interest rate and collateral requirement would improve a bank's expected remm 
and security in case of default, assuming no ex ante imperfect information. Stiglitz and 
Weiss, however, carefully illustrated that, through adverse selection and moral hazard 
resulting firom asymmetric information, a higher interest rate or collateral requirement 
could, after a point, adversely produce lower expected returns to banks and credit rationing 
on loans instead of reducing the bank's default risk and increasing the expected remms. 
According to this theoretical framework, an increase in the interest rate or collateral 
requirement in a loan market with imperfect information may (1) attract bad borrowers 
(those with riskier projects and a higher default rate), (2) increase the average riskiness of 
the pool of borrowers ex ante, (3) ration out the good borrowers (those with safer projects 
and higher probabilities of repaying the loans), and (4) reduce banks' profits because of 
adverse selection (sorting) problems. In addition, such actions may (1) induce borrowers 
to invest in riskier projects ex post with higher payoffs but lower probabilities of success, 
(2) push up the default rate, and (3) decrease the remms to the banks because of moral 
hazard (incentive) problems. 
If a borrower's credit risk can not be identified by a lender before contracting, or if 
the borrower's behavior can not be stipulated by the lender after contracting, increases in 
the interest rate and collateral requirement may acmally reduce the lender's profits, making 
the loan supply curve bend backwards when there is an excess credit demand. Therefore, 
in this case, lenders would choose to ration credit. In other words, they would reject some 
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potential borrowers who are observationally equivalent to those who receive credit, even 
though these potential borrowers are willing to pay a higher interest rate or offer more 
collateral. This important research clearly illustrates the complicated relationship between 
the borrower and the lender due to asymmetric information. However, Stiglitz and Weiss 
do not consider the costs of collateralization (transaction costs related to the collateral 
requirement), and lenders are only allowed to vary either the interest rate or the collateral 
requirement for loans, but not both. 
After this influential theoretical paper, several theoretical and empirical studies 
were completed in which lenders could simultaneously choose the interest rate and the 
collateral requirement in the presence of collateralization costs. These studies carefully 
elaborate the relationship between riskiness of borrowers and the function of interest rate 
and collateral under imperfect information and provide additional insight into the existence 
of different combinations of terms of a loan contract. 
Bester (1985), and Chan and Kanatas (1985) developed more realistic models in 
which lenders could simultaneously choose the collateral requirement and interest rate of a 
loan contract to avoid adverse selection problems. Both models arrived at similar 
conclusions that different contracts with various combinations of interest rate and collateral 
requirement can serve as a self-selection mechanism to sort good and bad borrowers. 
Specifically, if the use of collateral is costly, different collateral requirements of different 
loan contracts will be viewed as a self-selection mechanism. Risky borrowers can be 
identified in this case because they are more inclined to choose a contract with a lower 
collateral requirement and higher interest. Less-risky borrowers would accept higher 
collateral requirements, thereby signaling their creditworthiness. In other words, 
borrowers' risk information is revealed to lenders through their selection of different 
contracts, and no borrower is rejected by lenders. These two papers address an important 
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issue for my study. Even though economic agents do have asymmetric information, 
appropriate design of the credit contract by lenders may force borrowers to reveal or signal 
their private information. Then, lenders could successfully classify borrowers according to 
their creditworthiness. 
Besanko and Thakor examined aspects of admissible credit contracts under 
asymmetric information in their two 1987 papers. The first equilibrium result is consistent 
with the sorting-by-private-information paradigm, that is, low-risk borrowers offer more 
collateral than do high-risk borrowers. The second equilibrium result reverses the 
traditional positive relationship between interest rate and borrower risk and hypothesizes 
that low-risk borrowers will receive more credit and pay a higher interest rate than will 
high-risk borrowers. This result shows that a loan contract should be viewed as a bundle, 
so different combinations of component instruments significantly affect their 
interrelationships. 
Another related paper, published in 1987 by Chan and Thakor, explored both 
adverse selection and moral hazard imder two different concepts of competitive equilibriiun 
models: "all rents accrue to borrowers" and "all rents accrue to depositors" (p. 345). Chan 
and Thakor examined the economic role of collateral under these specifications, assuming 
unconstrained access to collateral by borrowers, systematic evaluation between banks and 
borrowers, and no collateralization costs. Under their first notion of competitive 
equilibrium involving "banks competing for loans, with a perfectly elastic deposit supply at 
market-determined bank borrowing rate" (p. 348), fiill collateralization avoids credit 
rationing either when both the adverse selection and moral hazard case occur or when only 
the moral hazard case occurs. However, under the second notion of competitive 
equilibrium involving "banks competing for a limited quantity of deposits" (p. 349) rather 
than for loans, even if full collateralization is feasible, credit rationing may occur in the 
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presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. However, rationing disappears in the case 
with only moral hazard. Therefore, as shown by the results of previous studies, good 
borrowers are inclined to put up more collateral, and collateral provides a means to solve 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
In sununary, the literature regarding the sorting-by-private-information paradigm 
creates a better understanding of the strategies and mechanisms used by lenders to 
overcome the asymmetric information problem and to correctly distinguish borrowers 
based on their different risk levels. The literature shows that by skillfully strucmring the 
loan contract, a lender may reduce his/her asymmetric information problem. In mm, this 
leads to the simation in which the collateral requirement is negatively related to the interest 
rate charged and positively related to the borrower's quality. 
Collateralization costs and access to collateral As previously mentioned, 
collateral can be regarded as a signaling mechanism to reveal a borrower's 
creditworthiness. Therefore, unlimited access to collateral and collateralization costs 
(transaction costs to collateral) are two important factors affecting borrowers' likeliness to 
reveal their private information or distinguish themselves by self-selecting the designed 
contracts. The effects of these two factors on the borrower's riskiness identification, the 
collateral submitted, the interest rate charged, and credit rationing should not be neglected. 
Most of the papers discussing the relationship of a borrower's creditworthiness, collateral, 
and credit rationing either neglect both the effects of limited access to collateral and 
collateralization costs or just incorporate one of them. However, Besanko and Thakor 
(1987) and Gale (1990) incorporate the impacts of these two crucial factors in their 
competitive models, which only focus on the adverse selection issue. 
Besanko and Thakor and Gale found that if low-risk borrowers are unable to post 
enough collateral to signal their creditworthiness due to insufficient wealth, then banks 
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have some likelihood of rationing credit on low-risk borrowers because they can not 
perfectly sort borrowers into different risk categories. One way out of this dilemma, 
suggested by Besanko and Thakor, is the presence of a co-signer who knows the low-risk 
borrower better than the bank does. The approach suggested by Gale relies on the 
presence of government subsidy programs—^a direct or guaranteed loan to the low-risk 
borrower. But Gale warned that if the government can not correctly identify the right 
borrowers (low-risk borrowers) to grant the subsidies as a well-informed co-signer, the 
subsidy program may result in further credit rationing by private lenders, which crowds 
out private credit, instead of improving rationing and efficiency. 
In addition, both papers showed that, in the case of unlimited access to collateral, 
high collateralization costs push up the interest rate charged and reduce the collateral 
posted on low-risk borrowers, but have no effect on those charged on high-risk borrowers. 
However, in the constrained collateral case, collateralization costs only positively affect the 
interest rate on low-risk borrowers. 
These papers reinforce the importance of collateralization costs and access to 
collateral on the loan contract. Because these two factors significantly affect the success 
and usefulness of a lender's strategy and contract mechanism when there is information 
asymmetry, they should not be ignored in the theoretical model with information 
asymmetry. 
The sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm 
Most of the conventional literamre, referred to as the sorting-by-observed-risk 
paradigm, assumes that banks have enough information provided by the applicant to assess 
the applicant's riskiness and the required collateral. In this case, observable risky 
borrowers are required to pledge more collateral than are safer borrowers. The main 
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theoretical work supporting the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm is presented in a paper 
by Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1988), which illustrated that if "the borrower's project is 
observable to both borrower and lender, while borrower effort is only privately known, 
higher collateral is pledged by observable riskier borrowers imder certain conditions" (p. 
24). This argument is supported by the empirical findings discussed next. Generally 
speaking, theoretical work supporting this paradigm is limited. Most current theoretical 
work considers or focuses on the influence of information asymmetry. 
Empirical study 
Unfortunately, although the theoretical literature in this area is abundant, empirical 
tests or applications are limited, due in part to the privacy of banks' credit contracts. 
Berger and Udell (1990) and Martin and Smyth (1991) recently published empirical smdies 
of credit rationing and granting behavior. 
To analyze the relationship between collateral and risk, Berger and Udell used a 
pooled time-series cross-sectional data set, "Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Bank 
Lending," which includes information on one million business loans firom 1977 to 1988 
provided by 460 different banks. The empirical findings indicate that risky borrowers are 
likely to pledge more collateral than are safer borrowers in general, which strongly 
suggests that the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm is empirically dominant. This 
conclusion implies that banks either produce information by themselves or share the 
information with other banks in advance of offering the contract. The results also show 
that the loans secured by collateral are more risky than the loans not secured by collateral. 
Martin and Smyth (1991) empirically tested the Stiglitz and Weiss hypothesis in the 
home mortgage market. Their results indicate that the collateral requirement decreases as 
the interest rate increases up to the optimal interest rate. Beyond the optimal interest rate. 
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however, the collateral requirement increases as the interest rate increases. This finding 
supports not only the viewpoint of Bester, that banks strategically offer sets of 
self-selecting contracts, but also that of Stiglitz and Weiss, which hypothesizes a 
backward-bending credit supply curve. Martin and Smyth's work supports the 
sorting-by-private-information paradigm. 
In summary, most theoretical papers associated with information asymmetry 
support the sorting-by-private-information paradigm, which concludes that low-risk 
borrowers pledge higher collateral but pay lower interest rates than do high-risk 
borrowers. Little theoretical work has been done to suppon the sorting-by-observed-risk 
paradigm except the paper by Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1988). Their paper illustrated that 
if the borrower's project is observable but his/her effort is unknown to the lender, higher 
collateral is pledged by observable riskier borrowers, given certain conditions. Combining 
both strands of thought provides a more complete theoretical foundation in analyzing the 
multi-dimensional nature of an optimal loan contract and the complex financial relationship 
between borrower and lender in a loan market. 
Vendor Financing 
In the classical models of financial and product markets with the absence of 
transaction costs and asjmimetric information, active eaming-driven financial 
intermediaries play no role in financial markets (Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner, 
1988). In the real world, however, the existence of transaction costs and imperfect 
information in the financial market not only provides a reason for the existence of financial 
intermediaries, but also for that of vendors. In addition to traditional financial 
intermediaries, such as commercial banks, vendors (or sellers of goods and services) can 
also supply credit and services to heterogeneous customers. The following literamre gives 
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a clear picture of the motivation, economic incentives, strategic instruments, and niche 
strategy of vendor financing. Reviewing these features of vendor financing from a 
different perspective enhances the comprehensive understanding of the lending activities 
and behavior of nontraditional lenders and their connections with niche market customers. 
Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner (1988) related the emergence of vendor 
financing to heterogeneous customers and market structure. Their model showed that a 
vendor, viewed as a monopolist in the product market, will earn a profit by offering 
distinct terms of the loan contract that attract different types of customers when cash 
customers and credit customers have different reservation prices. Even though cash and 
credit customers have the same reservation prices, adverse selection provides an incentive 
for price discrimination and makes vendor financing profitable for a monopolist. Brennan, 
Maksimovic, and Zechner further demonstrated that the total gain from vendor financing in 
a duopoly market, where two firms offer vendor financing, dominates that in a monopoly 
market. But the profits of a duopolist are less than those of a monopolist. This result 
suggests that vendor financing is advantageous as a strategic instrument if only some of the 
firms with some market power provide vendor financing, not all of them. In other words, 
the market strucmre is shown to significantly affect the emergence of vendor financing. 
Staten, Gilley, and Umbeck (1990) discussed vendor financing fi:om the perspective 
of indirect lending. Their model examined the interaction among banks, dealers, and two 
risk categories of borrowers. Because the borrowers are indistinguishable to lenders, if 
lenders do not screen and sort borrowers, adverse selection will force lenders to ration 
credit. Banks, therefore, could charge a higher test fee but a lower interest rate on direct 
lending. On indirect lending, no test fee is required but a higher interest rate is charged. 
This "two-desk" strategy serves as a mechanism for inducing borrowers to sort or 
self-select themselves and to signal their creditworthiness through their choice of financing. 
44 
The advantage to employing separate desks or locations is that the bank could save not 
only the costs of verification or screening by persuading applicants themselves to reveal 
information about their inherent default risk, but also the cost of loan origination and 
serving when the physical distance between the dealer and bank increases the borrower's 
transaction costs. In sum, the theory demonstrates that commercial banks could implement 
indirect lending to reduce the costs of lending across risk categories and the costs of 
expanding the bank's customer base. Furthermore, "both bank and borrower gain from the 
convenient point-of-sale financing on part of the bank's portfolio" (p. 527). The 
comparison of personal and contract characteristics between direct loans and indirect, 
non-recourse loans, based on 1979 new automobile loan data, indicates that direct and 
indirect borrowers on average have significantly different borrower characteristics and 
contract margins. This result implies that banks do take advantage of the two-desk strategy 
to screen credit applicants, which is consistent with the theory offered by Staten, Gilley, 
and Umbeck. Clearly, their study is helpful in interpreting the cooperative and mumally 
beneficial relationship between traditional and nontraditional lenders if information 
asymmetry exists. 
Sherrick and Lubben (1993) investigated the economic incentives of vendor 
financing in conjimction with the vendors' products. They employed an economic 
framework that included market power, information identification, and internal 
cross-subsidized activities to demonstrate the distinct strategic behavior between pure 
intermediaries and vendor financing units. 
In cases where the vendor has market power and both lenders and vendors compete 
for lending, the vendor finance operation with better expertise in disposing of specialized 
collateral or/and with subsidized manufacturing margins will always be optimal to finance 
riskier borrowers than will traditional lenders. In the case of two classes of borrowers— 
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rich low-risk and poor high-risk— the vendors are able to judiciously set product price and 
terms of loans in order to induce rich low-risk borrowers to self-select cash payment due to 
a higher risk premium included in the interest rate on financing. Poor high-risk 
borrowers, on the other hand, self-select loans due to the unaffordable higher product 
price. The total profits for the firms offering a vendor finance program increase because 
of the positive manufacturing margins generated on incremental sales. Furthermore, 
traditional lenders without subsidized positive manufacmring margins are not able to 
compete with vendors. However, if the borrower's remm distribution is unobservable to 
lenders, then "the credit market breaks down if borrowers fully self-select" (Sherrick and 
Lubben, 1993, 14). But vendors still have advantages in the credit market because of their 
superior knowledge, expertise on collateralization, better assessment ability, and lower 
bonding costs. The empirical "case" evidence presented by Sherrick and Lubben based on 
a farm cooperative's credit program is broadly in line with the theory, that suggests that a 
vendor's loan portfolio is riskier than that of a bank and the vendor's performance should 
reflect the cross-subsidization effect. 
Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992) discussed the competition and differential 
performance of banks and finance companies. Their evidence shows that, in spite of 
heavier capital burdens and the absence of deposit insurance, the success of finance 
companies has been driven by the emergence of the securities market, especially in 
commercial paper and corporate bond markets, and by their business strategy in niche 
markets. As a resuU, the credit ratings of a finance company and a parent company 
significantly influence the sources and costs of funds to the finance company. 
Furthermore, the parent company's credit rating dominates factors affecting the credit 
rating of a subsidiary finance company. Good credit ratings not only lower the explicit 
cost of funds, but also ease large debt issuances in securities markets. Large companies 
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with good credit ratings have dominated the finance company industry through 
wholly-owned subsidiaries and captive finance companies. The niche strategy enables 
finance companies to quickly, efficiently, and profitably penetrate specific markets where 
they have special expertise and information to manage relatively risky borrowers. The 
emergence and success of large finance companies is due not only to their higher leverage 
and lower cost of capital sources, but also to their ability to penetrate niche markets that 
are not feasible for commercial banks. 
In summary, these studies integrate different aspects of vendor financing. It has 
been shown that the emergence and success of vendor financing (or say nontraditional 
financing) strongly relies on vendors' market power, flexible internal cross-subsidized and 
transferable structure, information and knowledge advantages, and the different preferences 
of heterogeneous borrowers. These special feamres, reflected in the loan contract offered 
by vendors, help to explain why and how the competitive strategies used and loan contract 
offered by different lenders are different. 
Credit Scoring Models 
Credit scoring (assessment) models have been widely used by lenders to evaluate 
both loan applicants and existing borrowers. Recently, a number of researchers have 
attempted to apply statistical approaches to assess the creditworthiness of loans. These 
models use "the economic, fmancial and qualitative variables to objectively screen loan 
applications in terms of their probability of default, to price loans in terms of default risk, 
and establish loan loss provisions" (Turvey, 1991, 43). Consequently, credit scoring 
models not only provide some insight into the lender's empirical loan evaluation process, 
but also reveal the effects of the loan applicant's fmancial ratios and personal 
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characteristics on his or her loan participation decision. The following sections review a 
number of credit scoring models widely applied in various industries. 
Stover, Teas, and Gardner (1985) examined the relative effects of various criteria 
on the agricultural loan decision process from the perspective of the individual loan officer. 
The analysis testing the theoretical utility function with multi-dimensional attributes 
indicates that a measure of managerial ability, reflecting the borrower's ability and 
character, and the repayment variable, reflecting the source of repayment, are the most 
important attributes influencing loan approval. The collateral variable, reflecting the 
collateral's liquid and certain value, and the purpose variable, reflecting the borrower's 
compliance with loan policy, are secondarily important. The yield variable and the market 
variable are less important. This smdy demonstrates the order of significant factors 
affecting the loan approval decisions of loan officers. 
Miller and LaDue (1989) developed credit scoring models relating loan default to 
some financial and borrower-specific measures for dairy farm borrowers. Weighted logit 
models, including measures of farm size, liquidity, profitability, solvency, capital 
efficiency, and operating efficiency indicating borrower quality, were used to discriminate 
between acceptable borrowers and defaulting borrowers. Their results show that "larger 
borrowers can be classified well using financial ratios" (p. 22), but small borrowers can 
not. The characteristics revealing a borrower's quality should be identified individually for 
large borrowers and small borrowers. In addition, financial ratios of liquidity, 
profitability, and operating efficiency were found to usefully inform borrowers' quality 
through a credit assessment model. 
Turvey (1991) reviewed and empirically estimated four alternative credit scoring 
models for Canada's Agriculmral Credit Corporation. He found that both qualitative and 
quantitative variables should be considered in the credit scoring model. He also 
48 
summarized that most of the literature applying credit scoring models to agricultural 
lending use measures of liquidity, profitability, leverage, efficiency and repayment ability 
as explanatory variables, such as the current ratio, return on assets, and the debt-to-asset 
ratio. 
Siles, Hanson, and Robison (1994) recently extended a credit scoring model by 
incorporating the dummy business and social variable to demonstrate that "in addition to 
financial variables, the quality of business and social relationships also significantly affect 
the probability of loan approval, especially when the financial strength of the loan 
applicant is mixed" (p. 363). In other words, when the financial stams of a borrower is 
ambiguous, the effects of these relationships on loan approval are strongest. However, if 
the financial stams is strong or weak, the impacts are diminished; namely, "the loan is 
likely to be approved or rejected regardless of the applicant's relationship with lenders" 
(p. 363). This smdy supports the effects of business and social relationships on the loan 
approval decision and highlights the effects of socioeconomic factors between borrowers 
and lenders. 
In brief, financial ratios and borrower-specific characteristics are found to 
substantially affect the lenders' evaluation of a borrower's creditworthiness and the loan 
approval decision and pricing process. However, the extent and significance of these 
factors vary with different industries. These studies provide an empirical specification on 
the lender's formation of terms of the loan contract package in terms of default risk. 
Self-Selection, Participation, and the Discrete Choice Model 
In the previous three sections, both the theoretical economic frameworks and 
empirical econometric techniques used in this smdy were reviewed. These models help to 
explain how traditional and nontraditional lenders' choice criteria are established and 
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affected by information problems, their luique instimtional characteristics, and other 
economic factors. In this section, the literature relating to how a farmer-borrower 
self-selects the most appealing credit contract, given the optimal loan contract packages 
offered by two types of commercial lenders and the corresponding probability of 
participation, will be reviewed. Studies of discrete choice, primarily developed in labor 
economics, provide the appropriate framework for analyzing farmer-borrower's 
participation behavior. 
The discrete choice, or dichotomous choice, model has been widely employed to 
analyze the self-selection, participation, and migration decisions of economic agents. This 
model suggests appropriate econometric tchniques for examining the role of incentive and 
probability in the farmer-borrower's choice of a loan contract. It explains the motivation 
of the agent's decision, quantifies the decision-making process, and statistically models the 
agent's likelihood of selecting a best alternative among competing alternatives. Its 
binary-choice nature perfectly represents this dichotomous participation-nonparticipation 
decision (Bell et al., 1994). However, when rational economic agents select their chosen 
alternative, some econometric problems can occur due to the truncated sample. The 
smdies and methods initiated by Lee in 1978 and Heckman in 1979 are now universally 
applied to solve this problem, usually referred to as selectivity bias. 
Lee (1978) used "a variant of a traditional simultaneous equations model with a 
binary qualitative variable and limited dependent variable" (p. 415) to analyze the extent of 
unionism and the effects of unions on wage rate, which already addressed the selectivity 
bias problem. However, the sample selection bias issue was fully developed and 
elaborated in Heckman's 1979 paper. The simple estimation method presented in 
Heckman's paper "enables analysts to use simple regression techniques to estimate 
behavioral relationships free of selection bias in case of a nonrandomly selected or 
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censored sample" (p. 160). It also can be applied to a variety of statistical cases, including 
sample selection and the limited dependent variable, and to simultaneous equation models 
with endogenous variables. More importantly, the correct asymptotic standard errors of 
the estimators were also derived in this paper. This successful technique is broadly 
extended to handle this double selection problem by a number of current papers, such as 
Vijverberg (1993, 1995) and Osberg, Gordon, and Lin (1994). 
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) exploited this technique, including the decision to 
migrate, remrns to migration, and self-selection, to describe migrant behavior. The 
estimated returns to migration based on comparisons of the anticipated incremental remms 
of movers and those of stayers may cause selectivity bias; therefore, the selectivity variable 
is incorporated to account for the problem of migrant self-selection. Nakosteen and 
Zimmer estimated separated earnings equations for migrants and nonmigrants and then 
used the fitted value of these equations to examine the most significant factors for the 
decision to migrate. Robinson and Tomes (1982) also took into accoimt the self-selection 
process when estimating a model of individual migration behavior by using 1971 census 
microdata. This basic framework has been used with considerable success in analyzing an 
agent's binary decision. 
Chambers and Foster (1983), and Konyar and Osbom (1990) used a theoretical 
choice model and discrete econometrics, based on a random utility model, to evaluate 
farmer participation in the farmer-owned reserve program and conservation reserve 
program. Two categories of explanatory variables were suggested for incorporation in the 
panicipation decision: the attributes of each alternative or choice as perceived by the 
decisionmaker and the socioeconomic characteristics of the decisionmaker. Bell et al. 
(1994) also used a random utility model to determine the likelihood that a landowner would 
choose to participate in the Tennessee forest stewardship program and suggested the 
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incentives helpful in promoting this program. Caswell and Zilberman (1985) used a 
discrete choice model to analyze the factors affecting the land shares of alternative 
irrigation technologies and estimated the likelihood that fruit growers would use alternative 
irrigation technologies in the Central Valley of California. 
This category of literature introduces a fundamental and practical econometric 
framework to approach the center of my research objectives—^why a farmer-borrower 
chooses nontraditional lenders over traditional lenders. This research employs the binary 
probabilistic choice model to identify the incentives and criteria affecting the 
farmer-borrower's loan contract selection decision and the predicted probability of 
participation. 
Summary 
The farmer-borrower's loan contract participation or acceptance decision can be 
regarded as a two-stage decision process. First, the optimal terms of a multi-dimensional 
loan contract are determined in terms of the borrower's default risk by two types of 
lenders. Second, given two distinct loan contract bundles offered by two types of lenders, 
the farmer-borrower self-selects one loan contract over another. The first decision-making 
process can be understood by reviewing the monetary economic studies associated with the 
formation of an optimal loan contract by different types of lenders as discussed in the first 
three sections. 
The first section begins with the current literature, which stresses the significance 
of financial interaction between asymmetric information and the component instruments of 
a loan contract in the credit supply process. A main theme in this section is that the 
determination of loan contract terms is sensitive to asymmetric information problems. 
Namely, information plays an important role in determining an optimal loan contract 
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offered by lenders. Thus, the lender will skillfully design his/her optimal loan contract as 
an information signaling tool. The second section continues the review by examining the 
differential business strategies of nontraditional lenders affecting the loan contract offered 
and competition with traditional lenders. It is shown that the success of nontraditional 
lenders' credit activities can be attributed to their flexible organizational strucmre, unique 
business and market niche strategy, and power in the product market. Empirical analysis 
indicates that the lender's loan approval and pricing decision highly depend on the 
borrower's financial status and personal characteristics. In sum, these smdies offer several 
perspectives on how loan contracts are established by different types of lenders and how 
the lenders' credit contract decision-making processes when providing operating credit 
might differ. 
Given several competitive loan contracts, the borrower will choose the one with the 
most favorable return. The second decision-making process could, therefore, be described 
by a discrete choice model. The discrete choice model literamre, which has been widely 
applied in labor economics, helps to explain the factors motivating the borrower's decision. 
The attributes of each loan contract, such as collateral, interest rate, and loan size, as 
perceived by the borrower, are discussed. In addition, socioeconomic characteristics, 
including financial and personal characteristics, are found to significantly affect the 
borrower's loan contract decision-making process. 
In the next chapter, a theoretical model is developed that describes the lender's 
offering decision in the determination of optunal terms of the loan contract and the 
borrower's selection decision in choosing a lender based on the optimization framework. 
CHAPTER 5. 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
In this chapter, a theoretical model is developed to describe a competitive credit 
market in which risk-neutral farmers can request a production loan to finance a short-term 
or intermediate-term project from two different categories of agriculmral lenders— 
traditional and nontraditional. This model provides a theoretical framework that helps to 
examine the economic incentives for a farmer-borrower to select one lender over another. 
The basis for the model is the determination of an equilibrium loan contract, reflecting a 
number of factors relevant to a lender's offering decision and a farmer-borrower's 
participation decision, in the competitive credit market. The development of the model 
procedures requires, first, that we specify how the component instruments of a 
multidimensional loan contract are determined by two categories of lenders, and, second, 
that we specify how a farmer-borrower chooses between distinct loan contract packages. 
In the first section of this chapter, the basic framework and strucnire of the model are 
described. In the second section, the theoretical model, explaining how a lender 
determines the optimal terms of a loan contract imder a competitive credit market where 
lenders compete for offering loans, is developed and employed to examine the borrower's 
self-selection problem. Finally, the farmer-borrower's decision-making process in 
selecting between a traditional lender and a nontraditional lender is modeled. 
Model Structure 
The initial model is based on several assumptions. There are many lenders and 
borrowers (farmers) in the agricultural credit market. All agents are risk-neutral; thus. 
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there is no aggregate risk, risk-sharing, or insurance included in the model.' The 
borrowers are indexed by i = 1, ..., Z. The lenders fall into two groups, traditional 
lenders and nontraditional lenders, indexed by j = T, N. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
traditional lenders are those institutions that only provide credit to borrowers, and that 
nontraditional lenders are those firms that provide credit to their customers to facilitate or 
promote purchases of the firms' own goods and services. 
At the beginning of the period, the representative farmer-borrower i requests a 
production loan up to an amount Lj to fmance inputs needed for a project. It is assumed 
that Lj can be financed from debt and owner equity. The project will yield a stochastic 
revenue of yj at the end of the period if the initial Lj of inputs is invested, assuming that y; 
is bounded between zero and Y< °°, yj € [0,Y] c 9?+, where 9?^ denotes a set of real 
positive numbers. The variable y; is a random variable with the probability distribution 
F(yi) and the probability density fimction f(yi). 
We assume that after the initial loan interview, yj is freely observed by lenders due 
to the homogeneity of agricultural products. Although the lenders already know the 
probability density ftmction of the borrower's project, the riskiness of the borrower is 
significantiy influenced by the borrower's characteristics, ability, financial stams, and so 
on. However, in view of the literature, nontraditional lenders have superior information 
advantages because they extend "point-of-sale" credit, whereas traditional lenders are 
commonly regarded as delegated monitors, performing information collection and sharing 
roles. In other words, these two types of lenders possess their own informational 
advantages in assessing the borrower's creditworthiness before contracting. Therefore, 
' An interesting discussion by Dowd (1992) concludes that the most reasonable alternative for the above 
universal risk-neutrality assumption is to assume that the borrower is risk-averse but the lender is risk-neutral 
and diversified in loan investments because the risk-neutrality combining with the diversification will cancel 
out the lender's risks. However, if the lender does not have a diversified portfolio, this assumption will be 
awkward and will result in an inverse debt contract requiring the lender to bear all the risk. 
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assuming the necessary personal, business, and financial information of borrower i is 
available to lenders ex ante, lenders not only have the same symmetric expectation and 
valuation of the outcome yj as borrower i, but also are able to perfectly identify the 
borrower's type and then correctly measure the terms of the loan contract charged, 
contingent on a vector of socioeconomic factors.^ 
Let djj e [0,1] be the loan-approval (granting) ratio, which describes the percentage 
of a requested loan Lj approved by lender j. Accordingly, the actual credit extended by 
lender j is dyLj, and d^ percent of the project would be financed by an external loan from 
lender j and (1 - djj) percent would be financed from equity of borrower i. At the end of 
the period, borrower i will pay back the full principal, dyLj, plus interest payment, iydyLj, 
to lender j, which can be written as (1 + iy )dijLi = RjjdyLj, where Rjj = 1 + iy. We 
assume that ijj is dependent on the size of the loan extended, dyLj, by lender j, and 
contingent on the personal, business, and financial stams of borrower i, as vector Wj, 
where Wj indexes borrower creditworthiness. Thus, holding Wi fixed, a larger loan is 
hypothesized to result in increased lending risk and, in turn, a higher interest factor 
charged by lenders. However, holding dy fixed, a borrower with higher creditworthiness 
is hypothesized to be charged a lower interest factor by lenders. Specifically, the interest 
factor charged, conditional on s^i consisting of a vector of socioeconomic factors, is 
denoted as RijCdyLj v^;), where /Sdjj > 0 and SRy /5wj < 0. If the revenue from sale of 
output, y;, is greater than the contractual repayment, Rjj(dijLi|Wi)djjLi, borrower i just 
repays the loan in full, assuming there is no significant effect of inflation for this 
one-period loan. However, if the terminal proceeds of this project are insufficient to cover 
- This analysis focuses on the case where borrowers' types are known by lenders a priori; that is, there is no 
adverse selection problem. If borrowers' types are unknown ex ante, several different loan contracts with 
different terms of loan offered by a lender may cause borrowers to self-select themselves according to their 
risk. In this case, information about a borrower's type is released through the borrower's self-selection 
mechanism. 
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the contractual repayment, default occurs and lender j is entitled to the collateral owned 
and pledged by borrower i. Hence, the proceeds of collateral are used to compensate the 
nonperforming loan up to the value of Rij(djjLi | ffii)djjLi. 
Clearly, the loan has to be secured by collateral against default. The output of the 
project is normally pledged as collateral by the farmer-borrower, and the value of output, 
yj, is assumed to be identically valued by the borrower and lender because they agree on 
the probability distribution of yj. If a very low value of yj occurs, then the lender's 
security cushion may not be adequate. Therefore, in addition to yj requested as collateral, 
a lender may require other assets be held by the borrower as a secondary source of 
collateral. Let Cy denote the value of additional collateral and Cy denote the total value of 
collateral, yj + Cy, pledged by borrower i. We assimie that there is no divergence in 
lender-borrower evaluation of the total value of the collateral. 
After a series of credit analyses on borrower i, lender j will offer a loan contract 
characterized by (djj, Cy). Borrower i chooses only the loan contract, that maximizes 
his/her expected return among those offered by different lenders. The model describing 
the farmer-borrower's and lender's decision-making processes is developed next. 
The Lender's Problem 
The most crucial decisions a lender makes is whether to approve a given loan 
request and how the loan should be strucmred. As mentioned previously, although the 
lender already knows the riskiness of the project, the borrower's characteristics, 
management, and financial stams still significantly influence the success of the project. 
Lenders are assumed to be capable of perfectly screening the borrower's type and correctly 
forming the conditional expectation of yj ex ante, contingent on a creditworthiness index 
Wj, which represents a vector of influential factors. The borrower is also assumed to be 
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able to make these decisions. Let f(yil Wj) be the conditional probability density function 
for yj, given level j^i. In addition, py denotes the lender's costs of ftinds, which are 
exogenously determined. Normally, py is composed of the direct costs of fimds, the 
required rate of return, and other administrative or overhead costs expressed in percentage 
terms. 
Using collateral to secure the loan, or enforce the contract, results in 
collateralization costs for the lender, such as legal fees, administrative costs, and other 
costs required to transfer property rights from the defaulting borrower to the lender. Let 
<Dy(Cjj) denote the collateralization cost paid by lender j with respect to borrower i's 
collateral, where 0^(0) = 0 and <I>'ij(Cjj) > 0. In addition, borrower i's probability of 
default associated with lender j's loan contract, Py, is assumed to be described by 
which shows that a higher loan-approval ratio or interest rate may increase the borrower's 
probability of default. 
Furthermore, 
(5.1) 
where pr  denotes probability and Sy denotes Ry(dyLi |ffii)dyLi. Thus, 
dyLr]f(5y|w,)>0 (5.2) 
5 Py 5 R, d y  f s .  d  f ( y i |w . )  
^d. L f(5..|w.)-i- I 'r— ' ' ]dy. < 0 (5.3) 5 Wj 5 w. 
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The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (5.3) is negative because a higher index of 
borrower creditworthmess reduces the interest rate charged by lenders based on the 
assumption above. The second term is the marginal effect of a change in the 
creditworthiness index on the conditional probability density function of yi when the loan is 
not performing. A borrower's probability density function of nonperformance decreases, 
when his/her creditworthiness increases, which results in a negative sign of the second 
term. Therefore, a farmer-borrower with higher creditworthiness is inclined to have a 
lower probability of default. 
The competitiye credit market 
In a perfectly competitive credit market, competition among lenders generates a 
zero-profit contract to each lender. We assume that lenders compete to offer loans and 
face a perfectly elastic deposit supply schedule at some (exogenously given) 
market-determined borrowing rate from a capital market, which affects lenders' costs of 
capital. Therefore, the lender's optimization problem in a competitive credit market is to 
choose loan contract terms at his/her break-even level under the instimtional constraint that 
the proceeds of total collateral available to him/her are limited to the accrued principal plus 
interest payment. Specifically, if the revenue of a project is greater than the contracmal 
repayment (i.e., yj > 5^), the borrower pays in fiill and there is no default. If the project 
fails (i.e., y; < 5jj), the borrower defaults and collateralization costs apply to the lender. 
Then, two cases should be discussed. 
First, if the total collateral, yj + Cy, is less than the contracmal repayment, 5jj, when 
the borrower defaults, the lender can claim all the collateral assets, yj + Cy, that have been 
pledged by the borrower. Second, if the total collateral is greater than the contracmal 
repayment (i.e., Cy > 6ij), the lender only has access to the collateral up to the loan and 
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accraed interest payment (i.e., Sy). However, in both cases, the lender must pay the 
collateralization costs used to take possession of and liquidate the corresponding collateral. 
Technically, the optimal loan contract characterized by (dy, Cy) for borrower i offered by 
lender j must solve^ 
The left-hand side of Eq. (5.4) represents ±e lender's expected profit, which equals the 
expected value of the liquidated collateral net of collateralization costs in case of default, 
plus the probability of nondefault times the full repayment. The right-hand side of 
Eq. (5.4) represents total costs of funds to the lender. Consequently, Eq. (5.4) describes 
an equilibrium condition that each lender earns zero expected profits. It also states that, in 
the case of default, the lender can take only the assets of the defaulting borrower that have 
been pledged as collateral. That is, the lender only has access to collateral which is limited 
to the amount of the loan and accrued interest repayment.Moreover, Eq. (5.4) can be 
rewritten as 
^ The value of the collateral requirement charged may be lower than the contractual repayment. However, if 
the lender can provide several different zero-profit loan contracts with different combinations of djj and Cy, 
he/she may only offer the one with a value equal to the collateral and contractual payment to avoid any 
associated risk. Therefore, the equality setting dominates that of inequality. 
* Throughout the analysis, we assume that the collateralization costs are paid by the lender, not by the 
borrower, so that collateralization costs are not explicitly incorporated into the torrower's default-nondefault 
decision. If the collateralization costs were incorporated, the equilibrium value of collateral assets required 
by the lender would be larger than the accrued payment, which is not economically or empirically admissible. 
However, note also that the collateralization costs are already implicitly reflected in the equilibrium interest 
factor and additional collateral charged by the lender ex ante through the break-even Eq. (5.4). Thus, this 
setting is consistent with the definition of instimtional limitation. 
f''''l>i + S-®,/C,j)]f{yJw,)dy,+f" [5,-<I>,j(5,)]f(yJw,)dy, 
(5.4) 
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Jo"'"[yi + Cij]f(yi|w,)dyi+ 5ijf(yi|W;)dyi 
U Oij-Cy 
- Jo""'"<I>ij(Cij)f(yi|Wi)dyi- I'" Oij(5ij)f(yi|w.)dyi 
= d,L,(l+Pij) 
(5.5) 
This equation specifies the structural characteristics of the lender's problem in a 
competitive credit market. Because there are two unknown variables in one equation, 
numerous optimal interest factors are generated, each of which accompanies an optimal 
collateral requirement in a manner that satisfies Eq. (5.5). The multiple solutions of 
Eq.(5.5), or the multiple optimum values of dy and Cy, provide the multiple simultaneous 
solutions to the lender's optimization problem. Consequently, there are numerous loan 
contracts with different combinations of loan-approval ratios, interest factors, collateral 
requirements, and collateralization costs. Each of these loan contracts generates zero 
profits for the lender. Specifically, Eq. (5.5) shows that the optimal djj and Cy are 
parameterized by [Lj, py, f(yi|Wi), <l>ij(-), Rij( )]- At the same time, the optimum interest 
factor to request, Rij(-), and the optimum collateralization costs to employ, <I)jj( ), by lender 
j are also simultaneouly determined and parameterized by [Lj, py, f(yi| Wj), <Dij( ), Rij( )]. 
Therefore, the implicit solutions to Eq. (5.5) provide the loan supply curve of lender j and 
also generate different optimal zero-profit loan contracts with various combinations of 
(dij, Cjj) parameterized by [Lj, py, f(yilwi), (DyC-), Rij(-)]. 
In order to simplify the analysis and exposition, we assiune <I>ij(yi + Cy) = 
<t'ij (yi + Cy), where (j)y > 0, and therefore 0'y(yi 4- Cy) = (|)y. The collateralization factor, 
or marginal collateralization cost, (j)y, is treated as a nonstochastic parameter measuring the 
collateralization cost per dollar of collateral pledged. Accordingly, Eq. (5.5) can be 
simplified as 
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f'""(yi + Cij)f(yi|Wi)dyi+ 5ijf(yi|Wj)dyi 
U Ojj-Cij 
-<t»ij[Jt"'"(yi + Cij)f(yi|Wi)dyi+ I '" 5ijf(yil:w,)dyJ 
u Ojj-Sj 
= (l-<l>ij)[f" '"(yi + Cij)f(yi|Wi)dyi+ f" 6yf(yi|Wi)dyJ+ FSij f(yi|Wi)dyi 
= d,LKl+p,) 
(5.6) 
The solutions to Eq. (5.6) determine multiple optimal zero-profit loan contracts, where dy 
and Cjj are parameterized by [Lj, py, (l>jj, f(yi |sii), Rij( )], in this simplified case. Equation 
(5.6) may be fiirther explained as follows. 
If <j)y = 1 and djj ^ 0, the optimal values of dy for which expected profits are zero 
satisfies 
Namely, if the collateralization factor is equal to one, that is, the total collateralization 
costs are equivalent to the value of collateral, the optimal loan contract will be extended 
until the product of the corresponding interest factor and the probability of nondefault is 
equal to one plus the costs of funds. Accordingly, the optimal interest rate charged by the 
lender is higher than his/her costs of funds, Rjj > 1 + Py, because the probability of 
nondefault is less than one. The intuition is that if collateral plays no role in benefiting the 
lender against default owing to higher collateralization costs, the lender will take advantage 
of the interest rate instrument to avoid any losses. 
If <{»ij > 1 and djj ^ 0, then we obtain 
(5.7.1) 
(5.7.2) 
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Thus, the interest rate charged to the borrower is significantly larger than the lender's costs 
of funds in order to compensate for losses originating from liquidation of collateral. 
If <j)ij < 1 and dij 56 0, the multiple optimal dy and Rjj offered by the lender satisfy 
Eq. (5.6), still with Ry > 1 + py, due to the existence of collateralization costs. In sum, 
the interest rate charged on the borrower is universally higher than the costs of funds to the 
lender due to collateralization costs. 
The marginal rate of substitution between dy and Cy for optimal loan contracts 
offered by lender j to borrower i is given by 
dd^ .  (l-<l>ij)Jo'"' 'f(yil:w.)dyi 
dc , .  ~ X[(j)ySyf(5y|Wi)+(l)yl®;^f(yi|Wj)dyi-{^.,^.f(yi|w.)dyi]+Li(l+ p^) 
(5.8) 
where A, = RyL; + dyLf >0. The value of X represents the margmal effect of dy on 
o  djjLj 
the contractual repayment 6y. This substitution rate will vary with the values of dy and Cy. 
The sign of ddjj /dcy is ambiguous. If <|)y <, =, and > 1, then the numerator is 
positive, zero, and negative, respectively. If A, f(yi|Wj)dyi is less (greater) than the 
sum of the other terms of the denominator, then the denominator is positive (negative). In 
other words, if the probability of the lender obtaining adequate repayment is less (greater) 
than the sum of the expected interest payment weighted by the collateralization factor, 
where the expected collateralization factor when the loan is nonperforming but adequate to 
pay the contractual payment and total costs of funds divided by the marginal effect of dy on 
6jj, then the denominator is positive (negative). In the case when <{>y < 1 and the 
denominator is positive, ddy /cfcy is positive. The positive sign implies that a higher 
collateral requirement accompanies a larger loan size. In other words, an increase in the 
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loan size extended will cause a lender to charge a higher collateral requirement. 
Moreover, a higher collateralization factor may result in a lower positive substimtion rate 
between dy and Cjj, and may even cause a negative marginal rate of substimtion between d^ 
and Cjj if <j)jj > 1. The effects of different characteristics of traditional and nontraditional 
lenders derived from Eq. (5.6) are further analyzed and discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The marginal effect of the collateralization factor on the loan-approval ratio 
Consider the impact on dy of a change in (j)ij, holding Lj, p^, Cy, and parameters of 
Rjj( ) fixed. Implicit differentiation of Eq. (5.6) yields 
dd , ^  J " o ( y  i  +  C j j )  f (  Y i  I  W j )  dy ,  +  5 jj f( y ^ | w.) dy^ 
~ f(yilWi)dyi-(|)ij5ijf(5ij |w.)-<t)JJ;^ f(yi|Wi)dyJ-Li(l+ p^^) 
(5.9.1) 
Since the numerator is positive, as long as A, ^ f( yi] w i) dyi is less than the sum of other 
terms of the denominator, the sign of ddy / d^  y is negative, that is, dy decreases with (j)y. 
This fact indicates that an increase in the collateralization factor will cause a lender to 
grant a smaller percentage of requested loans, which results in a lower interest rate 
charged. If X f(yi| wi)dyi is larger than the sum of the other terms of the 
5 ij-Cij 
denominator, the positive dd^^ /d(t)y implies that a larger loan will be granted to compensate 
for higher collateralization costs. 
On the other hand, a nontraditional lender usually is more capable of disposing of 
specialized collateral through existing facilities and expertise than is a traditional lender. 
Holding other variables fixed, a higher (j)iT may cause djj to be less than dj^ if die sign of 
rfdy /i/(j)y is negative. Namely, a nontraditional lender could extend a larger loan to the 
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same type of borrower than could a traditional lender due to the nontraditional lender's 
lower collateralization factor. Or, a traditional lender could offer less credit (i.e., 
diN > djx) and charge a corresponding lower interest factor based on a smaller loan size 
extended and a higher collateralization factor. 
Furthermore, 
Jw, +Cij)f(yi|w,)dyi + 5,jf(y,|w.)dy 
(5.9.2) 
The numerator is positive. If (t)ij < 1, then the denominator is positive because, first, the 
sum of the decreased probability of default when Wj increases equals the increased 
probability of performance, and, second, repayment when the loan defaults is less than or 
equal to repayment when the loan performs. Therefore, dsL\ ld^\y is positive, implying that 
lenders with higher collateralization costs are likely to lend to less-risky borrowers. 
Moreover, if djT = dhN, PiT = PhN^ Rit = and the parameters of Rix(-) equal those of 
RhN( ) but Wj a nontraditional lender with a lower collateralization factor could lend 
to a more risky borrower h compared with a less risky borrower i compared with a 
traditional lender (i.e., Wj > In other words, if two types of lenders offer identical 
terms of loan contract, a nontraditional lender should be able to reach a high-risk borrower 
because of the nontraditional lender's lower collateralization factor. Or, say, a less risky 
borrower is more likely to finance operating fimds firom a nontraditional lender than is a 
traditional lender if other terms of contract offered by the two types of lenders are 
identical, such as services and monitoring criteria. If the sign of ^/dy is positive, the 
opposite conclusion could be drawn. That is, nontraditional lenders are only able to extend 
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a smaller loan, charge a lower interest rate, and reach a less risky borrower than are 
traditional lenders. 
The marginal effect of the collateralization factor on the collateral requirement 
To examine the effect of a change of on Cy, taking the derivative of Eq. (5.6) 
with respect to Cy and (jjy generates 
d  Cy Jq(yi + Cjj) f( Yi Iw.) dyi + . 5 ijf( yj |w.) dy, 
(yj + Cij)f(yi|Wi)dyi+ 4';^S ijf(yi|w,)dyi 
^<t>ij '  J?'" ' '  f(yi|Wi)dyi 
(5.9.3) 
> 0 (5.9.4) 
The sign of cfcy is positive (negative) if (t)ij is less (greater) than 1 and rf^Cy /rf<t)y" > 0. 
So, the impact of an increase of (l)y on Cy is significantly influenced by collateralization 
costs. Specifically, if the collateralization factor is less than 1, Cy increases with (j)y, and 
the marginal rate is increasing. This statement implies that higher collateralization costs 
will push up the collateral requirement charged by the lender. The larger the 
collateralization factor, the larger the collateral requirement requested. Furthermore, the 
marginal rate between Cy and ((>y is increasing as (jjy increases. However, if the 
collateralization factor is greater than 1, the collateral requested by the lender will decrease 
with collateralization costs. This relationship shows that if the value of collateral is not 
sufficient to pay the collateralization costs, the lender will reduce the collateral requested 
as collateralization costs are higher. The negative marginal rate is increasing as <i)y 
increases. 
In the case that (j)y < 1, a nontraditional lender with lower collateralization costs is 
able to charge a lower collateral requirement on the same type of borrowers than is a 
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traditional lender, holding other variables fixed. In other words, a traditional lender may 
need to request a higher collateral requirement due to his/her higher collateralization costs. 
The mar^nal effect of costs of funds on the loan-approval ratio We now 
examine the effect on dy of a change in py, holding other variables and parameters of Rij( ) 
fixed. Differentiating Eq. (5.6) with respect to dy and pjj results in the condition 
^ 
^P i j  f ( y i lWi )dy i - ( t ) i j 5 i j f (5y lWj ) - ( t ) y f ; ^  f ( y i |Wj )dy i ] -L i ( l+  p- , - )  
(5.10.1) 
d^jLf 
^Pij '  f(yilWi)dyi-(t)ij5ijf(5ij |Wi)-(|)ijf;^ f(yi|Wi)dyJ-Li(l+ p^j)}' 
(5.10.2) 
For Eq. (5.10.1), the mraierator is positive and the denominator is ambiguous. If 
^ I f( y'l wi)dyi is less (greater) than the sum of the other terms of the denominator, the 
O ij-Cij 
sign of ddjj /rfpy is negative (positive). Obviously, rf^dy /dp;/ > 0. Thus, if py is 
positively (negatively) correlated with dy, higher costs of funds could result in a larger 
(smaller) size of loan extended. The marginal rate of the effect of py on dy is increasing, 
implying that the marginal effect of py on dy increases as py increases. 
In fact, traditional lenders report lower average costs of funds than do 
nontraditional lenders, in part due to their ability to acquire low-rate insured deposits and 
10 maintain more diversified loan portfolios (Remolona and Wulfekuhler, 1992). 
However, traditional lenders' advantages in borrowing costs may be offset by regulatory 
costs, such as the costs of required reserves, deposit insurance premiums, and a higher 
capital requirement. On the other hand, because some nontraditional lenders treat credit as 
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a marketing tool or promotional device to stimulate sales and profits, the manufacmring 
margin from sales of a product can be used to cross-subsidize the lending margin. Thus, 
after considering the effect of cross-subsidization, nontraditional lenders may have a 
substantial advantage in costs of funds even though their borrowing costs are higher than 
those of traditional lenders. Specifically, holding <j)ix = <t)iN, we find nontraditional lenders 
wi± lower costs of fiinds are capable of offering a larger loan, that is, djN > djx if /rfpy 
is negative. If the parameters of RiT( ) equal those of RiN( ), a stronger result, Rjn > R^t, 
can be obtained. 
Moreover, 
(iW: dijLi 
(5.10.3) 
The niraierator is positive, and if ((jy < 1, then the denominator is positive. Therefore, 
dWj /Jpij is negative. Namely, if djj = dhN, <l)iT = 'I'hN' Rit = the parameters of 
Rjx(-) equal those of RhN(*) but Wj ^ w^^ we easily show that a nontraditional lender with 
lower costs of funds could more easily lend to high-risk borrowers compared with a 
traditional lender if both types of lenders offer identical loan contracts. In brief, the above 
analysis partly explains why nontraditional lenders without advantageous borrowing costs 
and a diversified loan portfolio may be able to reach high-risk borrowers. If £?dij /c/py > 0, 
the opposite conclusion that nontraditional lenders may offer a smaller loan and reach 
lower-risky borrowers could be drawn. 
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The marginal effect of costs of funds on the loan-approval ratio Now, we 
coosider the impact of py on Cy, that is, the effect of an increase in the costs of funds on 
the collateral charged. Taking a derivative of Eq. (5.6) with respect to py and Cy yields 
d C:= dijL: 
- = JT-^  (5.10.4) 
<^Pij (l-<t>ij)£" "f(yilWi)dyi 
The sign of <fcy /dpy depends on the value of (j)y. If (j)y < 1, a lender with higher costs of 
funds will increase the collateral requested. If <i)y > 1, the collateral requirement 
decreases witii py. Similarly, under the general case that <t)y < 1, if a nontraditional lender 
has advantages in costs of fimds due to the cross-subsidization effect, he/she may request a 
smaller collateral requirement than would a traditional lender. 
The marginal effect of the creditworthiness index on the loan-approval ratio 
Consider the impact on dy of a change in Wj, holding Lj, Cy, py, (j)y, and parameters 
of Ry( ) fixed. Implicit differentiation of Eq. (5.6) yields 
^d.. L f ' j J l -O  m)  yx  y , i  5,j .J 
f(yi|Wi)dyi-(t)ij5yf(6ylWj)-<l)yJJ^,^. f(yi|Wi)dyi]-Li(l+ 
(5.11.1) 
In the case that (t)y < 1 and the denominator is negative, ddy /rfw; is positive, which implies 
that a farmer-borrower with higher creditworthiness is likely to be granted a larger size of 
loan and a farmer-borrower with lower creditworthiness is likely to be granted a smaller 
size of loan. 
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The marginal effect of the creditworthiness index on the collateral requirement 
Now, examine the impact on Cy of a change in wj, holding Lj, dy, py, (t)jj, and 
parameters of Rij(-) fixed. Implicit differentiation of Eq. (5.6) yields 
rfs.-cS f(yi|Wi) p,, ,  5f(yi|w.) fY- 5f(y;lw.) J [Jq — ^(yi + Cii)dy;+JsV. Oil— ^aViJ + jR Oh— dv-dc- 5 Wj 'J 5,1-v.,,  'J 0 w. " ^ 5 Wj 
d ^ , ~  f ' " "  f ( y , | w . ) d y i  
(5.11.2) 
The numerator and denominator are positive, so rfcy /fifwj is negative, which implies that 
the collateral requirement charged by the lender may decrease as the creditworthiness 
index increases. In other words, lower collateral is pledged by an observably less-risky 
farmer-borrower and higher collateral is pledged by an observably more-risky 
farmer-borrower, given certain conditions. 
In sum, the above analyses show that an increase in collateralization factor or costs 
of fimds results in a smaller loan extended by lenders. In addition, so long as ({>ij < 1, an 
increase in collateralization factor or costs of funds leads to a higher collateral 
requirement. Moreover, a nontraditional lender may offer a larger size of loan, lend to 
high-risk borrowers, and require less collateral requirement if he/she has a competitive 
advantage in disposing of collateral pledged by borrowers or in taking advantage of the 
cross-subsidization effect. In addition, a higher creditworthiness index of a 
farmer-borrower may increase the size of a loan granted by the lender and decrease the 
collateral requirement requested by the lender if there is no asymmetric information. 
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Monitoring costs 
In the above setting where f(yi | Wi) is known by lenders a priori and lenders have 
perfect conditional expectations as to outcome y^, the contracting problem is not influenced 
by the borrower's behavior or action after the transaction. However, if the outcome 
f(yil Wi) is not freely observed by lenders without some costs, it is likely that the borrower 
will change his/her behavior or action after contracting. Such behavior may result in a 
higher default rate and suboptimal loan contracts offered by lenders ex ante. 
Therefore, if f(yilsii) is not freely observed, the lender will have a commitment to 
monitor the borrower's action after contracting. Monitoring may include periodic 
reporting of business information or making farm visits to prevent slacking, changing 
behavior, changing the status and purpose of the loan, or other actions that might increase 
the probability of default. In other words, the purpose of monitoring after contracting is to 
ensure that the borrower's behavior and the purpose and stams of the loan are consistent 
with the loan contract anticipated and charged by the lender ex ante. The monitoring 
actions would attempt to lower the ex post default rate or riskiness of the project to some 
anticipated level, but not to increase costs by attempting to improve the anticipated 
distribution (increase mean or reduce variance) of the project. Such action is unnecessary 
because the lender already charged the loan terms and monitoring costs ex ante based on 
the anticipated level of lending risk. Hence, the terms of a loan contract definitely should 
incorporate monitoring costs ex ante, and more importantly the lender could reduce his/her 
own risks and the likelihood of moral hazard by monitoring the borrower at the borrower's 
expense. 
Let my be lender j's monitoring criteria determined ex ante, for example, the 
frequency of periodic visits and the acquisition and analysis of financial statement and 
other information. Let My be die corresponding monitoring costs for lender j in dollars. 
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which are dependent on the loan size extended and contingent on the borrower's attributes, 
ability, and financial status. Specifically, the total monitoring costs MyCdyLjIwi) equal the 
product of the monitoring criteria mij(dijLi | and the average costs per criteria. By 
spending My dollars, lender j is able to observe f(yi|Wi), but other lenders can not 
automatically observe f(yi| Wj). It is, therefore, efficient for lenders to include monitoring 
costs. My, in their maximization problem before contracting. In general, as shown in the 
literature reviewed in the previous chapter, the periodic relationship in supply of input 
products conveys some private and updated information about the current operation and 
management states of a farmer-borrower, which helps to lower the monitoring costs of 
nontraditional lenders. Hence, if dj^ = djx, My^ with high probability is less than Mjj. In 
other words, if two types of lenders offer the same size of loan, the monitoring costs of 
nontraditional lenders may be lower than those of traditional lenders. 
Specifically, the optimal loan contract offered by lenders in the competitive credit 
market where f(yi|aii) is not freely observed still solves Eq. (5.5) except that the additional 
term MyCdjjLj l^j) should be added to the right-hand side of Eq. (5.6). This change comes 
from the inclusion of additional monitoring costs in the lender's cost fimction. Therefore, 
the structural system in the competitive credit market turns out to be 
(1 - <1)ij) [ f"(yi + Cy) f( yi IwJ) dyi + f" 5ij f( yi IW;) dyi ] + f 5 y f( yi I w.) dy, V Ojj 
= di.Li(l+Py)+My(dyLi|W.) 
(5.12) 
The implicit solutions to Eq. (5.12), or the multiple optimal zero-profit loan contracts 
(dy, Cy), are parameterized by [Lj, py, f(yi| Wj), cDy(-), Rij(-)] and My(-). The simultaneous 
solutions to Eq. (5.12) determine various multidimensional loan contracts with different 
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combinations of optimal loan-approval ratios, interest factors, collateral requirements, 
collateralization costs, monitoring criteria, and monitoring costs when the outcome of the 
project is unobservable. Comparision of Eq. (5.6) and Eq. (5.12) reveals that the interest 
factor requested imder the unobservable case is larger than that of the observable case. 
In summary, two categories of lenders compete using their multidimensional 
optimal loan contracts, each of which is comprised of the loan-approval ratio, interest 
factor, collateral requirement, monitoring criteria, and services. Therefore, an optimal 
credit contract (dy, Ry, Cy, my, Sy) can be expressed as a vector that specifies a value for 
each of these variables, assuming the components of an optimal loan package or bundle can 
not be split and traded separately. In such a setting, it seems reasonable to expect that 
different compositions of loan terms will be offered by different lenders to different 
borrowers. Given various credit contracts, the borrower will choose one based on his/her 
own maximizing consideration. The detailed farmer-borrower decision-making process is 
specified in the following section. 
The Borrower's Problem 
In this section, the farmer-borrower's financing decision-making process is 
described. The representative borrower's problem is to choose the credit contract that 
maximizes his/her expected utility. Comparision of the maximum (indirect) utility of 
alternative multidimensional credit contracts determines an equilibrium loan contract which 
equals farm demand and supply for traditional or nontraditional credit. The first part of 
this section provides a theoretical model which explains how a representative 
farmer-borrower generates his/her indirect expected utility level under the conventional 
utility maximization firamework. After the important factors affecting the borrower's 
utility formation are identified by using this framework, a discrete choice model is 
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developed that provides an empirical framework to examine why a farmer-borrower might 
choose one lender over another. 
Accordingly, competition for loans by lenders implies that the borrower chooses 
among several credit contracts which yield zero profits to lenders. Assuming that 
borrower i always knows the interest factor requested by lender j, Rij(dijLi|wi), after 
requesting a loan, and that the borrower has adequate funds with costs of using his/her 
internal cash, y;, to finance 1 - dy of the project. Using collateral also results in additional 
costs for the borrower. In general, regardless of default or not, the use of collateral 
always involves some opportunity costs for borrower i, OijCy; + Cy), where O'jj > 0 and 
Oij(O) = 0, which describes the costs for losing the right to use specific collateral assets to 
secure other transactions. However, in case of default, the lender will liquidate or entitle 
total collateral Cy and the borrower not only sacrifices his/her possession of additional 
collateral, Cy, but also loses the productivity generated firom Cy, which can be expressed as 
(1+ ay)Cy where ay denotes the costs of losing productivity for borrower i in percentage 
terms. In addition, if the loan is not performing, the cost of default may include reputation 
damages which may also affect the borrower's decision. 
It is assumed that the difference between the contracmral repayment and total 
collateral is a ftmction of costs of default, 0y(5y - yj - Cy), where 9'y > 0 and 0y(O) = 0. 
Transaction costs, Ty, which is defined as the time and costs of credit acquisition fi-om 
lender j should also be considered by borrower i. Owing to the namre of nontraditional 
lenders, "one-stop-shopping" for product and financial inputs in the local vicinity saves 
transaction costs and also provides convenience for borrowers. Therefore, Tjx is normally 
larger than Ti^, which indicates that customer convenience is another competitive 
advantage for nontraditional lenders. In addition, the value of services, Sy, provided by 
lender j significantly affects borrower i's expected value of different contracts. 
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Consequently, a risk-neutral farmer-borrower i's problem is selecting an optimal 
loan contract offered by lender j out of a discrete set of loan contracts if the expected 
utility (return) level for loan contract j is a maximum. The expected utility of a choice 
alternative is defined as the indirect (maximum) rather than direct utility because only the 
best terms of a particular contract is worth being compared with those of another contract. 
To solve this borrower problem, a discrete choice model including a two-stage 
analysis is presented. In the first stage, the indirect expected return level associated with 
different loan packages is specified, which is consistent with the conventional utility 
maximization framework. In the second stage, a rational farmer-borrower will compare 
the indirect utility of each contract and then select just one contract which generates 
highest expected return for the borrower. 
The Hrst-stage analysis 
If the outcome of a borrower's project is freely observed without cost, the 
first-stage analysis involves deriving the /th borrower's indirect expected utility with 
respect to individual contract j, j = N, T, by solving the following expected-retum-
maximization problem subject to theyth lender's problem, which includes his/her 
breakeven constraint and instimtional constraint: 
MAX 
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The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions associated with the Lagrangian 
maximization with the Lagrangian multiplier coy are 
{R,iLi +|§7d,Lr){-|'"''e,;(5, - C,)f(y,|w,)dy, 
-  I '  (l+aij)f(yilSi)<iy^ -  f f(y,|w,)dyi 
O , ,  
+ f" f(yiiw.)dy,]-(Oi. | ' '  f(yi|Wi)dyi} Oij"S 
c  L  
+ Li(l+yi)-cOijLi(l+ pij)<0;^-g-d|j =0 
(5.13.1) 
- C,j) - (1 + y,|w,)dyi - OJCCj) 
+ f(yila)dyi S 0; = 0 
(5.13.2) 
= f'" '[yi +Cij]f(yi|Wi)dyi + 5ijf(yi|w.)dyi 
ij '' '' 
IVi +Cij]f(yi|Wi)dyi + I" 5ij f(yi|w.)dyi] 
d  L  
— d L (1+ p )>0; CO =0 
Wjj 
(5.13.3) 
For the interior solution, the first-order Eqs. (5.13.1) through (5.13.3) equal zero. 
The equality of Eq. (5.13.3) specifies the multiple optimal loan contracts offered by theyth 
lender. In other words, the equality of Eq. (5.13.3) is identical to Eq. (5.6), which 
characterizes the structural system of the lender's problem. Let dy* and Cy* be defined as 
the borrower's loan terms choice variables, which reflect his/her willmgness to accept a 
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best loan contract offered by lender j as one of the choices. The interior solutions of dy* 
and Cjj* are determined by the lender's and borrower's optimization problem, that is, 
dij*= dij*(Li, ttij, pij, Yi, f(yilwi), cDj.(.), O'jj(-), O'ij(-), eij(-), 0'ij(-), Rij(0, SRy/SdyLi) 
(5.14.1) 
Cjj* = Cij*(Li, ttjj, Pij, Yi, f(yi|Wi), Oij(-), <I)'ij(-), 0'ij( ), 0ij(-), 0'ij(-), Rij(-), 5Rij/5dijLi) 
(5.14.2) 
In addition, ©ij is also characterized by [L|, ttij, pjj, Yi, f(yi 1 Wi), «I'ij(-), O'ij(-), 9ij(-), 
0'ij(-), Rij(-), SRij/SdijLj]. The indirect expected return, Uij*, is then found by substimting 
the profit-maximizing values of the choice variables, given by Eq. (5.14.1) and Eq. 
(5.14.2), into the objective function 
Uij*(Li, Pij, aij, Yi, Tij, Sij, f(yi|Wi), <Dij(-), Rij(-), BijO, Oij(0, aRij/adijL;) = 
E(yiIWj) + Sy - {(y; + Cij* (1 + ay) + 0ij(5- y^ - Cij*)) f( y^|w.)dy, 
+ f +(5ij*-yi)(l + ctij)]f(yi|W|)dyi + f  .5ij*f(yjw.)dyi 
0|j -wjj o ij 
+ 0 ,^ i y ,+c , . * )  +  T .  +  ( l -d , ^* )L , ( l  +  y , ) }  
(5.15) 
The expected remm Uij*(-) gives the maximum remm for a best multidimensional contract 
offered by lender j.  In other words, Uij*(dij*, Cij*) = Max Uij, j  = N, T. Note that Uij*() 
not only reflects the components of the yth contract bundle and the characteristics of the /th 
borrower, but also the attributes of the /th borrower's objective function. 
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For a comer solution, the first-order Eqs. (5.13.1) and (5.13.2) are less than zero, 
and the first-order Eq. (5.13.3) is greater than or equal to zero. The three comer solution 
cases follow. 
(1) dy* = 0 and Cy* = 0, or SL/Sdy < 0 and aL/Scy < 0. 
In this case, c!L/5dij = Li(l + yj) - a)ijLi(l + py) needs to be < 0, and 5L/5cy = 
- 0'y(yi) < 0; while olL/Scoy = 0 when dy* = 0 and Cy* = 0. This yields coy > 0. 
Therefore, this is a feasible solution only when 1+ yj < coy(l+ py), namely, if the 
borrower's costs of using internal equity are smaller than the lender's costs of funds times 
its shadow price, assuming the borrower has adequate fimds to finance the project and the 
borrower can choose to reject this loan contract offer. 
(2) dy* ^ 0 and Cy* = 0, or dLlddi^ = 0 and ciL/0Cy < 0. 
While Cy* = 0 needs 
= f' '[0i;(5ij -yi) -(1+aij)]f(y;IW;)dy; -  0[ . (y^) + cOy(1 -  (|)ij)f(yj|w^)dy^ < 0, 
and dy* ^ 0 needs 
Ht" -yi)f(yilWi)dyi -  |[f(yilWi)dyi 
+ f(5ij| Wj) - (Ojj f( y;i Wi)dy;} + L;(1 + yi) -  cOy Lj(1 + p^) < 0. 
While in this case, 
" yi f( yi I Wi) dy; + 6f( y; IW;) dy^ - y; f( y^ |) dy^ - dyLj (1 + p^p > 0 
Thus, dy* must simultaneouly solve these three first-order equations; otherwise, this is not 
a feasible solution for the loan to be granted without requiring additional collateral. 
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(3) djj* = 0 and c f  *  0 ,  or aL/Sdy < 0 and dL/dCi j  =  0 .  
djj* = 0 results in 
3  L  
= Li(l + yj) -cOjj Li(l + Pij), which needs to be less than zero, and dLldia^^ = 0. 
which implies that coy is not equal to zero. 
5  L  Cij* ^ 0 needs = -0^(0^) = 0, which contradicts the definition that O Cjj 
- O'ij < 0. Hence, this is clearly not a feasible solution. The lender would not require 
additional collateral and would not extend credit. 
If the output of the borrower's project is not freely observed by the lender, the 
lender will announce the monitoring criteria, my, in advance to reduce the moral hazard. 
However, monitoring of borrowers results in monitoring costs, MyCdyLilw;), for lenders as 
well as for borrowers. Let Ny be defined as borrower i's monitoring costs, resulting from 
the lender's monitoring requirement. In this case, NyCmy) should be added to the 
borrower's objective function to reflect the borrower's disutility if monitoring is frequent. 
Furthermore, Mij(dijLi|3Ki) should be added to the right-hand side of the first constraint in 
the borrower's optimization problem to reflect the lender's costs. As a result, dy* and Cy* 
are now characterized not only by Lj, py, fCyilWj), <I)y(-), and Rij(-), but also by My(-). 
Namely, Uy* of the monitoring case is not only affected by the factors in the 
non-monitoring case, but also by my, Ny(-), and My(-). 
The second-stage analysis 
Once the indirect expected utility (remm) fiinction, Uy*(-), is defined and obtained, 
borrower i will choose one contract maximizing his/her expected return. In other words, 
the loan contract participation decision of a farmer-borrower is modeled as a comparison of 
the indirect expected returns offered by the traditional and nontraditional lender, which 
should be viewed as a discrete choice problem. A probabilistic discrete and dichotomous 
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choice model in which the dependent variable is a discrete outcome, such as a "yes or no" 
decision, can be used to analyze the factors affecting the borrower's choice of alternative 
loan contracts (Lee, 1978; Heckman, 1979; Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980; Chambers and 
Foster, 1983; Caswell and Zilberman, 1985; Konyar and Osbom, 1990). 
A random utility model can be formulated by incorporating a random component 
(or dismrbance), Sy, to the indirect expected utility function to account for all unmeasured 
or unobserved attributes and characteristics: 
V = Uij*0 + 8ij i = 1, Z, j = N, T (5.16.1) 
where 0^* is the stochastic expected return derived from loan choice j by borrower i, 
Uij*(-) is the real valued or nonstochastic expected return affected by the attributes of loan 
choice j, which are specific to borrower i, and the characteristics of borrower i, which are 
not varied between loan choices. 
For the purpose of analysis, Uij*( ) is assumed to have the following linear 
functional form; 
Uij*(0 = r Xij + 4/ Zi i = 1, ..., Z, j = N, T (5.16.2) 
where 
1. Xjj is a colimm vector of attributes of loan contract j explaining borrower i's indirect 
expected remm function, which includes dy*, Cy*, Rjj*, my, Sy, ay, Ty, Oy(-), and 9y( ); 
2. Zj is a colmnn vector of the socioeconomic characteristics of the zth borrower, which 
includes f(yi | Wj) and yj; and 
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3. r and 4j are column vectors of parameters reflecting the impact of changes in Xy and Zj 
on borrower i's indirect expected return or vectors of implicit prices or hedonic prices 
for different characteristics. It is assumed that r and 4j are constant with respect to the 
levels of Xy and Z;. 
Hence, if the indirect expected return of contract N in a random utility model is 
greater than that of contract T, the farmer-borrower will choose the nontraditional lender's 
loan contract. Specifically, if U,^* > or if the unobservable, or latent, random 
variable = 0,-^* - UjT* > 0, borrower i will choose a nontraditional lender. As a 
result, the values of the observable dummy and dependent variable Y; are determined as 
Yj = 1 if Tij* > 0, or borrower i chooses a nontraditional lender 
Yj = 0 if Tij* < 0, or borrower i chooses a traditional lender 
can be rearranged as 
_ * _ fj * _ fj * 71, Ujjj UjT 
= r' (XiN - XJT) + (^N- 4T)' Zi + SiN - SiT 
= [r,fiv-4Tr] Zi - + Ui 
=  P ' X i - H U i  ( 5 . 1 7 )  
where P', X;, and U; are unknown parameters, explanatory variables, and random errors in 
the linear statistical model, respectively. 
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For borrower i, as long as Uj has a standard normal or logistic distribution, the 
probability of choosing the nontraditional lender's contract can be expressed as the binary 
probit or logit probability as follows: 
For the probit model, 
pr(Y, = 1) = * > 0) = pr(Ui > - p' Xj) = 1 - F(- P' Xi) = F(P' Xj) 
(5.18) 
where F(-) denotes the standard normal accumulative distribution function. 
For the logit model, 
priY, = 1) = priT^i* > 0) = priUi > - p' Xj) 
I P'Xj 
=  1  - =  M P ' X , )  ( 5 . 1 9 )  
'+= 1+e 
where A(-) denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function. The logit or probit 
functions are applied to describe the borrower's choice of an offered loan contract in terms 
of the loan contract attributes and the borrower's socioeconomic characteristics. In 
addition, the estimated model predicts the likelihood of the borrower's decision, as well as 
the marginal effects of different attributes on the borrower's selection decision. 
The theoretical model presented in this chapter describes the lender's optimization 
process in the determination of optimal terms of the loan contract offered, and the 
borrower's decision-making process in selecting the most appealing credit contract. The 
model suggests that the existing expertise, unique feamres, and special intermediary 
functions of nontraditional lenders may allow them to offer more attractive loan terms or 
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reach riskier borrowers compared with traditional lenders. Further, the model shows that 
the borrower's loan contract acceptance decision is significantly affected by the attributes 
of alternative loan contracts, and the borrower's socioeconomic characteristics. This 
theoretical firamework provides the foundation for the corresponding econometric model 
introduced in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, an econometric model is specified and applied to the 
farmer-borrower's loan contract participation decision in a discrete choice model. In the 
previous chapter, the results of the analysis indicate that the observable dependent variable 
Yj depends on the difference between two random indirect expected returns associated with 
loan contracts individually offered by a traditional and a nontraditional lender. However, 
each indirect expected return is affected by the attributes of the corresponding loan contract 
and the socioeconomic characteristics of the /th borrower. In o±er words, a 
farm-borrower's participation or selectivity decision is a function of the differences in 
expected remms between two contract packages and the characteristics of the /th borrower, 
as shown in Eq. (5.17). The econometric model specified in this chapter relates the 
borrower's choice of a loan contract to the endogenous variables, such as the terms of the 
loan contracts, and to other exogenous variables and information, such as 
borrower-specific characteristics. The model incorporates the borrower's dichotomous 
decision on self-selecting a loan contract and the lender's and borrower's decisions in 
determining the terms of the loan package. 
The main purpose of this estimation is to utilize the sample observations to estimate 
the parameters and marginal effects of different attributes on the borrower's decision 
function in order to reveal the interrelationships between the terms of a loan and 
borrower-specific characteristics from the borrower's perspective. However, several 
econometric problems must first be addressed. One of the most serious is the bias 
associated with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the endogenous terms of the 
loan contract. As a result, some adjustments are required in the estimation procedure. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents the 
specification of an econometric model. The second section describes the data utilized in 
this smdy. The third section provides the empirical definitions of the relevant variables. 
The econometric model and estimation procedure are presented in the final two sections. 
Specification 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the /th borrower will choose a 
nontraditional lender if ttj* > 0, that is, 
Yj = 1 if Tij* > 0, or borrower i chooses a nontraditional lender 
Yj = 0 if Tii* < 0, or borrower i chooses a traditional lender 
where 
where u^ is normally distributed with zero mean and variance Ou-
The most important part of this estimation is the structural participation decision 
equation specified in Eq. (6.1). Rewriting the decision equation above, we obtain 
Tti* = - 0;,* 
= r' (XiN - XJT) + (4N - ^t)' Zi + SiN - SiT 
= [r.(4„-5.y] 
L 
+ U; 
= p' Xj + Ui (6.1) 
Jtj* = To + r'^'( X°N - X°iT) + r^' (X^iN - X^ii) + Zi + Uj (6.2) 
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where both the column vector of attributes of a loan contract, N and T, offered by a 
nontraditional and a traditional lender individually, Xusr and Xif, can be decomposed into 
two categories of variables, endogenous loan term choice variables, x^j^ and and 
exogenous attributes variables of loan contract j, x^^f^ and respectively, and Zj is a 
vector of the exogenous socioeconomic characteristics of borrower i. Therefore, the model 
is completed by specifying the endogenous loan term variables, x^j^ and for the 
nontraditional lender and the traditional lender by their reduced-form equations, 
respectively: 
X iN = TION + T1' hiN + E. •iN 
X iT — •'loT + iT hjT + ejx (6.3) 
where hj is a column vector of attributes explaining the determination of endogenous loan 
term variables, r|' is a row vector of imknown parameters, and ej^ and ejj are disturbance 
terms assumed to be normally distributed with variance and Cj, respectively. 
Equation (6.2) and equation set (6.3) comprise the structural form of the model 
with endogenous variables ttj*, x'^jn' ^nd In fact, JCj* is not observable. Only the 
actual choice Yj can be observed. Further, we observe only x^j^ (or x'^jt) if borrower i 
selects a nontraditional lender (or a traditional lender), but not both. In other words, those 
borrowers who select an alternative are not randomly drawn from the population as a 
whole. Hence, equation set (6.3) can only be estimated by part of the samples. The 
resulting bias in data causes biased estimates of the loan term equations, which is defined 
as selectivity bias. 
Because the observed dependent variable is binary, the estimation approach we 
introduce in this analysis is the two-stage logit or probit estimation. The first stage 
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involves estimating the endogenous variables, and x^ij, by their reduced-form 
equations through OLS and then obtaining the predicted or fitted values of the endogenous 
variables. In the second stage, x°iN and x'^ij are replaced by their predicted values and the 
model's coefficients, or the marginal effects of different attributes in the decision equation, 
are estimated using standard probit or logit techniques. However, the selectivity bias in 
the first-stage OLS estimation for x^i^ and x'^jx occurs because of truncated samples. As 
originally shown by Johnson and Kotz (1972), Lee (1978), and Heckman (1979), OLS is 
not appropriate for estimating x'^iN and x'^jx because it can not fully reflect the existence of 
discrete selection on contracting. This can be seen by examining the non-zero and 
non-constant conditional means of e^^ and 
E(eiN I Yi = 1) = CNU. [- ) / F(Ti)] 
E(eiT I Yi = 0) = [f(4'i) / 1 - F(4'i)] (6-4) 
where f( ) and F(-) are the standard normal density and distribution fimctions, respectively, 
(Tutu. (cTxu*) is the covariance of ea,} (ejx) and U;*, and H'; and Uj* are defined by the 
following procedure. First, substitutmg Eq. (6.3) into Eq. (6.2) results in the 
reduced-form decision equation 
Tt * = bo + bi (Xj*) + b2 (Zj*) -1- Uj* (6.5) 
where the vectors Xj* and Zj* include all exogenous variables in the model and Uj* is 
normally distributed with unit variance. Second, let 4^; be defined as 
% = h o  +  b ,  ( X i * )  - h  b 2  ( Z i * )  (6.6) 
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After Ti is derived, we modify equation set (6.3) by adding the selectivity variables and 
zero-mean error terms, v, in order to avoid the selectivity bias problem in the first-stage 
OLS estimation. Two selectivity variables, VjN and Vj^, are defined as 
ViN = -fCFi)/FCFi) 
ViT= fOPi)/l-F(Ti) (6.7) 
After the selectivity variables are incorporated in equation set (6.3), a conventional 
two-stage probit or logit estimation procedure can then be applied to the structural model 
to generate consistent estimates of the parameters. In the first stage, the corrected 
equations ft)r and are constructed by adding the selectivity variables as follows: 
X°iN ~ "nON + 'n' [hiN ' + ^iN 
x°iT = Tlffr + n' [hiT . Vjj] + ViT (6.8) 
where E(ViN | Yj = 1)= 0 and E(ViT| Yj = 0) = 0. Then, estimation of Eq. (6.8) by OLS 
generates consistent estimated parameters in this stage. 
Using the above estimation procedure and incorporating the appropriate 
modification for selectivity variables will result in consistent coefficients in the OLS 
estimation. However, because and Vif are unknown, one just can replace Vj^ and Vjj 
A A 
with their predicted values, Vis and ViT. The predicted values are generated by estimating 
Eq. (6.5) by the maximum likelihood probit or logit method, which yields the estimates of 
A 
bo, b,, and b2, and the predicted value of *Fj, Ti. Using the fitted values of and Vj-r 
instead of their true values violates the standard error structure assumption for OLS, 
resulting in biased estimates of standard errors (Robinson and Tomes, 1982). Therefore, 
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the correct asymptotic variance-covariance matrix derived by Heckman in 1979 will be 
employed to develop appropriate standard errors and asymptotic t-statistics in the 
first-stage estimation, which can be used to test the significance of the variables affecting 
the terms of the loan. 
The second stage involves substimting the consistent predicted and x°ix back 
into structural Eq. (6.2) and then estimating this strucmral decision equation by the 
maximum likelihood probit or logit method. Consequently, the probability that the /th 
borrower chooses a nontraditional lender can be expressed as 
pr(Y^ = 1) = prill * > 0) 
= pKTo + r°' (x° N - x°t) + r^' (x^N - x^t) + 4' Zi + Ui > 0) 
= /7r(Ui > - p'Xj) = pr(Ui /a^ > - P' X; la^) = F(p' X; /CTJ 
= pr(Ki > - p*' Xi) = F(p*' Xi) (6.9) 
where F(-) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The consistent 
estimated coefficients in the structural form of the participation equation indicate the 
significance of factors reflecting the borrower's selection criteria and decision-making 
process in choosing between nontraditional and traditional lenders. 
Data Description 
The primary data used in this smdy are from the 1993 Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 
which was conducted by Iowa State University in cooperation with Iowa Agriculmral 
Statistics in April 1993. The objective of this survey, conducted since 1984, is to obtain 
information on the financial stams of Iowa farm families and their lenders. Therefore, the 
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information reveals not only family and farm demographic characteristics, but also the 
profitability, liquidity, and solvency of Iowa farm businesses, along with the quality of the 
agricultural lenders' loan portfolios included in the sample. 
The data were collected from a random sample of 3,500 Iowa farm operators 
through response to a questionnaire survey that was sent out on April 15, 1993. By May 
15, 1993, 1,300 surveys had been returned, and 1,125 surveys were usable. For each 
farm operator, the data contain five categories of microeconomic information: 
1. Farmer's personal characteristics—^age, family stams, farm size, education, experience, 
and status of operation, 
2. Traditional credit availability—loan amount borrowed, average interest rate, average 
length of loan, and so on, 
3. Risk management—frequency of using risk management strategies, 
4. Merchant and dealer credit (nontraditional credit)—loan amount borrowed, loan length, 
interest rate, and the reason for using nontraditional credit, and 
5. Farmer's income statement in 1992 and balance sheets in January of 1992 and 1993— 
where profitability, liquidity, and solvency stams, as well as loan portfolios using real 
estate and non-real estate debt are released. 
Therefore, this data set is appropriately used to estimate the coefficients of the econometric 
model. A general examination of the sample representation of this survey follows. 
Generally speaking, the respondents to this survey were older and operated larger 
farms on average compared with the population of the 1987 Census of Agriculmre (Jolly, 
1993). Survey respondents with less than 50 acres and younger than 35 years of age tend 
to be undersampled, while respondents with more than 50 acres and older than 45 years of 
age are oversampled. Weather-related losses in 1992 significantly affected the farm 
businesses' financial performance in 1992 and 1993. Liquidity, solvency, and profitability 
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ratios deteriorated, and net worth or equity all eroded in 1992 and 1993. Therefore, in 
this survey, the farm businesses characterized as having a strong financial position, defined 
as a strong equity position along with good profitability and solvency, account for only 38 
percent of the population. Forty percent of the farm businesses were categorized as having 
a stable financial position. This category of farms has adequate equity position but 
experiences moderate cash flow or liquidity problems. The remaining 22 percent of farm 
businesses experienced financial stress and were classified into the financial-at-risk 
category, which includes severe and weak categories individually. In 1986 and 1991, 
however, this category of farms only comprised 31 percent and 15 percent of the 
population, respectively. Overall, farm financial performance fell by the beginning of 
1993. 
Empirical Dennitions 
The variables used in the empirical estimation can be divided into three categories: 
borrower personal characteristics, financial measures, and contract margins. Borrower 
personal characteristics and financial measures are two sub-categories of a farmer's 
socioeconomic attributes, which are directly evaluated by lenders for determining a best 
multidimensional loan contract and influence the borrower's participation decision. 
Contract attribute variables are endogenous and dependent variables hypothesized to be 
significantly associated with the probability of participation. The detailed definition and 
explanation of the derivation of selected variables are summarized in Table 6.1 and 
discussed next. 
91 
Table 6.1. Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
PARTICIP 1 = if use nontraditional credit 
0 = if use traditional credit 
Borrower Characteristics 
AGES 
EDH 
EDW 
EXPER 
DEPSUPP 
FLEXP 
SIZEA 
Farm Type 
CASGRAF 
GRALVSF 
HOGF 
BEEFF 
DAIRYF 
Age in years 
1 = < 35 years; 2 = 35-44 years; 3 = 45-54 years; 
4 = 55-64 years; 5 = > 65 years 
Husband's education 
Wife's education 
1 = high school education; 2 = community college; 
3 = college; 4 = post graduate 
Years of farming 
Numbers of dependent to support 
Family living expenses 
Farm operation size 
1 = <50 acres; 2 = 50-179 acres; 
3 = 180-499 acres; 4 = 500-999 acres; 
5 = > 1,000 acres 
>95% of gross farm income from crops 
50%-95% of gross farm income from crops 
>50% of gross farm income from hog 
>50% of gross farm income from beef 
>50% of gross farm income from dairy 
Risk Management Strategy 
MPCI Frequency using multiple-peril insurance 
HAILI Frequency using hail insurance 
GOVTI Frequency using government program 
scale: 1-5, 1= never and 5= always 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
Variable Description 
Financial Measures 
ROA 
LIQUIDIT 
DTOA 
INTCOV 
ASSETTO 
MGTEFF 
COD 
COLOSPRD 
ROE 
PM 
NCI 
Contract Attributes 
DEBT 
COLLATER 
INTEREST 
Return on asset ratio = (Net farm income + interest expenses 
- family living expenses) / Total assets 
Current ratio = Current assets / Non-real estate debt 
Debt to asset ratio = Total debt / Total assets 
Interest coverage ratio = (Net farm income -l- interest 
expenses - family living expenses) / Interest expenses 
Asset mrnover ratio = Gross farm income / Total assets 
Managerial efficiency ratio = Operating expenses / Gross farm 
income 
Cost of debt = Interest expenses / Total debt 
Cost of losing productivity = Net farm income / Total Assets 
Return on equity = (Net farm income - family living 
expenses) / Net worth 
Profit margin = (Net farm income + interest expenses -
family living expenses) / Total gross income 
Net cash income = Net cash farm income + off-farm income 
Size of loan 
Collateral proxy = Non-real estate assets - non-real estate debt 
Interest rate 
MONTH Length of loan 
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Type of credit user 
The total sample size of the 1993 Iowa Farai Finance Survey consists of 1,125 
usable observations. However, a number of observations were deleted. The data were 
deleted if the respondent (1) did not report either non-real estate nontraditional debt, 
including merchant and dealer credit, or non-real estate traditional debt, including bank 
credit and Farm Credit System credit; (2) did not provide sufficient financial information 
for estimation; or (3) provided obvious erroneous data. Note that respondents participating 
in either nontraditional or traditional non-real estate credit markets were included in the 
sample. Nonparticipants were excluded. 
For this research, borrowers were categorized as nontraditional and traditional 
credit users. In general, if the respondents reported that they participated in nontraditional 
credit, they were categorized as nontraditional credit users. If they reported only 
participating in traditional credit, they were categorized as traditional credit users. 
However, measuring credit market participation is not straightforward. In this study, two 
definitions of participation are developed—the flow approach and the stock approach. The 
flow approach is based on the concept of the flow of fimds or credit and emphasizes a 
borrower's additional credit usage and credit participation over a specific time period. 
This approach reflects the farmer-borrower's short-term choice of debt contract and the 
general pattern of borrowing and lending. In this smdy, the flow-based estimates reflect 
the farmer-borrowers' reported new borrowings in the given year of 1992. The stock 
approach, on the other hand, is based on the stock of fimds, or the borrower's accumulated 
credit usage and credit participation at a given point in time. This approach reflects a 
farmer-borrower's long-term choice of credit contract, and possibly his/her loyalty or 
commitment to a specific type of lender. In the following analysis, the stock-based 
estimates reflect the farmer-borrowers' accumulated borrowings as reported on their 1993 
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balance sheets. The sample sizes of nontraditional and traditional credit users based on the 
two approaches are discussed next. 
The flow approach The flow estimates were made as follows. Respondents 
were categorized as nontraditional credit users if they answered that they received non-real 
estate credit from nontraditional lenders in 1992 and provided the terms of their loan 
contracts. Respondents who reported additional new borrowing from traditional lenders in 
their balance sheets were categorized as traditional credit users. Using this definition, we 
identified 64 nontraditional credit users and 121 traditional credit users. The dependent 
variable, PARTICIP, was evaluated as 1 for nontraditional credit users and 0 for 
traditional credit users. 
The stock approach Under this approach, if a farmer-borrower showed 
nontraditional debt in his/her 1993 balance sheet, then the value of 1 was assigned to 
PARTICIP. For the rest of the farmer-borrowers, if they showed traditional debt in their 
1993 balance sheets, the value of 0 was assigned to PARTICIP. Using this definition, 282 
observations resulted in 88 nontraditional credit users and 194 traditional credit users. 
The sample means and standard deviations of the variables for farmer-borrowers 
classified as nontraditional and traditional credit users are presented in Table 6.2 through 
Table 6.9, by type of credit user. 
Borrower personal characteristics 
Several measures of borrower personal characteristics are directly available from 
the survey. These measures include age, education, number of family dependents, farm 
size, farm type, and firequency of use of selected risk management strategies. The 
grouping standard for each category variable is consistent with that of the 1993 Iowa Farm 
Finance Survey report. Brief descriptions of the variables used in this analysis follow. 
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Table 6.2. Summary of sample statistics, by type of credit user—the flow approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev 
Financial Measures 
ROA 62 -0.0140 0.23867 111 -0.0635 0.2486 
LIQUIDIT 58 3.4499 4.2088 120 3.6887 4.7110 
DTOA 54 0.3305 0.2659 82 0.3444 0.2354 
INTCOV 60 2.7313 20.1024 106 -4.3200 27.9654 
ASSETTO 63 0.3858 0.2462 114 0.3418 0.3335 
MGTEFF 63 0.7130 0.3263 117 0.7597 0.9977 
COD 54 0.0856 0.0587 84 0.0906 0.0783 
COLOSPRD 62 0.0714 0.0918 111 0.0429 0.1708 
ROE 54 -0.0700 0.2643 85 -0.1435 0.5101 
PM 62 -0.0653 1.0280 109 -0.4427 1.3551 
NCI 63 58439.83 61781.24 118 47098.58 61538.57 
Borrower Characteristics 
AGES 64 2.7187 1.0461 121 2.8512 1.0928 
EDH 63 1.7777 0.9745 120 2.0166 1.0369 
EDW 58 1.9655 1.0590 113 1.9292 1.0750 
EXPER 64 22.9687 10.6532 121 23.6694 11.2237 
DEPSUPP 64 3.2500 1.4692 121 3.2066 1.4196 
FLEXP 64 25455.52 6369.89 121 25787.05 5810.87 
SIZEA 64 3.2968 1.0028 121 3.2066 0.9212 
CASGRAF 64 0.1718 0.3802 121 0.2479 0.4336 
GRALVSF 64 0.4687 0.5029 121 0.4297 0.4971 
HOGF 64 0.0937 0.2937 121 0.0991 0.3001 
BEEFF 64 0.0781 0.2705 121 0.0743 0.2634 
DAIRYF 64 0.0781 0.2705 121 0.0247 0.1561 
MPCI 59 3.1864 1.6965 117 3.3504 1.7035 
HAILI 60 3.7500 1.7036 117 3.2393 1.7203 
GOVTI 63 4.4444 1.0438 120 4.4583 0.9949 
Contract Attributes 
DEBT 64 26381.53 24036.03 40 21927.74 36171.38 
COLLATER 61 174154.54 138916.08 120 126741.42 142822.43 
INTEREST 60 6.9954 3.8951 40 9.1118 1.2457 
MONTH 60 31.3555 19.9875 40 47.1000 39.7890 
Sample Size 64 121 
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Table 6.3. Frequency in age group, by type of credit user—the flow approach 
Age Group (AGES) Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Nontradidonal credit users 
less than 35 years 6 9.4 6 9.4 
35 to 44 years 24 37.5 30 46.9 
45 to 54 years 20 31.3 50 78.1 
55 to 64 years 10 15.6 60 93.8 
over 65 years 4 6.3 64 100.0 
Traditional credit users 
less than 35 years 11 9.1 11 9.1 
35 to 44 years 41 33.9 52 43.0 
45 to 54 years 32 26.4 84 69.4 
55 to 64 years 29 24.0 113 93.4 
over 65 years 8 6.6 121 100.0 
Table 6.4. Frequency in farm size group, by type of credit user—the flow approach 
Farm Size Group (SIZEA) Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Nontraditional credit users 
less than 50 acres 4 6.3 4 6.3 
50 to 179 acres 7 10.9 11 17.2 
180 to 499 acres 25 39.1 36 56.3 
500 to 999 acres 22 34.4 58 90.6 
over 1000 acres 6 9.4 64 100.0 
Traditional credit users 
less than 50 acres 6 5.0 6 5.0 
50 to 179 acres 13 10.7 19 15.7 
180 to 499 acres 62 51.2 81 66.9 
500 to 999 acres 30 24.8 111 91.7 
over 1000 acres 10 8.3 121 100.0 
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Table 6.5. Frequency in farm type, by type of credit user—the flow approach 
Farm type Frequency Frequency 
Nontraditional credit users 
CASGRAF 
GRALVSF 
HOOF 
BEEFF 
DAIRYF 
if farm type = 0 
53 
34 
58 
59 
59 
if farm type = 1 
11 
30 
6 
5 
5 
Traditional credit users 
CASGRAF 
GRALVSF 
HOGF 
BEEFF 
DAIRYF 
if farm type = 0 
91 
69 
109 
112 
118 
if farm type 
30 
52 
12 
9 
3 
= 1 
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Table 6.6. Summary of sample statistics, by type of credit user—the stock approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev 
Financial Measures 
ROA 73 0.0213 0.1791 183 -0.0757 0.2399 
LIQUroiT 87 3.3756 4.2995 193 3.7859 6.1341 
DTOA 65 0.3376 0.2320 147 0.3533 0.2889 
INTCOV 70 1.9273 14.8299 176 -3.8672 27.0953 
ASSETTO 73 0.3674 0.2256 187 0.3161 0.2901 
MGTEFF 75 0.6764 0.1805 189 0.8191 1.0813 
COD 56 0.0835 0.0563 149 0.0953 0.0751 
COLOSPRD 73 0.0873 0.1435 183 0.0321 0.1443 
ROE 57 -0.0188 0.2445 147 -0.1602 0.5534 
PM 73 0.0626 0.4734 181 -0.5878 1.7169 
NCI 75 64596.08 65437.58 190 54798.67 89211.58 
Borrower Characteristics 
AGES 88 2.7613 1.0170 194 2.9175 1.1259 
EDH 85 1.9764 1.0115 193 1.9015 1.0535 
EDW 78 2.0256 1.0316 173 1.8786 1.0411 
EXPER 88 23.9090 10.4448 192 23.9375 11.6756 
DEPSUPP 88 3.4204 1.5663 194 3.0000 1.4031 
FLEXP 88 25914.36 6055.03 194 25092.32 6136.74 
SIZEA 88 3.5681 0.9918 194 3.1340 0.9005 
CASGRAF 88 0.2272 0.4214 194 0.2061 0.4056 
GRALVSF 88 0.4886 0.5027 194 0.3711 0.4846 
HOGF 88 0.1022 0.3047 194 0.1391 0.3470 
BEEFF 88 0.0681 0.2535 194 0.1030 0.3048 
DAIRYF 88 0.0454 0.2094 194 0.0257 0.1588 
MPCI 84 3.1547 1.6317 186 3.1720 1.7187 
HATLI 84 3.6071 1.5524 185 3.2486 1.7824 
GOVTI 86 4.4651 1.0255 194 4.3505 1.0534 
Contract Attributes 
DEBT 88 22216.86 25314.97 194 41980.72 49602.32 
COLLATER 87 214069.24 214785.59 193 141039.97 181444.11 
INTEREST 40 6.5637 3.4296 69 9.0607 1.1226 
MONTH 40 40.1250 16.6324 69 38.8405 26.1430 
Sample Size 88 194 
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Table 6.7. Frequency in age group, by type of credit user—the stock approach 
Age Group (AGES) Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Nontraditional credit users 
less than 35 years 8 9.1 8 9.1 
35 to 44 years 31 35.2 39 44.3 
45 to 54 years 26 29.5 65 73.9 
55 to 64 years 20 22.7 85 96.6 
over 65 years 3 3.4 88 100.0 
Traditional credit users 
less than 35 years 18 9.3 18 9.3 
35 to 44 years 60 30.9 78 40.2 
45 to 54 years 53 27.3 131 67.5 
55 to 64 years 46 23.7 177 91.2 
over 65 years 17 8.8 194 100.0 
Table 6.8. Frequency in farm size group, by type of credit user—the stock approach 
Farm Size Group (SIZEA) Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Nontraditional credit users 
less than 50 acres 3 3.4 3 3.4 
50 to 179 acres 7 8.0 10 11.4 
180 to 499 acres 31 35.2 41 46.6 
500 to 999 acres 31 35.2 72 81.8 
over 1000 acres 16 18.2 88 100.0 
Traditional credit users 
less than 50 acres 8 4.1 8 4.1 
50 to 179 acres 33 17.0 41 21.1 
180 to 499 acres 88 45.4 129 66.5 
500 to 999 acres 55 28.4 184 94.8 
over 1000 acres 10 5.2 194 100.0 
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Table 6.9. Frequency in farm type, by type of credit user—the stock approach 
Farm type Frequency Frequency 
Nontraditional credit users 
CASGRAF 
GRALVSF 
HOOF 
BEEFF 
DAIRYF 
if farm type = 0 
68 
45 
79 
82 
84 
if farm type 
20 
43 
9 
6 
4 
= 1 
Traditional credit users 
CASGRAF 
GRALVSF 
HOGF 
BEEFF 
DAIRYF 
if farm type = 0 
154 
122 
167 
174 
189 
if farm type 
40 
72 
27 
20 
5 
= 1 
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Age AGES is a category variable which equals 1 if the borrower's age is less 
than 35 years old, 2 if 35 to 44, 3 if 45 to 54, 4 if 55 to 64, and 5 if greater than 65 years 
old. 
Education and experience EDH and EDW represent the level of the husband's 
and wife's educations, respectively. EDH and EDW are 1 if he/she has a high school 
education, 2 for community college, 3 for college, and 4 for post graduate education. 
EXPER represents years of farming. Since experience is a linear combination of age and 
education, we include the age and education variables but exclude the experience variable 
in the regression. However, for a better understanding of the borrowers' characteristics, 
the sample mean and standard deviation for the experience variable are included in Tables 
6.2 and 6.6. 
Family dependents and expenditures DEPSUPP refers to the number of 
dependents the farm family supports, and FLEXP refers to the family living expendimres. 
Based on the report of 1992 Family Living Expenditures of Iowa Farm Families, family 
living expenses are equal to $11,242 if the family has one dependent, $22,483 if two, 
$30,042 if three, and $29,885 if four. If the family has more than four dependents, then 
family living expenses are equal to the product of $5,523 and the niunber of family 
dependents. 
Farm size The total acreage operated by the farm business is represented by the 
variable SIZEA, which equals 1 if operating acres are less than 50 acres, 2 if 50 to 179 
acres, 3 if 180 to 499 acres, 4 if 500 to 999 acres, and 5 if greater than 1,000 acres. 
Farm type In order to investigate the effects of different farm types on the 
borrower's participation and the lender's assessment decision, specialized farm operations 
facing unique risks are defined separately. Five dummy variables are utilized for 
classifying farm type: cash grain farm (CASGRAF) with more than 95 percent of gross 
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farm income from crops, grain-livestock farm (GRALVSF) with 50 percent to 95 percent 
of gross farm income from crops, and hog farm (HOGF), beef farm (BEEFF), and dairy 
farm (DAIRYF) with more than 50 percent of gross farm income from hog, beef, and 
dairy enterprises, respectively. 
Risk management strategy Three measures of a farm's risk management 
strategies are important variables in identifying borrower quality, especially from the 
lender's viewpoint, because farmers are often required to assign to lenders the proceeds of 
insurance as a part of the security position. Therefore, MPCI, HAILI, and GOVTI are 
used to reflect the frequency with which farmer-borrowers use multiple-peril crop 
insurance, hail insurance, and government programs, respectively, to avoid production 
risks. For each variable, the scale ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating the respondent 
never used insurance tools and 5 indicating the respondant always used insurance tools. 
Financial measures 
Financial factors or ratios have been widely recognized as important explanatory 
variables in agricultural credit assessment or credit scoring. Lenders not only use these 
measures to assess the creditworthiness of credit applicants, but also to price the bundle of 
loan terms. Although no financial measure has consistently been identified as significant, 
liquidity, repayment ability, and solvency are the three measures most frequently applied to 
evaluate a borrower's quality in prior agriculmral smdies (Miller and LaDue, 1989). 
For this smdy, in addition to these three financial variables, measures of profitability, 
leverage, capital efficiency, and managerial efficiency are examined. Each of these ratios 
measures a particular aspect of a farm's position and performance. The definitions of these 
measures follow. 
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Profitability Profitability measures the farmer's potential ability to earn a 
satisfactory return on investment. The rate of return on owned assets (ROA) is an 
important indicator of profitability recommended by the Farm Finance Task Force. This 
ratio reflects pre-tax earnings per dollar of investment, which is independent of the way the 
farm business is financed and also excludes capital gains. 
Liquidity Liquidity assesses the borrower's ability to meet his/her immediate 
financial obligations and to meet short-term unanticipated and adverse financial 
contingencies. Determining liquidity by measuring short-term solvency is often associated 
with net working capital, or the difference between current assets and current liabilities 
(Ross and Westerfield, 1988, 43). The most widely used measure of accounting liquidity 
is the current ratio. In this study, the LIQUIDIT variable is measured by the current ratio, 
which relates current assets to current liabilities. Since current liabilities (short-term debt) 
were not reported in the survey, a broader proxy measure based on total non-real estate 
liability (short- and intermediate-term debt) is appropriately used. 
Leverage Debt is an important financial tool due to its tax advantages; however, 
too much debt is likely to lead to a higher probability of financial distress. Leverage 
indicates the extent to which a farm business relies on debt financing when compared with 
equity. The debt-to-asset ratio (DTOA) provides a simple measure of leverage. It 
measures the indebtedness of the farm in percentage terms. 
Repayment capacity Repayment capacity emphasizes the ability of a farm 
business to generate sufficient income to meet its interest obligations. One of the most 
widely used measures of repayment capacity is the interest coverage ratio (INTCOV), 
which is computed by dividing capital earnings before interest and taxes by interest 
expenses. This ratio measures the relationship between capital earnings and interest paid 
on debt. 
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Capital efficiency Capital efficiency reflects the fanner's financial management 
skills in effectively managing assets invested in the business (Miller and Ladue, 1989). In 
this study, the asset turnover ratio (ASSETTO), determined by dividing total gross income 
by total assets, is used to measure the borrower's capital efficiency. This ratio is an index 
of the efficiency of utilization of capital stock. 
Managerial efficiency Managerial efficiency, signaling how well the farm 
business produces a product or service at low costs by controlling its operating expenses, is 
often included in the evaluating the borrower's riskiness. The MGTEFF variable, which is 
the ratio of operating expenses to gross income, is exploited to measure management 
efficiency. This ratio expresses operating expenses as a percentage of gross income. 
Cnst of debt and cost of losing productivity In the previous chapter, the 
variable cost of debt (COD) and cost of losing productivity (COLOSPRD) were identified 
as influential factors affecting a borrower's selection decision between traditional and 
nontraditional lenders, but not in a lender's determination of loan terms. As a result, COD 
and COLOSPRD are incorporated only in the structural equation to reflect their impacts on 
the borrower's participation decision. 
COD is derived by dividing interest expense by total liability, which reflects the 
average (weighted) interest rate on the debt of a borrower. The weights are based on total 
outstanding loan balances. COLOSPRD, which reflects a borrower's production losses if 
he/she loses possession of productive assets in case of default, is generated by dividing net 
farm income by total assets. Whether borrowers with higher COD or COLOSPRD are 
more inclined to borrow from nontraditional lenders or not will be discovered by 
examining their coefficients in the structural equation. 
Several financial variables that were not selected as explanatory variables in the 
regression but are certainly helpful in describing a borrower's financial status are presented 
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in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. Return on equity (ROE), reflecting the farm business's 
pre-tax earnings on equity and its financial structure, is a critical income measure. Profit 
margin (PM), determined by estimating pre-tax return before financing per dollar of sales, 
is another index of profitability. Net cash income (NCI), the sum of net cash farm income 
and off-farm income, indicates the stams of the operator household's cash flow. 
Contract attributes 
In Chapter 5, it is shown that a farmer's choice of a loan contract is affected both 
by the borrower's socioeconomic characteristics and by attributes of the corresponding 
loan contract. Accordingly, the endogenous attributes of the loan contract are 
simultaneously determined by other exogenous variables in the lender's utility 
maximization process, given the farmer-borrower's socioeconomic characteristics. The 
equilibrium terms of the loan contract offered by the lender and accepted by the borrower 
are described as follows. 
T^an size DEBT refers to the size of the loan, which is the actual amount 
borrowed, in dollars. In the flow approach, DEBT represents the total amount of new 
loans extended by nontraditional or traditional lenders in 1992. In the stock approach, 
DEBT equals the accumulated outstanding amount of loans extended until 1993 as shown 
in the farmer's balance sheet. 
Collateral Because data on the amount of collateral requested by the lender were 
not available, collateral is represented by the proxy variable COLLATER, which equals 
the difference between non-real estate assets and non-real estate liabilities. This proxy 
variable reflects the amount of non-real estate assets that have not been committed to meet 
short- and intermediate-term pending obligations and that can be pledged as collateral. 
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Interest rate and loan length INTEREST is defined as the average interest rate 
paid by the borrower (in percentage terms) when using traditional credit or nontraditional 
credit. MONTH represents the average length of the loans extended, measured in months. 
Data analysis 
The simmiaries of the sample statistics listed in Tables 6.2 through 6.8 indicate the 
difference in financial and personal attributes of the two types of credit users with respect 
to two data sets—flow (1992) data and stock (1993) data. 
Financial measures Both Table 6.2 and Table 6.6 show that, on average, 
nontraditional credit users have better profitability, leverage ratios, repayment ability, 
financial and managerial efficiency, and cash flow in both data sets. In other words, 
traditional credit users have overall inferior financial performance with the exception of 
liquidity management, which is slightly superior to that of nontraditional credit users. As 
might be expected, nontraditional credit users have a much lower cost of debt and a much 
higher cost of losing pledged productive assets or productivity in case of default for whole 
businesses relative to traditional credit users. In addition, the negative ROA, ROE, and 
PM reveal the poor financial condition of most Iowa farm businesses in 1992 and 1993, 
regardless of whether they use nontraditional or traditional credit. 
In summary, these findings suggest that nontraditional credit users have less 
financial risk, are on average able to finance lower costs of funds, and are not likely to 
default due to the higher costs of losing productivity in case of default. Overall, 
nontraditional credit users have lower financial risk than do traditional credit users. 
Borrovyer characteristics Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.6, and 6.7 indicate that 
nontraditional credit users generally are younger, have less experience, and operate slightly 
larger farms relative to traditional credit users in both the flow and stock approaches. 
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Tables 6.2 and 6.6 also show that, except for the husband's education in the flow 
approach, nontraditional credit borrowers are more educated (both husband and wife) 
compared with traditional credit borrowers. In particular, the wife is more educated for 
nontraditional credit users, whereas the husband is more educated for traditional credit 
users. Tables 6.5 and 6.8 indicate that the distribution of farm type is similar for the two 
types of credit users in two cases, but the dairy farm is slightly undersampled for 
traditional credit users. In addition. Table 6.2 shows that nontraditional credit users use 
hail insurance more frequently, whereas traditional credit users make greater use of 
multiple-peril crop insurance. Both types of credit users participate in government 
programs at about the same frequency. 
Cnntract attributes The additional loan size obtained and the collateral assets 
that could be pledged by nontraditional credit users in the year 1992 are, on average, much 
larger than those of traditional credit users. In contrast, the average interest rate charged 
and the average loan length extended by nontraditional lenders are much smaller than those 
of traditional lenders. On the other hand, in the stock measure of participation, the 
average loan size extended by traditional lenders is almost double that of nontraditional 
lenders, while the pledgeable collateral of traditional credit users does not proportionally 
increase compared with that of nontraditional credit users. Note that the average interest 
rate paid by nontraditional credit users is still much lower than that of traditional credit 
users, but the loan length of nontraditional credit users is slightly longer than that of 
traditional credit users. 
The above results, however, suggest that nontraditional credit users are generally 
less risky and have a much lower average interest rate compared with traditional credit 
users. Besides, the additional loan size obtained by nontraditional credit users in the year 
1992 is much larger than that of traditional credit users. In Chapter 5, the theory states 
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that nontraditional lenders are able to extend a larger loan than are traditional lenders due 
to the cross-subsidization effect, lower collateralization costs, and lower monitoring costs. 
Although the theory indicates that nontraditional lenders could reach more risider 
borrowers and charge a higher interest rate, the empirical results suggest that they reach 
less risky borrowers and charge a significantly lower interest rate. This lower interest rate 
may reflect not only borrowers' lower interest premiums due to lower risk, but also the 
nontraditional lenders' cross-subsidization effect, or lower collateralization and monitoring 
costs. In general, these descriptive statistics are consistent with the theory. 
Econometric Model 
The econometric model basically consists of eight equilibrium loan term equations 
for two types of credit users individually, and one farmer-borrower participation equation. 
The flow and stock specifications use the same econometric model but employ different 
data sets. The empirical specification of the whole model is presented below. 
The four equilibrium loan term equations for nontraditional and traditional credit 
users are: 
DEBTy = r\\ + Ti°,jDEPSUPPi+ rf 2j AGESi -I- Ti^jjEDHj -I- n^jEDWi 
-I- Ti°5jSIZEAj -I- Ti-^gjCASGRAFi -1- Ti°7j GRALVSPj -H ri^gjHOGFj 
+ r|°9jBEEFFi + T]°ioj DAIRYF; -1- Ti^njlMPCIj + HAILIj 
+ Ti^iajGOVTIi + ri°i4jR0Ai -1- Ti°i5j LIQUIDIT; + rj^igjDTOAi 
+ Ti-'njlNTCOVi + n^igjASSETTOi -I- MGTEFFj + ri^zojVy 
+ v°ij, i = 1, ..., n, j = N, T. 
(6.10) 
COLLATERjj = ri^pj + Ti^ijDEPSUPPi+ TISJ AGESJ -H n'^sjEDHi + Ti'4jEDWj 
+ nSjSIZEAi -H n^ejCASGRAFi -1- ti^jGRALYSFj 
-I- iT^gjHOGFj + nSjBEEFFi + DAIRYFj + Ti=i,j MPCIi 
+ r|^i2iHAILIi + Ti^isjGOVTIi + Ti'^MiROAj -h LIQUIDITi 
+ n',"; DTOA; + 1="; INTCOV, + ASSETTCI^' 
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+ Ti=,9jMGTEFFi + Ti=20jVij + , 
i = 1, n, j = N, T. 
(6.11) 
INTERESTij = ti'q + Ti'ijDEPSUPPi+ ti'jj AGES; + ti'sjEDHj + Ti'4jEDWi 
+ "n'sj SIZEAj + Ti'gj CASGRAFj + rj^ j GRALVSFj 
+ Ti'gjHOGFj + Ti'gjBEEFFi + ti'ioj DAIRYFj + Ti'njMPCIj 
+ Ti-,2jHAILIi + Ti'isjGOVTIi + Ti',4jR0Ai + ti'isj LIQUIDITj 
+ Ti',6jDT0Ai + Ti'njINTCOVi + ri'igj ASSETTOj 
+ Ti'igjMGTEFFi + Ti'zojVij + v'y, 
i = 1, ..., n, j = N, T. 
(6.12) 
MONTHjj = Ti"oj + r|",jDEPSUPPi+ AGES; + ti^jjEDHi + n^jEDWi 
+ Ti%SIZEAi + Ti"6j CASGRAFi + GRALVSFj 
+ Ti^gjHOGFj + Ti"9jBEEFFi + Ti"ioj DAIRYFi + Ti«„jMPCIi 
+ Ti"i2jHAILIi + Ti"i3jG0VTIi + Ti"i4jR0Ai + Ti"i5j LIQUIDITj 
+ Ti"i6jDT0Ai + Ti"i7jINTC0Vi + Ti",8j ASSETTOj 
+ MGTEFFj + Ti"20j Vjj + v^jj , 
i = 1, ..., n, j = N, T. 
(6.13) 
These optimal loan term equations, simultaneously determined for borrower i, are 
expressed as a fimction of his/her personal characteristics, including dependents supported, 
age, education, farm size, farm type, insurance program participation, and six major 
financial performance measures associated with the health of the farm business. The 
variables included in this specification are those found to be important in the theoretical 
model and in the literamre. Since the data used are not panel data and representative only 
of Iowa farm businesses which have similar local economic and production conditions, 
time trends and regional (county) variables are omitted. In addition, due to the namre of 
ex-post data, only the equilibrium terms of the contract package offered by the lender and 
accepted by the borrower are examined. Hence, the coefficients of these equations indicate 
the competitive equilibrium behavior or relationship of both the traditional or 
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nontraditional lenders and a farmer-borrower, rather than the ex-ante maximum loan 
supply, actual loan demand, or disequilibrium loan contracts. In other words, what are 
observed are the formal multidimensional loan contracts accepted by both parties. 
As mentioned earlier, sample selectivity bias is a potential problem in this analysis 
because the approach entails the estimation of separate optimal loan term equations for 
nontraditional and traditional credit users, where these optimal loan term equations are 
fitted to a nonrandom subset of the population. Therefore, the selectivity variable, Vy, 
must be included to be included to derive a dismrbance term with a zero mean and a 
normal distribution. 
The empirical specification of the probability of the zth borrower selecting 
nontraditional lenders or participating in nontraditional credit programs is 
Pr{ PARTICIPi = 1) = (D[ To + r^DEBTiN - DEBTij) -H TzCCOLLATERiN -
COLLATERij) + TsONTERESTiN - INTERESTiy) 
+ r4(M0NTHiN - MONTHIT) + TsCODi 
-1- TgCOLOSPRDi-^ r^FLEXPi-h TgAGESi -1- r9EDHi 
+ TioEDWi -I- Tn SIZEA; -1- r,2CASGRAFi 
-1- risGRALVSFj -h rnHOGFj -I- TisBEEFFi 
-I- TifiDAIRYFi + ri7R0Ai -I- TigLIQUIDITi 
-f FisDTOAi + r2oINTCOVi -h Tji ASSETTOj 
4-TzsMGTEFFi], i = 1, ..., n. 
(6.14) 
where 0( ) is the ciraiulative normal distribution fimction. This probability is represented 
as a function of several variables, including the participant-nonparticipant loan term 
differentials, the farm business's cost of debt, the cost of losing productivity, family living 
expenses, financial measures, and borrower personal characteristics excluding risk 
management variables. 
I l l  
As illustrated in the theoretical model in Chapter 5, a farmer-borrower will 
self-select the nontraditional loan contract when the total indirect utility generated from this 
contract bundle exceeds that of a traditional contract bundle. Accordingly, the differentials 
in loan size, collateral security, interest rate, and loan length are needed in order to 
directly estimate the probability of participation. In addition, borrowers with different 
financial costs, financial ratios, and personal demographics are hypothesized to behave 
differently. However, the importance of different financial measures on the probability of 
participation of the flow and the stock approach may be different. Thus, the financial 
measures incorporated in the flow or the stock participation equation will be different. The 
financial measures indicating a borrower's financial profitability and stability, including 
ROA, LIQUEDIT, DTOA, and MGTEFF, are assumed to affect his/her additional or 
short-term borrowings. However, the financial measures reflecting a borrower's capital 
stability, including DTOA, INTCOV, and ASSETTO are assimied to affect accumulated or 
long-term borrowings. 
Estimation Steps 
The detailed two-stage estimation procedure can be divided into the five steps 
described next. 
First step: 
The first step of the procedure involves the estimation of the reduced-form decision 
equation by the probit method. The reduced-form decision equation includes all the 
exogenous variables shown in Eqs. (6.10) through (6.14). The coefficients firom the 
reduced-form probit equation explain the total effects of the exogenous variables on the 
probability of participating in a nontraditional lender's credit program, both through the 
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contract term differentials for participating versus nonparticipating and through the 
farmer-borrower's socioeconomic attributes. 
Second step: 
In this step, the fitted value from the reduced-form probit result is used to generate 
two selectivity variables for participants and nonparticipants, respectively. The derivation 
of selectivity variables follows the expression in equation set (6.7), but replaces 4*; 
A 
with Ti, the estimated 4^;. 
Third step: 
After deriving the estimated selectivity variables, the corresponding corrected loan 
term equations can be formed by adding in the estimated selectivity variables. Then, the 
corrected loan term Eqs. (6.10) through (6.13), which are specified to incorporate the 
variables identified to be important in determining loan terms, may be estimated by OLS, 
which produces imbiased coefficients. This first-stage estimation procedure is completed 
by deriving the corresponding asymptotic t-statistics for each equation based on the correct 
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix developed by Heckman in 1979. 
Fourth step: 
The fourth step entails calculating the predicted values of loan size, collateral 
requirement, interest rate, and length of loan from the estimated coefficients. The 
consistent estimated coefficients from the loan term equations permit the prediction of loan 
terms for each individual in both participation and nonparticipation status. Afterwards, the 
predicted loan term differences can be applied to estimate the probability that the borrower 
will choose the nontraditional lender. 
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Fifth step: 
The final step of the procedure involves the second-stage probit estimation of the 
decision or participation equation expressed as Eq. (6.14). In addition to the loan term 
differentials obtained in the fourth step, other appropriate exogenous variables 
hypothesized to influence the borrower's panicipation decision are incorporated in the 
structural decision equation. In particular, because the loan term equations and decision 
equation do not have all the same exogenous variables, that is, more than one exogenous 
explanatory variable do not appear in both equations, there is no identification problem in 
estimating the coefficients of the structural decision equation. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the results of the econometric estimation. According to the 
analytical models in the previous two chapters, the financial and personal attributes of a 
borrower are theoretically recognized as important factors in establishing optimal terms of 
loan contracts offered by lenders. In addition to these two categories of variables, the 
terms of the loan contract are theoretically identified as being critical in the 
farmer-borrower's participation decision. Therefore, the empirical results, presented in the 
following three parts, give a clearer picture about which factors are empirically crucial in 
affecting the lender's formation of a loan contract package and the borrower's participation 
decision. 
The results are presented iu the following three sections. The first section reports 
the estimation results after implementing step one as specified in the previous chapter. 
These results indicate the combined effect of all the variables used in estimating the 
probability of participation. The second section presents the estimation results after 
implementing step three. These results include sixteen corrected equilibrium loan term 
equations—eight for the flow approach for nontraditional and traditional borrowers and 
eight for the stock approach. Selectivity variables are included in each equation to 
generate unbiased coefficients. These results reveal how the equilibrium terms of a loan 
contract are established by lenders and borrowers. In addition, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the significance of the selectivity variables indicates the borrowers' 
self-selection phenomenon in the loan contract participation decision. The third section 
reports the estimates of the structural-form decision equation after implementing the fifth 
step, which explains the incentives for the farmer-borrower's selection decision and the 
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magnitudes of these incentives on the borrower's participation probability. The 
correspondmg empirical implications of these findings are discussed at the end of this 
chapter. 
Estimates of the Reduced-Form Probability Equation 
Maximum likelihood probit estimates of the reduced-form participation equation for 
the flow and stock approaches are reported in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, respectively. The 
reduced-form participation equation includes all the exogenous variables shown in Eqs. 
(6.10) through (6.13). Therefore, the estimates capmre the "combined" effects of those 
variables on the probability of participation, both via their indirect effects through loan 
term differential variables and via their direct effects on the probability equation. The 
direct effects of the variables on the probability equation after incorporating the predicted 
loan term differential variables are discussed in the third section of this chapter. 
The flow approach 
Table 7.1 shows that for flow lending activity in 1992, among the 22 variables 
considered, only the borrower's cost of debt, husband's education, use of hail insurance, 
and asset mmover ratio have strongly significant effects on the static reduced-form 
probability equation. The coefficient of the COD variable is significantly positive, 
indicating that farmer-borrowers with higher financing costs for operating farm businesses 
are more inclined to select nontraditional lenders. Another significant financial variable is 
ASSETTO. The significantly negative coefficient reveals that the likelihood that a 
farmer-borrower chooses nontraditional lenders is expected to decrease with a higher 
ASSETTO ratio in the reduced-form model. The remaining financial measures do not 
have significant combined effects. 
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Table 7.1. Probit estimates of the reduced-form probability equation for the flow approach 
Regressor Coefficient Chi Square 
INTERCEPT -0.04735 0.00248 
COD 5.10476*** 7.38957 
COLOSPRD -0.61449 0.22982 
FLEXP 0.00002 0.62407 
DEPSUPP -0.07682 0.32718 
AGES 0.06776 0.31226 
EDH 0.28778** 4.53006 
EDW -0.08342 0.45516 
SIZEA -0.13275 0.92473 
CASGRAF 0.14239 0.13924 
GRALVSF -0.01772 0.00252 
HOGF 0.05877 0.01681 
BEEFF -0.41766 0.71664 
DAIRYF -0.42252 0.56054 
MPCI 0.07382 1.08571 
HAILI -0.20976*** 8.05785 
GOVTI 0.08925 0.51911 
ROA 0.44382 0.31889 
LIQUIDIT 0.00197 0.00601 
DTOA 0.00771 0.00028 
INTCOV -0.00797 1.90265 
ASSETTO -1.05836* 2.71011 
MGTEFF 0.02716 0.03876 
Log Likelihood -106.2014 
L.R. Chi-square 212.4029*** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 7.2. Probit estimates of the reduced-form probability equation for the stock 
approach 
Regressor Coefficient Chi Square 
INTERCEPT 1.32311 2.86549 
COD 2.92750* 2.98640 
COLOSPRD 0.42151 0.10915 
FLEXP 0.00002 0.96658 
DEPSUPP -0.20140* 3.19962 
AGES 0.01493 0.02357 
EDH -0.01235 0.01399 
EDW -0.00542 0.00280 
SIZEA -0.20660* 3.21991 
CASGRAF -0.49085 2.19533 
GRALVSF -0.50911* 2.85828 
HOGF -0.25858 0.49505 
BEEFF -0.16237 0.15829 
DAIRYF -0.69624 1.75101 
MPCI 0.02153 0.14365 
HAILI -0.11665** 4.40319 
GOVTI 0.07673 0.58614 
ROA -1.63017* 2.95129 
LIQUIDIT 0.00741 0.18333 
DTOA 0.12525 0.09500 
INTCOV 0.00198 0.19247 
ASSETTO -0.57012 0.95269 
MGTEFF 0.05919 0.26364 
Log Likelihood -154.5534 
L.R. Chi-square 309.1069** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
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Except for the education of the husband and use of hail insurance, the personal 
characteristics of farmer-borrowers appear to have insignificant combined effects on the 
reduced-form decision equation. The significantly positive coefficient of EDH implies that 
a more educated husband is more likely to participate in a nontraditional lender's credit 
program after considering the EDH variable's direct and indirect effects. The HAILI 
variable is highly significant and exhibits a strong negative relationship with participation 
in the reduced-form model. In other words, farmers who use hail insurance very often are 
less inclined to select nontraditional lenders' programs. Examination of the farm type 
coefficients suggests that the probability of participation will be similar among operators of 
different types of farm businesses after incorporating the total effects of the exogenous 
farm type variables. The 1 percent significance of the likelihood ratio test shows that the 
null hypothesis that all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected, which implies 
that these exogenous variables capture explanatory power in explaining the participation 
equation of the flow approach. 
The stock approach 
Table 7.2 reveals that the significance of the probit estimates of the reduced-form 
probability equation for the stock approach is different firom that of the flow approach. 
Results in Table 7.2 indicate that the variables of cost of debt, dependents supported, farm 
size, grain-livestock farm, hail insurance use, and remm on assets seem to have 
statistically significant effects on the reduced-form probability equation. The positive 
coefficient of COD implies that farm businesses are more likely to finance from 
nontraditional lenders as their cost of debt is higher, which is consistent with the result of 
the flow analysis. The variable DEPSUPP has significant combined effects on the 
reduced-form probability equation, which suggests that farm borrowers with more 
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dependents to support would be less likely to finance credit from nontraditional lenders. 
The significantly negative sign of SIZEA demonstrates that operators of larger farms are 
more inclined to borrow operating funds from traditional lenders than from nontraditional 
lenders. The signs of the insignificant variables FLEXP, AGES, and EDW are the same 
as those for the flow approach. The coefficient of EDH strikingly changes from 
significantly positive in the flow approach to insignificantly negative in the stock approach, 
and the coefficient of COLOSPRD also changes from negative to positive. 
With the exception of operators of grain-livestock farms, which appear less likely to 
finance from nontraditional lenders, operators of other types of farms have no significant 
preference to participate in nontraditional lenders' programs. HAILI is the only risk 
management variable with a significant effect on participation probability, which is 
consistent with the result for the flow approach. Of the six financial measures, remm on 
assets, ROA, is the only measure with a significant combined effect for the stock approach. 
The coefficient on ROA indicates that farmer-borrowers with higher ROA are inclined to 
reduce their participation in nontraditional lenders' programs. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of these variables are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 5 percent (or 1 
percent) significance level of likelihood ratio test. Therefore, these variables have 
statistically significant power in explaining the reduced-form participation equation in the 
stock approach. 
Estimates of the Equilibrium Loan Term Equations 
The estimates of the 16 equilibrium loan term equations for the flow and stock 
approaches are presented in Table 7.3 through Table 7.10. These equations are fitted by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with an instrumental variable included in each equation to 
control for selectivity bias. In particular, the t-statistics reported in these tables are 
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Table 7.3. Estimated coefficients of the corrected loan size equation for the flow approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
-15862.00 -0.713 223826.00*** 5.975 
LIQUIDIT^^ - 1702.64*** -3.135 277.19 0.484 
DTOA 17094.00 1.036 2214.74 0.084 
INTCOV 315.11 1.058 - 109.99 -0.579 
ASSETTO - 996.08 -0.049 - 20222.00 -1.072 
MGTEFF^^^ - 1481.93 -0.186 31089.00*** 5.052 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP 1120.54 0.356 2614.10 0.870 
AGES 2891.87 0.719 - 3332.74 -0.581 
EDH - 3180.37 -0.680 - 456.01 -0.087 
EDW 789.32 0.181 - 5791.67 -1.271 
SIZEA 4360.00 1.048 - 3726.45 -0.642 
CASGRAF^ 23105.00*** 5.801 - 9447.26 -0.664 
GRALVSF 13518.00 1.247 - 5931.93 -0.470 
HOGF^^ 12703.00 0.801 - 59248.00** -2.088 
BEEFF 11574.00 0.749 - 24189.00 -1.460 
DAIRYF - 8149.33 -0.708 - 12245.00 -0.589 
MPCI - 537.70 -0.234 924.93 0.363 
HAIL! 1183.46 0.431 - 687.76 -0.203 
GOVTf 99.94 0.035 - 15027.00* -1.738 
SELECTIVITY - 3196.65 -0.148 5982.74 0.255 
R- 0.280 0.307 
F- value 0.837 2.210*** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
tt 
ttt 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 5 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 1 percent level. 
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Table 7.4. Estimated coefficients of the corrected collateral equation for the flow 
approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
ROA - 84402.00 -0.988 - 33169.00 -0.705 
LIQUIDIT 6867.38*** 2.703 6428.45*** 3.300 
DTOA -130860.00** -2.397 -153997.00*** -3.903 
INTCOV 698.52 0.807 - 420.04 -0.884 
ASSETTO^ -140107.00* -1.789 19108.00 0.846 
MGTEFF - 36323.00 -0.852 - 5031.97 -1.030 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP - 12814.00 -1.173 - 14024.00 -1.449 
AGES - 10513.00 -0.636 4707.98 0.470 
EDH 20488.00 1.025 1336.98 0.107 
EDW 8820.23 0.508 1971.58 0.176 
SIZEA 74682.00*** 3.613 97942.00*** 5.842 
CASGRAF - 20089.00 -0.463 - 78403.00*** -3.282 
GRALVSF 12885.00 0.297 - 53550.00*** -2.864 
HOGF^^ 146989.00** 2.236 - 8892.78 -0.299 
BEEFF 99159.00 1.323 - 20675.00 -0.407 
DAIRYF 41111.00 0.768 - 2938.52 -0.106 
MPCf^ - 26054.00** -2.395 - 2302.39 -0.448 
HAILI 7422.52 0.664 - 5539.25 -0.640 
GOVTI 16160.00 1.317 - 837.02 -0.070 
SELECTIVITY - 40535.00 -0.470 - 39998.00 -0.698 
R- 0.654 0.518 
F- value 3.640*** 5.324*** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
tt Two coefficients are significantly different at 5 percent level. 
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Table 7.5. Estimated coefficients of the corrected interest rate equation for the flow 
approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
ROA -0.4686 -0.162 1.7323** 2.548 
LIQUIDIT 0.0438 0.517 0.0253 0.891 
DTOA 0.0640 0.028 -0.9845 -0.878 
INTCOV 0.0241 0.552 -0.0006 -0.120 
ASSETTO 7.0224** 2.158 1.4943** 2.579 
MGTEFF^ -3.2017 -1.630 0.3067** 2.477 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP 0.2853 0.842 -0.2934 -1.608 
AGES 0.7046 0.987 -0.2310 -0.926 
EDH -0.1777 -0.286 0.3922** 2.202 
EDW -0.5928 -0.915 -0.1194 -0.568 
SIZEA -1.1294 -1.401 -0.2049 -1.453 
CASGRAF 1.9899 0.845 -0.8363 -1.250 
GRALVSF -0.2321 -0.108 -0.7731 -1.519 
HOGF^ -2.2034 -1.019 2.3312** 2.487 
BEEFF 2.1038 0.901 -0.3975 -0.679 
DAIRYF 0.7877 0.238 1.3392 1.383 
MPCI 0.2663 0.664 0.0656 0.702 
HAILI 0.7547 1.599 0.2868** 2.437 
GOVTI 0.1073 0.224 -0.5469*** -2.742 
SELECTIVITY 2.3904 0.749 1.0328 1.432 
R- 0.353 0.658 
F- value 1.063 1.828^ 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
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Table 7.6. Estimated coefficients of corrected loan length equation for the flow approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
ROA^^ 20.908 1.414 -64.105** -2.121 
LIQUmiT 0.761* 1.918 - 0.153 -0.138 
DTOA - 7.309 -0.860 -84.414 -1.493 
INTCOV - 0.376*** -2.681 - 0.002 -0.008 
ASSETTO^ - 7.789 -0.534 49.250 1.589 
MGTEFF 1.418 0.122 -10.764 -1.348 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP^ - 1.667 -0.685 9.152* 1.713 
AGES - 4.879* -1.638 - 0.967 -0.133 
EDH - 2.703 -0.817 - 0.399 -0.054 
EDW 6.703** 2.090 - 2.243 -0.337 
SIZEA 5.316 1.340 5.105 0.533 
CASGRAF^^ 20.786** 2.219 - 0.836 -1.287 
GRALVSF 8.687 0.960 - 0.773 -1.293 
HOGF 27.373** 2.497 2.332 0.100 
BEEFF 16.478* 1.699 - 0.397 -0.431 
DAIRYF 4.695 0.503 1.339 1.417 
MPCI - 0.767 -0.507 5.869 1.303 
HAILI 3.204* 1.728 8.528 0.949 
GOVTI - 0.756 -0.344 4.616 0.426 
SELECTIVITY^^^ -10.610 -0.707 36.456 0.825 
0.434 0.414 
F- value 1.495 0.672 
Note; * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 5 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 1 percent level. 
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Table 7.7. Estimated coefficients of the corrected loan size equation for the stock 
approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic r Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
ROA^^ - 9674.78 -0.439 56031.00** 2.243 
LIQUIDIT^^^ - 609.91 -1.617 - 2266.08*** -4.910 
DTOA^^^ -27663.00** -2.519 17978.00* 1.982 
INTCOV^^ 336.57 1.599 - 189.50** -2.002 
ASSETTO 6459.28 0.657 - 3978.65 -0.331 
MGTEFF - 8175.68 -0.531 - 860.46 -0.336 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP^ - 2939.82 -0.826 6133.64** 2.153 
AGES^^ - 4861.74** -2.093 2373.31 0.821 
EDH 3840.36 1.009 6366.18* 1.971 
EDW^ 708.18 0.273 - 6458.71* -1.935 
SIZEA^^ 10277.00*** 3.161 27482.00*** 4.741 
CASGRAF 9435.03 0.950 7572.57 0.822 
GRALVSF - 2533.85 -0.307 10755.00 1.114 
HOGF 9904.02 1.081 22775.00** 2.186 
BEEFF 1174.83 0.134 30016.00* 1.802 
DAIRYF - 5471.48 -0.516 38808.00 0.994 
MPCI - 488.65 -0.228 - 914.95 -0.656 
HAILI - 325.65 -0.125 3301.72 1.579 
GOVTI - 735.76 -0.218 - 1437.17 -0.455 
SELECTIVITY 1607.26 0.059 18484.00 1.217 
0.407 0.330 
F- value 2.295*** 4.269*** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 5 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 1 percent level. 
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Table 7.8. Estimated coefficients of the corrected collateral equation for the stock 
approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
ROA -329308.00** -2.435 -153061.00 -1.152 
LIQUIDIT 6839.54* 1.789 11115.00* 1.999 
DTOA^ -214316.00*** -3.273 - 86217.00** -2.223 
INTCOV 357.39 0.317 520.23 1.130 
ASSETTO - 70479.00 -1.383 - 9700.43 -0.313 
MGTEFF^ 150540.00 1.496 4083.72 0.872 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP - 51434.00*** -2.796 - 21398.00** -2.244 
AGES 1276.40 0.072 293.76 0.036 
EDH 3339.29 0.150 - 7511.18 -0.599 
EDW 22221.00 1.362 - 7097.24 -0.435 
SIZEA 109833.00*** 4.566 69444.00*** 4.237 
CASGRAF - 96545.00 -1.396 - 85953.00*** -2.507 
GRALVSF -169524.00** -2.479 - 94104.00*** -2.683 
HOGF 22338.00 0.250 1117.79 0.032 
BEEFF - 19328.00 -0.225 19674.00 0.532 
DAIRYF - 21610.00 -0.216 - 90119.00* -1.913 
MPCI - 21916.00* -1.756 - 9167.61* -1.777 
HAELI - 25665.00 -1.388 - 9807.18 -1.209 
GOVTI 34388.00** 1.983 18077.00** 2.031 
SELECTIVITY^ -357549.00** -2.020 - 99570.00 -1.473 
0.580 0.446 
F- value 4.547*** 6.920^ 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
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Table 7.9. Estimated coefficients of the corrected interest rate equation for the stock 
approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
ROA 
UQUIDIT 
DTOA 
INTCOV 
ASSETTO^^ 
MGTEFF 
-1.4298 
0.0800 
5.6232* 
-0.0476 
7.5778** 
-4.1280 
-0.202 
1.490 
1.664 
-1.395 
2.097 
-1.140 
1.9208* 
-0.0217 
1.8877** 
0.0025 
-0.6063 
0.2603 
1.732 
-1.208 
2.509 
0.805 
-0.930 
1.147 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP^ 
AGES 
EDH 
EDW 
SIZEA 
CASGRAF 
GRALVSF 
HOGF 
BEEFF 
DAIRYF^ 
MPCI 
HAIU^^^ 
GOVTI 
SELECTIVITY^^ 
F- value 
0.8332** 2.057 
0.4381 0.518 
0.1437 0.211 
0.1997 0.402 
0.6930 1.465 
-0.3109 -0.206 
-2.1507* -1.680 
-5.2388** -2.119 
-2.4965 -0.823 
-3.3806* -1.913 
-0.1728 -0.598 
1.1035** 2.598 
-1.3157** -2.238 
9.9869*** 2.932 
0.620 
1.550 
0.0993 1.227 
0.2132* 1.743 
0.2093 1.322 
-0.0552 -0.137 
-0.3016 -1.457 
-0.6364 -1.388 
-0.5239 -1.035 
-1.1434** -2.031 
-1.2635*** -2.801 
1.1747 1.471 
0.0199 0.268 
-0.0212 -0.268 
-0.3371*** -2.491 
0.4849 0.691 
0.467 
2.102** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 5 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 1 percent level. 
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Table 7.10. Estimated coefficients of the corrected loan length equation for the stock 
approach 
Nontraditional Credit User Traditional Credit User 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t Coefficient Asymptotic t 
Financial Measures 
ROA 22.801 0.835 -41.434 -1.275 
LIQUIDIT 0.571* 1.816 0.190 0.411 
DTOA 6.951 0.505 -22.372 -1.560 
INTCOV - 0.202 -1.624 - 0.111** -2.081 
ASSETTO^ - 8.877 -0.578 28.283** 2.149 
MGTEFF -31.573 -1.469 3.128 0.638 
Borrower Characteristics 
DEPSUPP 2.555* 1.694 3.904** 2.440 
AGES^^ -10.579*** -2.911 - 0.040 -0.017 
EDH -10.678*** -3.680 - 2.647 -0.611 
EDW 5.296** 2.816 - 0.443 -0.125 
SIZEA - 3.476 -1.279 5.706 0.995 
CASGRAF 11.284 1.528 - 0.910 -0.077 
GRALVSF - 1.873 -0.257 -18.983 -1.492 
HOGF 23.985** 2.342 5.205 0.376 
BEEFF 1.282 0.113 5.271 0.407 
DAIRYF^ -11.886 -1.293 18.245 1.369 
MPCI 3.943*** 2.783 5.263*** 2.888 
HAILI^^ - 2.455 -1.211 3.681** 2.237 
GOVTI 3.911 1.322 5.645** 2.139 
SELECTIVITY -22.553 -1.520 - 6.716 -0.364 
R- 0.653 0.462 
F-value 1.790* 2.060** 
Note; * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
^ Two coefficients are significantly different at 10 percent level. 
Two coefficients are significantly different at 5 percent level. 
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asymptotic t-statistics derived from die correct asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. As 
mentioned previously, the loan size, collateral, interest rate, and loan length equations are 
simultaneously determined, and include only those variables hypothesized to influence 
these four terms of the contract package simultaneously. 
The flow approach 
Table 7.3 contains the estimates of the equilibrium loan size equations by type of 
credit user using the flow form of the participation variable. The significant financial 
variable for determining nontraditional credit users' loan size is LIQUIDIT, while those 
for traditional credit users are ROA and MGTEFF. The results indicate that as the 
nontraditional credit user's liquidity becomes higher, the equilibrium size of the loan 
declines. In addition, as the traditional credit user's profitability increases and managerial 
efficiency decreases, the loan size extended by traditional lenders increases. Examination 
of the borrower characteristic variables reveals that nontraditional credit users categorized 
as operators of cash-grain farms accept larger loans from nontraditional lenders compared 
with other types of nontraditional borrowers. However, traditional credit users categorized 
as operators of hog farms accept smaller loans from traditional lenders compared with 
other types of traditional credit users. Traditional credit users who are more likely to 
participate in government programs are also foimd to borrow less from traditional lenders. 
In general, the most significant factors affecting the nontraditional and traditional 
equilibrium loan sizes extended by lenders and accepted by borrowers are different; 
furthermore, the estimated signs for these two equations are not consistent. ROA, 
LIQUIDIT, MGTEFF, CASGRAF, HOGF, and GOVTI have significantly different effects 
on the determination of the equilibriimi loan size by two types of lenders. 
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Table 7.4 shows the estimated coefficients of two collateral equations for 
nontraditional and traditional borrowers. The sign and significance of the financial 
variables between these two groups in the collateral equation are more consistent than 
those in the loan size equation. The significantly positive and negative coefficients of the 
variables LIQUIDIT and DTOA in Table 7.4 reveal that farmer-borrowers with higher 
liquidity or lower leverage pledge more collateral. However, the significantly negative 
coefficient of ASSETTO in the second column of Table 7.4 indicates that the pledgeable 
collateral assets sought by nontraditional lenders are lower if the borrower's capital 
efficiency is higher. Nontraditional credit users with larger farms or hog enterprises have 
a higher value of collateral assets. Farms frequently using multiple-peril crops insurance 
have lower values of collateral assets. Among traditional credit users, larger farms have 
more collateral assets and cash-grain farms have significantly less collateral assets. 
ASSETTO, HOGF, and MPCI play significantly different roles in determining the 
collateral pledged by two types of credit users. The significance of the F-value and R" 
indicates that these variables capture overall explanatory power of the reduced collateral 
equations. 
Table 7.5 lists the OLS estimates of two interest rate equations for static credit 
extension in 1992. The most significant factor determining the nontraditional interest rate 
charged is ASSETTO, meaning that a higher capital efficiency will increase the interest 
rate asked by nontraditional lenders. The most significant factors for traditional lenders 
are ASSETTO, MGTEFF, EDH, HOGF, HAILI, and GOVTI. This result implies that for 
a traditional borrower, higher profitability and financial efficiency may increase the 
interest rate paid. However, higher managerial efficiency may lower the interest rate 
charged. Furthermore, traditional credit users with a more educated husband, greater 
frequency of using hail insurance, or categorized as operating hog farms are charged a 
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higher interest rate. The more frequent a borrower's participation in government 
programs, the lower the interest rate charged by traditional lenders. In general, the 
financial and characteristic variables have same effects on the nontraditional and traditional 
interest rate equations, with the exception of MGTEFF and HOGF, which are differently 
used by two types of lenders. 
The estimated coefficients for the corrected loan length equations for the flow 
approach are given in Table 7.6. For nontraditional credit users, the equilibrium loan 
length increases as liquidity increases, but significantly decreases as repayment ability 
increases. EDW, CASGRAF, HOGF, BEEFF, and HAILI all have a significantly positive 
relationship with the equilibrium loan length, with the exception of AGES, which is 
negatively associated with loan length. For traditional credit users, the significant factors 
affecting the equilibrium loan length are ROA and DEPSUPP, which are negatively and 
positively associated with loan length, respectively. This result implies that traditional 
credit users with higher returns on assets have shorter operating loans, and those with 
more dependents to support are offered longer loan lengths. ROA, ASSETTO, 
DEPSUPP, CASGRAF, and SELECTIVITY play significantly different roles in 
determining the nontraditional and traditional loan length equations. 
Of particular interest are the estimated coefficients of the selectivity variables. 
However, under the data limitations, especially the relatively small number of loan terms, 
none of the coefficients of the eight selectivity variables in the eight equilibrium loan term 
equations by type of credit users is significantly different from zero. This evidence, 
therefore, can only be interpreted that the self-selection phenomenon was not so important 
in financing operating credit in 1992 based on limited observations; however, whether 
self-selection has a marked effect on the estimated responses of farmer-borrowers to loan 
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term differentials based on whole samples will be carefully examined in the third section of 
this chapter, which discusses the structural-form participation equation. 
The stock approach 
Table 7.7 gives the estimates of two loan size equations based on the 1993 data set, 
where the accumulated debt reported in the farmers' 1993 balance sheets is used as the 
participation measure. The results show that financial factors significantly affecting the 
traditional and nontraditional equilibrium loan size equations for the stock approach are 
different in sign and significance, except for the liquidity variable, which has consistent 
significantly negative effects across credit users, implying that higher liquidity generally 
reduces the size of the loan offered. For nontraditional credit users, an increase in the 
leverage ratio or the fanner's age results in a significantly smaller size of loan extended. 
Farm size is most responsive to the equilibrium loan size, meaning that operators of larger 
farms tend to borrow significantly more than do operators of smaller farms. Accordingly, 
except that liquidity has a significantly negative effect on the equilibrium loan size in both 
the fiow and stock approaches, leverage ratio, age and farm size become more crucial in 
determining loan size in the stock approach. 
For traditional credit users, ROA, LIQUIDIT, DTOA, and INTCOV play 
significant roles in affecting the size of the loan granted. Only ROA has positive effects on 
loan size for both the flow and stock approaches. In contrast to that for nontraditional 
credit users, the leverage ratio for traditional credit users appears to have a significantly 
positive relationship with the equilibrium loan size, indicating that traditional credit users 
with higher leverage ratios are likely to be granted more money from traditional lenders. 
The significant negative sign of INTCOV implies that an increase in repayment ability will 
reduce the size of the loan extended. In addition, more dependents, a more educated 
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husband, and a less educated wife in the traditional credit user's family tend to increase the 
equilibrium loan size. Loan size is most responsive to farm size, as shown in the 
nontraditional credit users group. Regarding farm type, operators of hog and beef farms 
are found to borrow more than are operators of other types of farms. 
ROA, LIQUIDIT, DTOA, INTCOV, DEPSUPP, AGES, EDW, and SIZEA are 
significantly differently used by two types of lenders when offer their optimal loan size. It 
is clear that the variables in the stock approach have more significantly different effects 
between nontraditional and traditional loan size equations than those of the flow approach. 
The test statistics listed at the bottom of Table 7.7 indicate that both the nontraditional and 
traditional credit user's loan size equations are jointly statistically significant at the 1 
percent significance level. Comparing the flow and stock regression results for corrected 
loan size in Table 7.3 and Table 7.7, it is obvious that the financial measures and borrower 
characteristics have more significant efiects on determining the equilibrium loan size in the 
stock approach than in the flow approach, especially for the traditional credit users group. 
That is, the socioeconomic characteristics appear to have a more significant influence on 
accumulated borrowings or dynamic lending activity than on new borrowings or static 
lending activity. 
The parameter estimates of the corrected collateral equations are presented in Table 
7.8. Among the six financial measures, LIQUIDIT and DTOA appear to have 
significantly positive and negative effects upon collateral across the two types of credit 
users, respectively. This result coincides with the findings for the flow approach discussed 
in the previous section. ROA also is a crucial factor and displays a negative relationship 
with collateral across borrowers, especially for nontraditional credit users. This result 
might be due to the fact that credit users with higher ROA have less collateral assets to 
pledge. In addition, DEPSUPP, GRALVSF, and MPCI have significantly negative 
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relationships, but SIZE and GOVTI have significantly positive relationships with collateral 
across farmer-borrowers. These findings imply that borrowers with more dependents, 
smaller farms, greater frequency of using MPCI, less frequency of using government 
programs, and categorized as grain-livestock farms operators have less pledgeable 
collateral assets across farm borrowers. For traditional credit users, in addition to the 
significant influences of the above variables, operators of cash grain farms and dairy farms 
are shown to have less collateral assets. 
In general, most of the socioeconomic variables are similarly valued by two types 
of lenders, except that DTOA, MGTEFF, and SELECTIVITY, which are significantly 
differenfly used by two types of lenders. The significance of the selectivity variable in the 
nontraditional credit user's collateral equation also provides evidence of the importance of 
accounting for selectivity bias in estimating the collateral equation. A test of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the collateral equation are jointly equal to zero is 
rejected for both nontraditional and traditional credit users at the 1 percent significance 
level. This result is consistent with the test result for the flow approach. The borrower's 
socioeconomic characteristics more significantiy affect the stock collateral equation than 
the flow collateral equation. 
The OLS estimates of the interest rate equations by type of credit user are reported 
in Table 7.9. There is an opposite sign pattern in the coefficients of the financial variables 
across the two types of borrowers, except for that of DTOA. DTOA has a significantly 
positive relationship with the equilibrium interest rate across credit users, meaning that a 
higher leverage ratio will significandy increase the interest rate paid, regardless of whether 
the lender is nontraditional or traditional. For nontraditional lenders, ASSETTO appears 
to have a significandy positive effect in determining the equilibriimi interest rate. In other 
words, a higher asset turnover ratio imexpectedly increases the equilibrium interest rate. 
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Further, note that DEPSUPP and HAILI have a significantly positive relationship, while 
GRALVSF, HOGF, DAIRYF, and GOVTI have a significantly negative relationship with 
the equilibrium interest rate paid by nontraditional credit users. This result suggests that 
farm businesses with more dependents and that make greater use of hail insurance tend to 
pay a higher interest rate. Those businesses categorized as grain-livestock farms, hog 
farms, and dairy farms, or those that participate more frequently in government programs 
tend to pay a lower interest rate. For traditional credit users, the significantly positive 
effect of ROA implies that a higher return on assets increases the interest rate paid by 
traditional credit users. In addition, the positive effect of AGES and the negative effects of 
HOGF, BEEFF, and GOVTI are shown to be significant. These results suggest that 
traditional lenders are inclined to charge higher interest rates to older traditional credit 
users, but to charge lower rates to those traditional credit users who are classified as 
operators of hog farms or beef farms and who more often participate in government 
programs. In general, increased participation in government programs will significantly 
reduce the interest rate paid across the two types of borrowers. 
ASSETTO, DEPSUPP, DAIRYF, HAIU, and SELECTIVITY have significantly 
different effects on determining the interest rates offered by the nontraditional and 
traditional lenders, respectively. The selectivity variable is positively associated with the 
nontraditional credit user's interest rate, revealing that self-selection is statistically 
important in estimating the interest rate equation. The sign and significance of ASSETTO 
of nontraditional credit users and those of ROA and GOVTI of traditional credit users are 
consistent in both the flow and stock interest rate equations. Furthermore, socioeconomic 
attributes more significantiy affect the interest rate equation in the stock approach than that 
in the flow approach, especially for the nontraditional credit users group. 
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The empirical results in estimating the corrected loan length equations using the 
stock data set are presented in Table 7.10. The coefficient of LIQUIDIT is significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level in the loan length equation of nontraditional 
credit users, but not significant in that of traditional credit users. In addition, an increase 
in INTCOV decreases the loan length extended across credit users. This effect is 
significantly different from zero at the 11 percent and 5 percent levels for nontraditional 
and traditional credit users, respectively. The significantly positive relationship between 
ASSETTO and loan length extended to traditional credit users does not apply to 
nontraditional credit users. 
With respect to the effects of borrower characteristics, DEPSUPP and MPCI are 
significantly positively associated with loan length across the two types of borrowers, 
indicating that an increase in dependents or in the frequency of using multiple-peril crop 
insurance increases the length of loans extended across all credit users. In addition, for 
nontraditional credit users, the estimates of AGES and EDH are significantly negative, 
whereas those of EDW and HOGF are significantly positive. These outcomes indicate that 
nontraditional credit borrowers of older ages and with higher education of the husband are 
extended shorter contract lengths, while those with higher education of the wife and 
classified as operating hog farms inversely are extended longer loan lengths. These 
relationships are not significant for traditional credit users. For the traditional credit users 
group, in addition to the significant effects of DEPSUPP and MPCI explained above, 
HAILI and GOVTI have a significantly positive association with loan length, which is 
weak for nontraditional credit users. As the frequency of hail insurance usage or 
govenmient program participation by traditional credit users increases, the equilibrium 
length of the loan contract extended also increases. This relationship is insignificant for 
nontraditional credit users. 
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ASSETTO, AGES, DAIRYF, and HAILI play significantly different roles in 
affecting the nontraditional and traditional loan length equations. Namely, the two types of 
lenders differently use these variables when determine their optimal loan length. The 
effect of the selectivity variable in the loan length equation of the nontraditional credit 
users group is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level, but it is significant at the 
13 percent level, which suggests that the self-selectivity variable should be taken into 
accoimt in estimating the loan length equation. The significant sample value of the 
F-statistics supports that a test of the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to 
zero is rejected at the 10 percent and 5 percent significance levels for nontraditional and 
traditional credit users, respectively. Comparison of the effects of socioeconomic 
characteristics on the flow and stock loan length equations obviously indicates that the 
stock loan length equation are more strongly affected by socioeconomic attributes, in 
particular for the traditional credit users group. 
Taken together, financial measures and borrower characteristics have more 
significant impacts on stock lending activities than on flow lending activities. In other 
words, socioeconomic characteristics offer more power in explaining lending activity based 
on total accumulated borrowings but less power in explaining that of new additional 
borrowings. 
Estimates of the Structural-Form Participation Equation 
The bivariate probit estimates of the structural decision equation, explaining the 
farmer-borrower's probability of participating in nontraditional lenders' credit programs 
based on the specification of Eq. (6.14), are reported in Tables 7.11 and 7.12 for the flow 
and stock approach, respectively. These two tables include the maximum likelihood 
estimated coefficients, likelihood ratio statistics, chi square ratios, and marginal effects of 
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Table 7.11. Estimated coefficients of the probit structural decision equation for the flow 
approach 
Regressor Coefficient Chi Square Marginal Effect 
INTERCEPT 1.018045 1.071371 
DEBTHAT 0.000023* 3.456589 0.0000077 
COLLATERHAT -0.000005** 3.585884 -0.0000019 
INTERESTHAT -0.528431** 4.439794 -0.2098706 
MONTHHAT -0.015468 0.937567 -0.0059648 
COD 4.532132*** 6.074481 1.7472573 
COLOSPRD -0.944957 0.583521 -0.3765142 
FLEX? 0.000040* 2.532039 0.0000094 
AGES 0.263413 2.230846 0.0799770 
EDH 0.104478 0.237725 0.0408384 
EDW -0.313518* 3.495823 -0.1043812 
SIZEA -0.920707*** 6.372919 -0.0043177 
CASGRAF 2.034973 1.998314 0.7333344 
GRALVSF 0.731532 1.051572 0.2768940 
HOGF -2.831753** 3.882264 -1.0876326 
BEEFF 1.122183 1.254099 0.4460750 
DAIRYF -1.278383 1.885094 -0.5092263 
ROA 5.777198** 3.606904 2.2233182 
LIQUroiT 0.711691* 2.863889 0.0126433 
DTOA 1.604576 1.063643 0.5667418 
MGTEFF -1.045343* 3.555872 -0.3082893 
Log Likelihood -107.3343 
L.R. Chi-square 213.3909*** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 7.12. Estimated coefficients of the probit structural decision equation for the stock 
approach 
Regressor Coefficient Chi Square Marginal Effect 
INTERCEPT -1.2874072 0.635799 
DEBTHAT 0.0000227*** 6.773959 0.0000089 
COLLATERHAT -0.0000003 0.013138 -0.0000001 
INTERESTHAT -0.0438338 0.505039 -0.0171442 
MONTHHAT -0.0022965 0.138764 -0.0009141 
COD 2.8611403* 2.909762 1.1310794 
COLOSPRD 0.2279085 0.043035 0.0909174 
FLEX? 0.0000296* 2.501383 0.0000089 
AGES 0.1574484* 2.479747 0.0567213 
EDH 0.0298083 0.074988 0.0118722 
EDW -0.1348007 0.844476 -0.0520113 
SIZEA 0.2133109 0.774724 0.0667273 
CASGRAF -0.4900201 2.168698 -0.1944302 
GRALVSF -0.2475966 0.409527 -0.0982745 
HOGF -0.0839764 0.035767 -0.0334998 
BEEFF 0.4279893 0.837097 0.1706101 
DAIRYF 0.0516290 0.006649 0.0205969 
DTOA 1.3493156*** 5.457752 0.4842765 
INTCOV -0.0125899* 2.650119 -0.0050201 
ASSETTO -0.5113421 0.445797 -0.2012746 
Log Likelihood -154.6148 
L.R. Chi-square 310.4421** 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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the regressors on the probability of decision equation evaluated at the sample means. In 
order to examine the relative contributions to the probability of participation, it is helpful 
to calculate the marginal effect on the likelihood of participation for each explanatory 
variable. Specifically, the marginal effect of theyth variable associated with the borrower 
i's participation probability is 
apr(Yi = 1) / a Xjj  = a F(P*' x^) / d x ^ '  =  f(p=<" Xj)  Pj* (7.1) 
Obviously, the relative impact will vary with the values of Xj. In interpreting the estimated 
model, it will be helpful to calculate the marginal effects at the means of the regressors. 
Accordingly, given a one unit change in a particular independent regressor, the 
corresponding estimated percentage change in the overall probability of participation at the 
sample mean, holding everything else constant, is listed in the fourth column of Tables 
7.11 and 7.12. 
The flow approach 
The estimates presented in Table 7.11 indicate the most significant factors 
determining a farmer-borrower's decision in choosing between two types of lenders using a 
flow measure of participation. Examination of the nontraditional and traditional lenders' 
loan term differential coefficients reveals that, except for the loan length differential, the 
terms of a loan contract, such as loan size, collateral, and interest rate differentials, are 
statistically significant determinants of loan contract selection. In other words, a 
farmer-borrower's participation decision strongly depends on the potential loan term gains 
or differentials, except for that of loan length. Specifically, the loan size differential has a 
significantly positive effect at the 10 percent level, but collateral and interest rate 
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differentials have significantly negative effects at the 5 percent level on the probability of 
participation in nontraditional lenders' loan contracts. These findings imply that a larger 
loan size, less collateral assets, or a lower interest rate may provide a strong incentive for 
farmer-borrowers to participate in nontraditional lenders' credit programs. Furthermore, 
the marginal effect of a 1 percent interest rate differential on the probability of 
participation is much stronger than that of $1,000 in the loan size differential or that of 
$1,000 in the collateral differential at the mean level. This result reveals that the empirical 
magnitude of the impact of a unit increase in the interest rate differential on the 
participation probability is larger compared with the other loan term variables, even though 
they have similar statistical significances. The insignificant coefficient of the loan length 
differential demonstrates that the probability of participation will not be significantly 
different for loan contracts of different lengths. In sum, these results indicate that, after 
considering the selectivity variable, farmer-borrowers are very sensitive to the loan term 
differentials when seeking new operating fiinds, especially to the interest rate differential. 
Another variable substantially influencing the participation decision is cost of debt, 
which has a significantly positive association with the probability of participation. The 
higher the cost of debt already borne by the farmer, the higher the probability of 
participation in nontraditional lenders' programs. The marginal effect indicates that a 1 
percent increase in the cost of debt will result in an approximately 1.8 percent greater 
likelihood of participation. This result is consistent with those of the reduced-form 
equation presented in Table 7.1. Examination of the variable COLOSPRD reveals that the 
cost of losing productivity is not a statistically significant determinant, but its marginal 
impact is empirically considerable, with a 0.58 percent change in probability 
corresponding to a 1 percent change in COLOSPRD. SIZEA also markedly affects the 
likelihood of participation at the 1 percent level. Its significantly negative coefficient 
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suggests that operators of larger farms are less inclined to borrow operating funds from 
nontraditional lenders. In other words, other things being equal, operators of smaller 
farms are significantly more likely to finance operating credit from nontraditional lenders. 
The negative coefficient of the farm type variable HOGF indicates that operators of 
bog farms are less likely to select nontraditional lenders' credit programs than are 
operators of other types of farms. Note that the other farm type variables were not 
significant. The positive coefficient of ROA reveals that the farmer-borrower with higher 
profitability is more willing to finance from nontraditional lenders. Specifically, a 1 
percent rise in ROA causes the probability of participation to rise by 2.2 percent. 
The FLEXP variable exhibits a significantly positive association with participation 
at the 10 percent level, meaning that farm businesses with higher family living 
expenditures are more inclined to participate. Analytically, a $1,000 increase in living 
expenditures will increase the probability of participation by 0.94 percent. Also, EDW has 
a significant effect on the participation decision at the 10 percent level. Its significantly 
negative coefficient shows that the more educated the wife is in a farm business, the lower 
the probability is of the business choosmg a nontraditional lender's contract. This 
relationship is weak for EDH. The variable EDH is insignificant and has a positive sign, 
suggesting that the husband's education has little positive effect on participation in 
nontraditional lenders' loan packages. 
Two financial measures with significant effects at the 10 percent level on the flow 
decision equation are LIQUIDIT and MGTEFF. The significantly positive coefficient of 
liquidity reflects that a farm business with higher liquidity is more inclmed to choose a 
nontraditional lender. For example, at the sample mean, a 1 percent increase in the 
liquidity ratio increases the probability of participation by 0.012 percent. In other words, 
a 100 percent (1.0 unit) rise in the ratio of current assets over non-real estate liabilities 
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increases the participation likelihood by 1.2 percent. The significantly negative coefficient 
of MGTEFF indicates that the farm business with higher managerial efficiency tends to 
finance from traditional lenders. The marginal effect of MGTEFF implies that a one unit 
rise in MGTEFF may result in a 0.3 percent decrease in the likelihood of participation. 
In simimary, the estimated results presented in Table 7.11 reveal that the 
farmer-borrower's probability of selecting a nontraditional lender decreases with collateral, 
interest rate, wife's education, farm size, hog farm category, and managerial efficiency, 
but increases with loan size, cost of debt, family living expenditures, remm on assets, and 
liquidity. The significance of likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero at the 1 percent significance level. In other words, 
these variables capture overall explanatory power of the participation equation in the flow 
approach. 
The stock approach 
The estimated coefficients of the structural decision equation using a stock-based 
measure of participation are reported in Table 7.12. It is clear that the significance of 
explanatory variables for the stock equation is substantially decreasing compared with that 
for the flow equation. Most of their signs are remarkably consistent across the two tables. 
These findings show that these explanatory variables have the same direction of effects, but 
have different significances for the two participation equations. Specifically, the loan term 
variables and socioeconomic variables have more significant influences when the flow 
measures are used than when stock measures are employed. 
The only loan term differential variable that appears to substantially affect the stock 
decision equation is the loan size differential, which is highly significant at the 1 percent 
level and exhibits a strong positive relationship with participation. An increase in the loan 
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size differential of $1,000 is associated with an increase in the probability of selecting 
nontraditional lenders' programs of 0.89 percent at the sample mean. This evidence 
implies that the loan size differential serves as a significant determinant of a 
farmer-borrower's participation decision, which is in line with the results of the flow 
approach reported in Table 7.11. As to the other loan term differentials, although the 
estimated coefficients are not significant, their relative size indicates that they may be of 
considerable importance in explaining the participation decision in the stock approach. 
Their signs are generally consistent with the flow approach as well. These findings also 
suggest that collateral and interest rate differentials do not significantiy contribute to the 
borrower's participation probability in the stock participation equation but do contribute in 
the flow participation equation. In general, the loan term differentials are found to have 
identical signs in the two models, but differ in their statistical significance. 
The most significant financial measure affecting the borrower's accuinulated 
borrowings is the debt-to-asset ratio. The positive and statistically significant effect of 
DTOA on the likelihood of participation implies that a higher leverage ratio may 
substantially motivate participation in nontraditional lenders' loan contracts. Evaluated at 
the mean, a 1 percent increase in the leverage ratio increases the probability of 
participation by 0.48 percent. 
Other variables significant at the 10 percent level include COD, FLEXP, AGES, 
and INTCOV, which all have signs consistent with those estimated in the flow model. The 
positive coefficients of the first three variables indicate that farmer-borrowers with higher 
costs of debt, higher living expenditures, and older ages are more likely to finance 
operating fimds firom nontraditional lenders. Therefore, a 1 percent increase in the cost of 
debt and a $1,000 increase in living expenses will cause a 1.13 percent and a 0.89 percent 
increase in the probability of participation, respectively. The large marginal effect of the 
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cost of debt reveals its empirical significance in the decision equation of both approaches. 
The interest coverage ratio is also significant at the 10 percent level but with a negative 
sign, meaning that the higher the repayment ability of the farmer, the lower the probability 
of participation. Its marginal effect is just 0.5 percent with a 100 percent, or 1.0 unit, 
increase in INTCOV. 
On the other hand, although both EDH and EDW are insignificant in the stock 
decision equation, they have identical signs to those in flow model. The coefficient of 
SIZEA obviously changes from significantly negative to insignificantly positive in the 
stock participation equation, implying a diminishing role of farm size on the borrowing 
decision. The farm type variables in this equation are all insignificant. Taking these 
variables together, the husband's education, wife's education, farm size, and farm type are 
found to have no significant impacts on the decision-making process of dynamic borrowing 
activity. 
The test statistics reported at the bottom of Table 7.12 indicate that the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1 percent 
significance level, which supports the explanatory power of these loan term variables and 
socioeconomic variables on the participation decision equation. 
Empirical Implications 
The estimation results presented in Tables 7.11 and 7.12 provide a number of 
insights into the relative importance of various factors on the likelihood of loan contract 
participation, and also help create a better understanding of the marketing strategies that 
lenders could use to enhance borrowers' willingness to participate. The empirical 
implications for the flow and stock approaches are analyzed below. 
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The flow approach 
Table 7.11 shows that the interest rate differential significantly outweighs other 
factors, even other loan term differentials, in influencing the borrower's participation 
decision. As shown previously, a 1 percent decrease in the percentage interest rate 
charged results in a 21 percent increase in the probability of panicipation based on the flow 
approach. A $1,000 increase in loan size or a $1,000 decrease in collateral cause 
approximately a 0.2 percent and a 0.7 percent increase, respectively, in the probability of 
acceptance of a nontraditional lender's loan contract. This finding implies that the 
incentive effects of a 1 percent decrease in interest rate are stronger than those of a $1,000 
decrease ua the collateral requirement or those of a $1,000 increase in loan size extended. 
To achieve the equivalent effect of a 1 percent decrease in interest rate on the participation 
probability, loan size and collateral need to increase by approximately $30,000 and 
decrease by approximately $105,000, respectively. 
Based on the standard deviations of the contract attributes presented in Table 6.2, 
the variability of nontraditional lenders' interest rates is larger than that of traditional 
lenders, but the variabilities of loan size and collateral of both types of lenders are similar. 
This result seems to imply that for nontraditional credit users, the interest rate incentive 
probably has stronger effects than do loan size and collateral incentives because a 1 percent 
increase in interest rate is more likely than a $30,000 decrease in loan size and a $105,000 
increase in collateral. For traditional credit users, this relationship is weak, which implies 
that all three incentives are likely to have similarly critical effects on motivating 
panicipation. Therefore, this evidence implies that for nontraditional credit users, the 
interest rate incentive may be more useful in encouraging participation in nontraditional 
lenders' credit programs. Or, increasing (decreasing) the interest rate charged appears to 
be the most efficient way to decrease (increase) a borrower's willingness to borrow 
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additional funds. For nontraditional lenders, the implementation strategy for short-term 
participation should focus on creating and offering a more competitive interest rate. 
Collateral and loan size incentives should be viewed as substitute tools for motivating 
participation if nontraditional lenders are able to easily reduce the interest rate charged. 
For traditional credit users, the interest rate, loan size, and collateral incentives may be 
equivalently helpful in motivating lending activity. 
In sum, using the flow measure of participation, borrower acceptance could be 
increased if lenders concentrated more on reducing the interest rate charged rather than 
offering relatively larger loans or reducing the collateral requirement. Interest rate 
competition between nontraditional and traditional lenders appears to be a major factor that 
will influence market share in the agricultural credit market. 
The stock approach 
When participation is viewed from a stock perspective, a different set of inferences 
can be drawn. Table 7.12 indicates that the loan size differential is the only loan attribute 
with a statistically significant effect on the farmer-borrower's participation decision across 
borrowers. Although the interest rate differential is foimd to be statistically insignificant, 
the size of the estimated coefficient may have an important effect on a borrower's 
participation. According to the results of the previous section, if loan size and collateral 
each increases by $1,000, the probability of participation increases by 0.89 percent and 
decreases by 0.01 percent, respectively. A 1 percent increase in the interest rate, on the 
other hand, will increase the probability of participation by 1.7 percent, evaluated at the 
mean. In other words, to achieve the same effect as a 1 percent increase in interest rate, 
loan size must decrease by $2,000 and collateral must increase by $170,000. 
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The standard deviation statistics of contract attributes presented in Table 6.6 show 
that a $2,000 increase in loan size is much more likely than a 1 percent increase in the 
interest rate and a $170,000 increase in the collateral requirement, respectively. This 
evidence suggests that, across borrowers, the loan size incentive has more influence on a 
borrower's willingness to select one lender over another than does the interest rate or 
collateral incentive. From the farmer-borrower's perspective, the offered loan size 
differential substantially affects the choice of a loan contract. The offered interest rate and 
collateral differentials are also important in stimulating borrowers' participation, but 
relatively less effective than the loan size incentive. Therefore, an implementation strategy 
for accumulated or long-term participation might emphasize offering relatively larger 
loans. The role of the interest rate incentive appears to be less important based on the 
stock equation of credit. 
In sum, both the flow and stock models indicate the importance of loan attributes in 
promoting farmer-borrowers' selection of nontraditional lenders' credit programs, 
especially interest rate and loan size. For the purpose of encouraging participation with 
limited credit sources compared with traditional lenders, nontraditional lenders should take 
advantage of the cross-subsidization effect to reduce the interest rate charged, and 
concentrate resources on the activities that could directly and indirectly reduce operational 
and financial costs and the interest rate charged. For traditional lenders without a 
cross-subsidization advantage but with diversified portfolios, lower funding costs, and 
broad credit sources, it is more advantageous to emphasize offering larger loans rather than 
lower interest rates when competing with nontraditional lenders. In one word, the issue of 
how to offer a competitive interest rate and a larger loan certainly determines a lender's 
position in the short- and intermediate-term credit market. 
CHAPTER 8. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the farmer-borrower's decision-making 
process in choosing between traditional and nontraditional lenders when financing short-
and intermediate-term credit. In this study, the theoretical and econometric models were 
derived to explain contract formation based on differential features of the two types of 
lenders, and contract selection based on differential characteristics of a borrower and loan 
contracts. The empirical analysis examined the impacts and incentives of various factors 
identified in the theoretical models on the farmer-borrower's choice of a lender or a loan 
contract. The corresponding implications of the empirical results provide a better 
understanding of the incentive strategies that lenders could use to motivate borrowers' 
willingness to participate. 
This study is significantly different from current and previous studies in several 
ways. First, most current studies about agricultural lenders focus only on the lending 
activities of traditional lenders, whereas this study addresses the emergence and importance 
of nontraditional lenders, especially in the agricultural non-real estate credit market. 
Second, the existing literature emphasizing nontraditional lenders' activities is limited to 
the supply side analysis of loan contracts, whereas this analysis primarily focuses on the 
farmer-borrower's perspective of credit, or demand side analysis, of the loan market. 
Third, unlike other papers, which discuss how lenders efficiently design a loan contract, 
this study examines why farmer-borrowers accept loan contracts offered by either 
nontraditional lenders or traditional lenders. The major insights gained from the 
theoretical models and empuical analyses are siramiarized as follows. 
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1. The theoretical model identifies collateralization costs, costs of funds, 
monitoring costs, and borrowers' creditworthiness as important characteristics in the 
determination of contract terms. Nontraditional lenders may possess unique economic and 
managerial features and business strategies that directly lower these costs and provide 
potential advantages to either charge a lower interest rate or reach riskier borrowers than 
can traditional lenders. The empirical results indicate that nontraditional credit users are 
less risky and are charged much lower interest rates than are traditional credit users. The 
significantly lower interest rates charged to nontraditional credit users could be attributed 
to their lower financial and operation risk and to nontraditional lenders' cross-subsidization 
advantages, lower collateralization costs, and lower monitoring costs, which is in line with 
the theory. 
2. Based on the utility maximization and discrete choice frameworks, the attributes 
of alternative loan contract packages and the socioeconomic characteristics of a 
farmer-borrower are theoretically identified in the conceptual model as significantly 
contributing to the probability of participation. In the first-stage analysis of the conceptual 
model, the importance of these factors affecting the borrower's utility formation are 
identified. In the second-stage analysis, a discrete choice model is developed to examine a 
farmer-borrower's selection of a loan contract. 
3. The estimation procedure used in this smdy is a two-stage probit estimation. 
The first stage involves estimating the loan term variables, and the second involves 
estimating the participation or decision equation. En^irically, however, the self-selection 
process may cause biased estimates of the terms of loan contracts due to the truncated 
sample. Therefore, the selectivity variables should be taken into account in the estimation 
of loan term equations. Based on this limited data, the self-selection phenomenon was 
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found to have an insignificant effect on the loan term equations in the flow approach, but 
to have a significant effect on some of equations in the stock approach. 
4. The empirical results support the conclusion that loan term differentials, 
financial measures, and borrower characteristics have significant impacts on the 
farmer-borrower's participation decision in choosing between two types of lenders in both 
the flow and stock approaches. Although the levels of significance of these variables in 
explaining incremental and accumulated borrowing activities are different, most of the 
estimated signs are consistent. Specifically, the farmer-borrower's probability of choosing 
nontraditional lenders in the flow approach is found to significantly decrease with 
collateral, interest rate, wife's education, farm size, hog farm category, and managerial 
efficiency, but to increase with loan size, cost of debt, family living expendimres, remm 
on assets, and liquidity. For the stock specification, loan size, cost of debt, family living 
expenditures, age, and leverage ratio are significantly positively related, but the interest 
coverage ratio is significantly negatively related to the probability of participation. 
5. Based on the empirical results, it appears that interest rate, loan size, and 
collateral incentives are efficient tools to increase a borrower's willingness to participate. 
Specifically, the flow approach indicates that, for nontraditional lenders, interest rate 
incentives may have a stronger effect on the probability of participation than do loan size 
and collateral incentives. For traditional lenders, all three incentives are equivalently 
influential. The stock approach, however, suggests that, regardless of the type of 
borrower, loan size incentive is the most useful instrument to motivate participation. 
Therefore, the financial loan terms play crucial roles in stimulating a farmer-borrower's 
use of nontraditional credit. 
6. Financial loan terms appear to outweigh other socioeconomic factors in 
determining contract acceptance. This conclusion provides not only some strategic insights 
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for lenders, but also some implications for policymakers. A regulation or policy should 
avoid creating unfair competitive advantages for different commercial lenders, particularly 
relating to the interest rate and loan size incentives due to their vital roles in commercial 
lenders' competition and credit activities, which further affects borrower participation in 
the short- and intermediate-term credit market. 
7. Given the shortcomings of the survey data, several variables, such as a 
borrower's collateral pledged, transaction costs, monitoring criteria and costs, reputation 
costs, and services provided by lenders, are not available to incorporate in the estimation 
process. In the absence of these variables, some insights can not be exammed through the 
above empirical results. In addition, the farmer-borrower's dynamic borrowing behavior 
and intertemporal decision can not be well examined in this smdy because no panel data 
are available. The completeness of the microdata set certainly affects the success of fiimre 
studies. Obtaining a microdata set that includes panel data, complete loan contract 
information, and the corresponding costs used for each loan contract may help in analyzing 
a farmer-borrower's decision-making process when financing operating credit. 
8. Further smdy could extend to analysis of a farmer-borrower's intertemporal 
behavior over time in theoretical and empirical smdies. Under a multiperoid framework, 
the effects of a farmer-borrower's preferences, criteria, and intertemporal decisions on 
his/her choice of a credit supplier could be better understood. Specifically, the importance 
of the quality of the business and social relationship, reputation effect, and past credit 
history on a farmer-borrower's determination of a loan contract and the relationship 
between borrowers and lenders could be examined. 
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APPENDIX A. 
DETAILED DATA 
Table A.l. Total farm debt outstanding, 1976-94 (million dollars) 
Year Real Estate Non-real Estate Total 
1976 50,495 46,504 96,999 
1978 66,707 65,339 132,046 
1979 79,703 75,561 155,264 
1980 89,692 80,968 170,660 
1981 98,788 90,481 189,269 
1982 101,809 102,200 204,009 
1983 103,182 98,464 201,646 
1984 106,697 95,519 202,216 
1985 100,077 95,121 195,198 
1986 90,408 85,753 176,161 
1987 82,398 77,132 159,530 
1988 77,634 70,636 148,270 
1989 76,351 67,105 143,456 
1990 74,138 67,606 141,744 
1991 74,597 67,853 142,450 
1992 75,639 68,402 144,041 
1993 76,015 69,339 145,354 
1994 77,236 74,819 152,055 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
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Table A.2. Real estate farm debt, by type of lender, 1976-94, (million dollars) 
Year CB FCS CFSA LIC I&O CCC TOTAL 
1976 6,075 16,881 3,311 6,826 17,258 144 50,495 
1997 6,994 19,640 3,613 8,150 19,556 492 58,445 
1978 7,717 22,686 3,746 9,698 21,712 1,148 66707 
1979 7,798 27,322 6,254 11,278 25,660 1,391 79,703 
1980 7,765 33,225 7,435 11,998 27,813 1,456 89,692 
1981 7,584 40,298 8,096 12,150 29,318 1,342 98,788 
1982 7,568 43,661 8,298 11,829 29,326 1,127 101,809 
1983 8,347 44,318 8,573 11,668 29,388 888 103,182 
1984 9,626 46,596 9,523 11,891 28,438 623 106,697 
1985 10,732 42,169 9,821 11,273 25,775 307 100,077 
1986 11,942 35,593 9,713 10,377 22,660 123 90,408 
1987 13,541 30,646 9,430 9,355 19,380 46 82,398 
1988 14,397 28,372 8,953 9,018 16,873 21 77,634 
1989 15,551 26,674 9,130 9,045 15,939 12 76,351 
1990 16,158 25,719 7,576 9,631 15,047 7 74,138 
1991 17,315 25,160 7,001 9,494 15,623 4 74,597 
1992 18,659 25,271 6,361 8,718 16,628 2 7,563 
1993 19,539 25,007 5,831 8,521 17,116 1 76,015 
1994 21,038 24,627 5,391 9,010 17,170 0 77,236 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, LIC: Life Insurance Companies, 
I&O: Individuals and Others, and CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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Table A.3. Market shares of real estate farm credit market, by type of lender, 1976-94 
Year CB FCS CFSA LIC I&O CCC TOTAL 
Percent 
1976 12.03 33.43 6.56 13.52 34.18 0.29 100.00 
1977 11.97 33.60 6.18 13.94 33.46 0.84 100.00 
1978 11.57 34.01 5.62 14.54 32.55 1.72 100.00 
1979 9.78 34.28 7.85 14.15 32.19 1.75 100.00 
1980 8.66 37.04 8.29 13.38 31.01 1.62 100.00 
1981 7.68 40.79 8.20 12.30 29.68 1.36 100.00 
1982 7.43 42.89 8.15 11.62 28.80 1.11 100.00 
1983 8.09 42.95 8.31 11.31 28.48 0.86 100.00 
1984 9.02 43.67 8.93 11.14 26.65 0.58 100.00 
1985 10.72 42.14 9.81 11.26 25.76 0.31 100.00 
1986 13.21 39.37 10.74 11.48 25.06 0.14 100.00 
1987 16.43 37.19 11.44 11.35 23.52 0.06 100.00 
1988 18.54 36.55 11.53 11.62 21.73 0.03 100.00 
1989 20.37 34.94 11.96 11.85 20.88 0.02 100.00 
1990 21.79 34.69 10.22 12.99 20.30 0.01 100.00 
1991 23.21 33.73 9.39 12.73 20.94 0.01 100.00 
1992 24.67 33.41 8.41 11.53 21.98 0.00 100.00 
1993 25.70 32.90 7.67 11.21 22.52 0.00 100.00 
1994 27.20 31.90 7.10 11.70 22.20 0.00 100.00 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, LIC: Life Insurance Companies, 
I&O: Individuals and Others, and CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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Table A.4. Non-real estate farm debt, by type of lender, 1976-94 (mUlion dollars) 
Year CB FCS CFSA I&O CCC TOTAL TOT+CCC 
1976 22,002 12,127 1,652 9,787 936 45,568 46,504 
1977 24,295 13,352 2,764 11,999 4,146 52,410 56,556 
1978 26,718 14,878 5,086 14,011 4,646 60,693 65,339 
1979 29,327 18,054 8,188 16,278 3,714 71,847 75,561 
1980 29,986 19,750 10,029 17,367 3,836 77,132 80,968 
1981 31,215 21,268 12,706 18,404 6,888 83,593 90,481 
1982 34,322 20,558 12,977 19.139 15,204 86,996 102,200 
1983 37,075 19,392 12,855 18,566 10,576 87,888 98,464 
1984 37,619 18,092 13,740 17,640 8,428 87,091 95,519 
1985 33,738 14,001 14,714 15,070 17,598 77,523 95,121 
1986 29,678 10,317 14,425 12,143 19,190 66,563 85,753 
1987 27,589 9,384 14,123 10,916 15,120 62,012 77,132 
1988 28,309 8,766 12,899 11,760 8,902 61,734 70,636 
1989 29,243 9,544 10,843 12,256 5,225 61,880 67,105 
1990 31,267 9,848 9,374 12,740 4,377 63,229 67,606 
1991 32,854 10,222 8,213 12,985 3,579 64,274 67,853 
1992 32,912 10,346 7,143 13,230 4,771 63,631 68,402 
1993 34,200 10,549 6,380 14,210 4,000 65,339 69,339 
1994 38,237 11,712 5,680 15,190 4,000 70,819 74,819 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculmre, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, I&O: Individuals and Others, and 
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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Table A.5. Market shares of non-real estate farm credit market, by type of lender, 1976-94 
Year CB FCS CFSA I&O CCC TOTAL 
Percent 
1976 47.31 26.08 3.55 21.05 2.01 100.00 
1977 42.96 23.61 4.89 21.22 7.33 100.00 
1978 40.89 22.77 7.78 21.44 7.11 100.00 
1979 38.81 23.89 10.84 21.54 4.92 100.00 
1980 37.03 24.39 12.39 21.45 4.74 100.00 
1981 34.50 23.51 14.04 20.34 7.61 100.00 
1982 33.58 20.12 12.70 18.73 14.88 100.00 
1983 37.65 19.69 13.06 18.86 10.74 100.00 
1984 39.38 18.94 14.38 18.47 8.82 100.00 
1985 35.47 14.72 15.47 15.84 18.50 100.00 
1986 34.61 12.03 16.82 14.16 22.38 100.00 
1987 35.77 12.17 18.31 14.15 19.60 100.00 
1988 40.08 12.41 18.26 16.65 12.60 100.00 
1989 43.58 14.22 16.16 18.25 7.79 100.00 
1990 46.25 14.57 13.87 18.84 6.47 100.00 
1991 48.42 15.06 12.10 19.14 5.27 100.00 
1992 48.12 15.13 10.44 19.34 6.97 100.00 
1993 49.32 15.21 9.20 20.49 5.77 100.00 
1994 51.10 15.65 7.59 20.30 5.34 100.00 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Finance Report, 1995. 
Note: CB: Commercial Banks, FCS: Farm Credit System, 
CFSA: Consolidated Farm Service Agency, I&O: Individuals and Others, and 
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation. 
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APPENDIX. B 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
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1993 Farm Finance Survey 
Information About You and Your Farm 
Q\ 
1. In what county is most of your farming operation located? 
Qz 2. What is your age? 
Q3 3. How many dependents are you supporting (including youisein? 
n Ui 
4. How many of these dependents arc under age 18? 
5. Please enter the number that corresponds with the highest level of education that 
you and your spouse have completed. 
)^fe: 1. high school 2. comm. college 3. college 4. post graduate 
Husband: 1. high school 2. comm. college 3. college 4. post graduate ^ ^  ^  
6. How many years have you been farming? 
7. During the 1992 crop year, how many acres did you: 
a. Own 
b. Rent from others O 7B 
c. Rent to others Q 7C> 
How do you describe your farming operation? (Please check one) 
Q 8 R  
a. Family or individual operation (do not include parmership 
and corporation) 
b. Partnership operation (include family partoerships) 
c. Corporation 
9. Number of households or families involved in the farming operation ^ ^  
10. Approximately what percent of your 1992 gross farm sales came fix>m each of these 
sources? 
a. Crops % 
b. Beef 
c. Pork 
d. Dairy 
e. Other farm enterprises 
TOTAL =100% 
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Credit Available for Expansion 
Despite the availability of loanable funds at banks and faim credit institutions, some 
farmers have expressed concern about the willingness of these lenders to extend credit for 
expansion or modernization of farm businesses. In this section, we ask a few questions 
about the availability of credit for expansion of your faim business. Expansion includes 
new purchases of land, facilities and intermediate assets such as machinery or breeding 
stoclL 
11. Over the past two years, since January 1991, have you ever requested financing 
from a cr^t institution to expand your farm business? 
Yes ^.. 
2. No (skip to 15) ^ 
12. Was your farm business expansion request? (check one) 
1. Completely approved ^ 
2. Partially approved ^ 
3. Was not approved (skip to 14) 
13. If your financing request was approved (completely or partially), please indicate the 
total amount borrowed and the average terms of your loan(s). 
Use of Borrowed 
Funds 
Amount Borrowed 
Since Jan. 1991 (S) CHWT; 
Average Inteicst Rate 
( % )  ( R T ^  
Aver^ Length 1 
ofLoan 1 
(years) (VR; | 
Machinery, equipment(£ 4) QI3C9 H U T  3l3<S5>Y/t 1 
Breeding livestock <9/3 B R - R T  5/7Be.YR. 1 
Livestock facilities ^ Q l 3 L V M ^ T  Q n L o a - T  an LV 
Other agricultural , 
buUdin^ Q l 3 A < i M / ^ T  Q 13 
Land S i  n  L f j  t t f i T  !2n l i J Y R  
Other (Qjy Q I 3  O T f ^ ^ T  Si 13 01 Rr Q 1^ or 1 
14. If your loan for the expansion was not approved, check all reasons that apply. 
a. Income from expansion was too variable 
b. Instiflicient documentation (budget or cash flow) 
c. Previous loss experience 
d. Insufficient cash flow 
e. Insufficient collateral 
f. Current debt levels were too high 
g. Not a profitable expansion 
h. Lack of experience with this enterprise 
i. Loan was wrong purpose for this lender 
j. Other (please indicate) 
Q VHP 
Q g 
Q 
<a iM w 
P IM J 
Q '<^3 
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15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Q A-
QvSli 
Q 
Q \ S D  
Q \36 
Q \?6 
Has inadequate financing limited the profitability or growth of your faiin business? 
Q ir 1. Yes 2. No 
Would you be willing to t^e on additional debt for expansion if your lender offered 
to make credit available? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Q \ ( »  
Please indicate the reasons why you have chosen to limit borrowing levels, (check 
all that apply) 
a. Interest rates are too high 
b. I want to maintain cash reserves 
c. I want to maintain a credit reserve 
d. Profit margins are insufficient 
e. My lender is unwilling to offer additional credit 
g. Other (Explain) 
Risk Management 
Q n3 
Q \ i c  
^ < 7  0  
Q'7^ 
Which risk management strategies do you use? Indicate the frequency with which 
you use these tools please circle) 
Frequency of Use 
Never Seldom H^of Most of Always 
a. Multiple peril crop insurance 
b. Hail insurance 
c. Hedging 
d. Forward contracting 
e. Commodity options 
f. Crop share leases 
g. Participate in govenm>ent programs 
Time Time 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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19. Please describe your crop production and insurance program for com and soybeans 
produced in 1992. 
Crop Planted Insured CHW y 
(acres) Mulriole Dcril Cnjp-Hsil 1 
(acres) (acres) | 
Com Q C.Kr^ PL Q \'\ 
Soybeans L > S3 63 l-\ SOT QI«|5o)r^L 1 
20. Please describe votir typical moltiole peril crop insurance fMPCD program 
1 Crop Average APH* 
Yieki (y; 
bu./ac. 
Coverage 
level 
(35,50,65,75%) 
Elected 
Price 
($/bu.) 
Premium y 
($/ac.)CP'^^ 
Com CCfcW) Q20CJi#/l_ aao 
1 Soybeans^ Q y Q Z a S o y L  (Si 3 . o i o y f = >  ( ^ ^ o S o y P f i \  
* APH is actual production history 
Merchant and Dealer Credit 
Some farmers are turning to institutions other than banks or the Farm Credit System for 
non-ieal estate financing. In this section we ask a few questions about your use of 
nontraditional credit suppliers such as your local coop, a farm supply fim, an equipment 
inanufacturer or a iDactwery dealer. 
21. Since January 1,1992 have you received non-real estate credit from a commercial 
souict other than a bank or tiie Farm Credit Svstem? 
1. Yes ^ 
2. No (skipto24) ^2' 
If you answered yes, please complete the following: 
Use of Credit Amount Borrowed Loan Term, 
(months)^^"^ 
Interest Rate 
% «J2T) 
Seed, fertilizer ^ Q Z I S P  Q 2 ' \ S P t ^ «  Q - z i s r a r  
F«d 
Q Z \ F O M t J T  Q T ^ l P D t ^ O  Q;iiPO (ti 
Feeder livestock Q Z I P L  H U T  S l i - I F L  S L 7  
tMO 
Machinerv. eauioment Q 21 Q V M 6 9 . T  
Grain storaee Q 'P 2-1 Gs /?-r 
i L F )  
Livestock facilities Q 2.1 LP ^^^T 
t. OTJ 
'other 02-1 OT ^3-1 OT 07 
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22. Please indicate the impoitance of the following reasons for using these 
"nontradidonal" credit suppliers. Rate each item on the five-point scale with a " 1" 
being not important and "5" being veiy important 
QZ-i- ^  
2^7^^ e. Other 
a. Easy to obtain credit 
(limited paperwork, quick approval) 
b. Compeddve interest rates 
c. Can't obtain credit elsewhere 
Not Important Very Important 
2 3 4 5 
d. Loan size restricted by bank's legal 
lending limits 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
23. 
Q Z 3 L - 0 C .  
9^3R.e<^ -
Which nontradidonal credit suppliers did you use during this period? (check all that 
apply) 
• Local coop 
Regional coop 
Private farm supply firm 
Machinery dealer . . 
Livestock contracting firm 
Othen 
24. 
B 
QPM !> 
Qjue 
PJM F 
OJH6 
Farm Income And Balance Sheet 
From your 1992 tax records (Form 1040,1040F, 1040E, and Form 4797) or 
your farm account book, please list the following information: Round to the nearest 
whole dollar. If you have a partnership or a fanilly farm corporation, please 
provide information for the entire business (the consolidated statement). 
1040 Form 
a. Total income, (line 23) 
b. Wages and salaries, (line 7) 
c. Interest and dividends, (line 8a + 8b + 9) 
d. Capital gains or losses (lines 13 + 14 + 15) 
1040F Form 
e. Gross income, (line 11) 
f. Interest expense, (Lines 23a -i- 23b) 
g. Deprcciadon (line 16) 
h. Total expenses, (line 35) 
1040E Form 
L Net cash and share rental income received from farm property. 
4797 Form 
j. Gain from sales of farm property excluding land 
(Parts I, II and III) 
171 
25. What was the approximate market value of farm and financial assets you have 
owned the past two years? (please use financial statements if available) Round to 
the nearest whole dollar. 
Jan. 1992 
a. Cash in checking, savings accounts "1 
b. Hnancial investments (CDs, mutual funds) 
O 2.5" ^  ^ ^  
c. Crops and livestock for sale 
(including CCC crops under loan) 
d. Machinery, equipment, breeding stock 
e. Land and buildings 
f. Total assets 
Jan. 1993 
Q 2 . r < - f 3  
13 
Q 
0,1  ^FIS 
26. Please list your outstanding loan balances for farm real estate and farm non-real 
estate debt by type of lender on January 1,1992 and 1993. 
Non-Real Estate Debt Real Estate Debt 
Tan. 1992 
(A'*? 3 J 
Tan. 1993 Tan. 1992 Tan. 1993 
QZ 
Ccs; 
Farm Credit Svstem QsCCifM 
SiiCsMi Q2COS B9Z 
FmHA QZCFH-^^ 
V 
TC 
Insurance Companv Sizcrf-fV 
QZClct.*il 
a Individual 
Oit 
Merchant or dealer Q 
Other loans Cincl. CCO Qifc oU r^u o 7CaLtt.fl 
Total debt p v4*fX>A/fJ QiiTOlCfi 32fcT-D 
Comments: 
Hole: If you have a question that requires an answer from the ISU 
Economics Department, please complete the following: 
I authorize Iowa Agricultural Stadstics to forward my name and address to Dr. Robert 
Jolly, ISU, Economics Department, for response to my questions. 
Name: 
Address: Iowa Date 
(Town) (Zip) 
